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Preface
Lively discussions about developing a general theory of reality are magni-
fied at the time of the emergence of new scientific theories. This situation 
occurred in the first half of the 20th century: in the natural sciences there 
appeared two fundamental theories of macro- and microcosmos: theory 
of relativity and quantum mechanics; whereas, in the formal sciences, a 
breakthrough was to be observed – among others manyvalued logic systems 
and the so-called limitation theorems were elaborated. Groundbreaking 
achievements in detailed sciences have changed the view of the world of 
natural phenomena. The mechanic image of reality was removed and in its 
place new insights into traditional problems that carried a philosophical 
charge began to be introduced. What we are referring here to is not only 
the change in the understanding of space, time or matter, the principles of 
causality, but also the development of systems distant from thermodynamic 
equilibrium and basic natural sciences research.
The testimonies of the philosophical struggle with the development of 
specific sciences and new concepts appearing in them can be, developed 
by Zygmunt Zawirski and Benedykt Bornstein, two different concepts of 
scientific metaphysics.
The subject matter of this monograph is the presentation, discussion 
and critical analysis of two selected paths leading to the development of 
scientific metaphysics, which deserve special attention due to the still valid 
research programs presented by Zawirski and Bornstein. Both studies meet 
very high standards of methodological development of a general theory of 
reality referring to the development of specific sciences, and in this respect 
can be considered as a model test for contemporary studies of this type.
In philosophical and methodological studies, Zawirski and Bornstein 
attributed a special role to mathematical and logical methods. They stood in 
the position of scientific approach to practicing philosophy, where there is 
no place to unjustified speculations and irrational elements. Both Zawirski 
and Bornstein, however, did not avoid pointing out the place for metaphys-
ical considerations in the world-dominated science. However, they did it 




such caution and diligence in practicing philosophical considerations, we 
have to deal with almost the entire period of Polish philosophy in the first 
half of the 20th century. An illustration of this situation in philosophy is 
Zawirski’s statement: “[…] work was done with great effort and success 
on displaying a whole array of detailed matters, but no great scientific syn-
thesis took place, no one was in a hurry feeling that it was still too early.”1 
Although there was an awareness of the completion of a thorough prepa-
ratory work, i.e. the work at the basis of the philosophical understanding 
of reality, there were attempts to formulate a full approach to behold the 
world around us.
Polish philosophers of the early 20th century were aware of the goals 
that philosophy has to achieve, so that the world inhabited by man would 
become better known and understood2. The specific goals that philosophy 
has to achieve were formulated by Władysław Heinrich in the pages of 
the quarterly “Kwartalnik Filozoficzny” [The Philosophical Quarterly]. 
Zygmunt Zawirski, agreeing with the understanding of philosophy given by 
Heinrich, brings a new aspect in the elaboration of philosophical synthesis 
concerning reality. The axiomatic method, which was only sporadically 
used in philosophy, was acquired in a significant way for the purpose of 
philosophical reflection on reality. All considerations in the field of natural 
sciences and ontologies should, according to Zawirski and Bornstein, take 
into account certain axioms adopted within these disciplines and thus be 
enriched by the possibility of using the axiomatic method in these studies, 
and what naturally comes from it, be able to appropriately use the results 
of the work of mathematicians and logicians.
The issue of the amazing effectiveness of mathematics in the description 
of natural phenomena has its extensive literature. The issue of mathemat-
ical natural science is one of the fundamental problems of the philosophy 
 1 Zygmunt Zawirski, O współczesnych kierunkach filozofii [On the Contemporary 
Trends in Philosophy] (Kraków: Wiedza-Zawód-Kultura, 1947), pp. 9–10.
 2 Władysław Heinrich, “Filozofia i jej zadania [Philosophy and its Tasks],” 
Kwartalnik Filozoficzny [The Philosophical Quarterly], Vol. 1 (1922), pp. 1–18; 
as well as Władysław Heinrich, “O zagadnieniach podstawowych filozofji 







of science. Generally speaking, the issue of mathematical natural science 
is closely related to the philosophical problem of intelligibility of being 
(intelligibilitatis entis). In medieval philosophy, the dominant function in 
the cognition of nature was attributed to philosophy, in particular paying 
special attention to accepted philosophical and theological assumptions, 
from the perspective of which attempts were made to evaluate natural the-
ories. In the era of modern rationalism, the situation has changed, and it 
was striving to practice philosophy in the way similar to the exact sciences.
In the 19th century, the development of modern science led to attempts 
to completely subordinate philosophy to science, which contributed to the 
frequent reduction of philosophy to the analysis of the language of sci-
ence and scientific research methods. The emerging extreme epistemolog-
ical isolationism between philosophical and natural cognition resulted in 
a neo-positivist division of opinions into scientific and metaphysical. Both 
for Zygmunt Zawirski and Benedykt Borsntein, the epistemological and 
ontological studies concerning the natural reality conducted by each of 
them, not taking into account new facts and scientific theories, lead to a 
characteristic style of philosophizing, in which commonsense intuitions are 
valued higher than the philosophical implications of scientific theories. In 
their opinion, on the one hand, the new physical theories, developed at the 
beginning of the 20th century, deserved special attention, which contrib-
uted to the mathematical and logical studies of the foundations of natural 
science; and on the other hand, the study of the foundations of mathematics 
and logic contributed to a fuller understanding of the surrounding reality 
and led to the possibilities to develop a scientific metaphysics. In this type 
of research, however, the epistemological difference between philosophy 
and natural sciences should not be blurred. Both types of cognition have 
different research methods and a separate language3. This situation, that 
methodologically orders the research, does not negate the perception of 
reality in terms of its ontological unity.
 3 Zygmunt Zawirski, “O stosunku metafizyki do nauki. Próba wytyczenia 
nowych dróg filozofii teoretycznej [On the Relation between Metaphysics and 
Science]” (the critical edition of the 1919 manuscript was prepared by Michał 





Zawirski and Bornstein, while discussing the genesis, essence and benefits 
of using the axiomatic method in deductive theories, at the same time 
present attempts to apply the axiomatic method in the study of real and 
philosophical sciences. Zawirski focuses on the introduction of the axiom-
atic method to contemporary physical theories, which through ontological 
generalization lead to a comprehensive approach to reality and describing 
it in the scientific perspective of metaphysics. In turn, for Bornstein, axi-
omatization can be subjected to the qualitative area of the natural reality 
and thus, thanks to ontological generalizations, to develop a general theory 
of being. Nevertheless, there are differences in both perspectives of reaching 
the concept of scientific metaphysics. Ontological generalizations, which 
we are dealing with in Zawirski’s works, are the approach to reality in the 
perspective of quantitative categories. At the same time, Bornstein carried 
out ontological studies based on qualitative categories.
The results that both philosophers reach – on the one hand, on the path 
of logical-natural research, and on the other hand, logical-ontological one – 
are two scientific concepts of the metaphysical image of reality, the theories 
of a generally perceived being.
The development of scientific metaphysics, proposed by Zawirski and 
Bornstein is a testimony to the struggle of native thought with fundamental 
philosophical problems concerning the scientific relationship of metaphysics 
to particular sciences and the classically understood metaphysics, as well 
as the problems of the so-called unity of the world. This monography is to 
show that both paths leading to the development of scientific metaphysics 
are still current research programs that bring tangible benefits in the natural 
and philosophical understanding of reality. In both cases, the development 
of scientific metaphysics was associated with the development of such a 
general and critical science that would give a unified theory of reality.
This study also shows the need to build a general theory of reality, 
but not on intuitively accepted assumptions, but on the basis of scientific 
assumptions, which will be discussed in more detail later. The development 
of two concepts of scientific metaphysics is intended to give new arguments 
in the debate between supporters and opponents of metaphysics. One of the 
main arguments of supporters of metaphysics is the strongly accentuated 
need to capture the totality of human knowledge in one system, which none 
of the particular sciences gives. Opponents, although many times strive for 
Preface 9
a synthesis of particular sciences and do not give up certain generalizations, 
do not go as far as metaphysical syntheses. However, they fight off the exis-
tence of separate methods of metaphysical research; they are also against 
certain hypotheses or assumptions of metaphysics that result from certain 
specific definitions of its subject, in particular regarding the principles of 
being as such. Another noteworthy issue is the fact that the opponents of 
metaphysics do not exclude hypotheses from science. While in science these 
hypotheses are a means of cognition, in metaphysics they function as the 
main goal of cognition. In spite of this significant difference regarding the 
role and significance of hypothetical factors in cognitive processes, there is 
a common area for both such opposite directions of thought, which will 
be illuminated after hearing the proposals of the scientific metaphysics of 
Zawirski and Bornstein that strongly refer to the development of  particular 
sciences.
The work Towards Scientific Metaphysics consists of two volumes. 
The first one is devoted to the philosophy of Zygmunt Zawirski and the 
second, to Benedykt Bornstein. Before I go to the elaboration and critical 
comments of both concepts of scientific metaphysics, I will outline the dis-
course regarding the legitimacy of metaphysical research that took place 
in the native academic milieu of the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries. In 
my opinion, the presentation of this issue will outline the intellectual back-
ground on which Zawirski’s and Bornstein’s concepts of scientific meta-
physics will turn out to become philosophically original shots of reality. 
This presentation will also make it possible to compare these two concepts 
with other attempts made at the time to frame a framework for metaphys-
ical research.
Outline of metaphysical research in Polish academic 
circles at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries
At the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries, the main centers of philosophical 
research were the universities in Lvov, Krakow and Warsaw. The diverse 
approaches of the partitioning powers defined the framework in which the 
intellectual life of these scientific institutions could develop. In terms of 
freedom of practicing science in the Polish language, the best was undoubt-
edly the Austrian partition, with the main centers of Lvov and Krakow.
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While discussing metaphysical research programs in the above-mentioned 
creative environments, I do not strive to fully implement this objective, 
which, however, would require separate studies. Presentation of even 
selected and developed metaphysical conceptions of the studied period is a 
good testimony that presents the maximalist aspirations to define the tasks 
and purpose of philosophy by native philosophers. It is only in this con-
text that the critical analyses of the two paths leading to a new concept of 
metaphysics referring to newly developed scientific methods, such as math-
ematical logic or methodological principles in the field of natural sciences, 
show the implementation of expectations for scientific philosophy, aiming 
at the development of a general theory of reality.
a) Criticism of positivism as the basis for restoring metaphysical issues
In the second half of the 19th century, Polish philosophy remained under 
the influence of the so-called Warsaw positivists. The growing awareness of 
the unreality of the idea of Polish romanticism, nurturing sentimentality, 
individualism, the cult of talents and the reluctance to the program of 
“organic work”, which – in the opinion of many of the people became the 
sources of the defeat of both the November and January Uprisings – con-
tributed to the development of this philosophy4. It was realized that after 
gaining the country’s independence, well-educated staff must be found to 
be able to lead the nation. The positivists proposed a scientistic orientation 
in philosophical research that refused, inter alia, the sense of metaphys-
ical inquiries and eliminated value-related judgements when establishing 
empirical facts. The proposed new program of philosophy, however, was 
not devoid of critical analyses.
One of the first attempts to criticize positivist concepts was made by 
Henryk Struve (1840–1912). The criticism also took place in the very center 
of positivism itself. Aleksander Świętochowski (1849–1938), generally 
 4 There are other opinions regarding the importance of the philosophy of Polish 
Romanticism, emphasizing its positive elements, such as, for example, its mysti-
cism and rationalism. Without going into the polemics of valuing romantic phi-
losophy, it should only be noted that it is, among others, Bolesław Józef Gawecki 
who boldly stands in the defense of the national philosophy created between the 
November Revolution and the January Uprising. See: Bolesław Józef Gawecki, 




recognized as one of the most eminent representatives of Warsaw positivists, 
who formulated the program of organic work and offered its theoretical 
justification, among others in the papers such as My i Wy (1871 – work is a 
positivistic manifesto program) and Praca u podstaw (1873), criticized the 
concept of positivism in 1876. Henryk Struve noticed that the dispute over 
the existence or lack of scientific concepts does not boil down to whether 
we objectify them or not, whether they are transcendental or not, because 
the concepts we use are common for science and metaphysics. The dispute 
is about providing such objectification to mental products that fulfill the 
conditions determined by logic or by scientific methodology5. At the same 
time, Świętochowski, in one of the papers from the Dumania pessymisty 
series, presented in the “Przegląd Tygodniowy” of 1876, showed the pow-
erlessness of empiricism, which initiated a gradual rebirth of metaphys-
ical problems. Świętochowski has shown that human knowledge based on 
experience, which is illusory and not subject to verification, has dubious 
value. Empirical knowledge closes man in the circle of his own sensory 
experiences and does not allow him to reach an objectively existing world. 
In subsequent articles, he pointed to the limited scientific knowledge, which 
does not answer any of the relevant questions about the existence of the 
world, matter, man or consciousness. He also presented the problem of 
human alienation, its deepening loneliness as a result of the development 
of a civilization functioning based on specific mechanisms that prevent the 
authenticity of contacts between people.
According to Julian Ochorowicz (1850–1917), philosophy, while gen-
eralizing data of particular sciences, at the same time unites them and 
protects them from far-reaching specialization and one-sidedness, which 
could be the cause of distortion of the real world image. Philosophy clearly 
shows that the world is a unity in diversity. Everything that exists is part 
of nature governed by general laws. The sciences investigating these issues 
should use methods of observation and experiment, appropriate for natural 
science. Ochorowicz did not accept the existence of boundaries for human 
cognition, he believed that the use of natural science methods would help 
 5 Henryk Struve, Pozytywizm i zadania krytyczne filozofii, in: Filozofia i myśl 
społeczna w latach 1865–1895: Part. 2, ed. Anna Hochfeldowa and Barbara 




one solve the problems that – at the given stage of knowledge – seem to 
be insoluble. Being a positivist, he did not accept Comte’s development of 
knowledge, that splits itself into the theological, metaphysical and positive 
phases, but he supported the abrasion of opposites, the existence of the 
dialectical right to develop reality. He believed that the binding of certain 
ideas should be associated with better adaptation to a given situation, which 
would be subject to change, causing a change in the validity of certain ideas. 
He also rejected the possibility of a philosophical synthesis of the knowledge 
of abolishing adversity. He believed that human thought oscillates between 
realism and idealism, empiricism and mysticism, and materialism and spiri-
tualism. In the process of developing thoughts, these positions become more 
critical, but their inclusion in a synthesis is impossible.
By accepting a reductionist position in philosophy, Ochorowicz pointed 
to the power subordinated to the law of evolution as the principle of unity 
in nature. Due to the fact that evolution shows the irreversibility of phe-
nomena, and the motion of matter can be reversible, therefore the world 
should not be perceived mechanically but dynamically, in this way being 
equated to the body. Without accepting mechanistic theories and not 
advocating materialism, Ochorowicz points to a dynamic principle that 
unites all reality in its diversity. He advocates dynamic monism. In the work 
Siła jako ruch6, he pointed to the discovered general law of the inverse: if 
force A transforms into force B, the reverse force B transforms into force 
A. On this law he based his research on parapsychology and used it in 
numerous inventive works7.
It should be noted that not all representatives of positivism were 
able to accept the rebirth of metaphysics. An example of this can be the 
 6 Julian Ochorowicz, “Siła jako ruch. Studium z filozofji fizyki,” Ateneum, Vol. 
3–4 (1879), pp. 538–564.
 7 Ochorowicz was quite close to the discovery of radio and television. With 
the help of the transmitters and receivers constructed by him, he transmitted 
long-distance voice waves, converting them into electromagnetic waves. His 
spectacular success was the message of the instrumental performance of the 
Marseillaise, played at the Opera in Paris, to the exhibition of the Electricity 
Exhibition in Paris in 1885. His other ideas were a harbinger of modern ecology 
and bioelectronics. See: S. Borzym, H. Floryńska, B. Skarga, A. Walicki, Zarys 






representative of the Lvov scientific community, Władysław Kozłowski 
(1832–1912), who openly advocated Comte’s views. Being also a supporter 
of Spencer’s evolution, he praised his agnosticism. At the end of the 19th 
century, he argued with Jan Władysław Dawid and Adam Mahrburg about 
the importance of psychophysical parallelism, in which he saw the danger 
of the return of metaphysics to philosophical decisions.
The scientific significance of metaphysics was also rejected by represent-
atives of neo-criticism8: Adam Mahrburg (1855–1913), Henryk Goldberg 
(1845–1915) and Marian Massonius (1862–1941)9. Henryk Goldberg in 
his work Filozofia i Wiedza (1877) refused the notion of scientific value 
in philosophy. Its meaning consists mainly in creating a synthesis of all 
skills – it organizes human experience and corresponds to the aspirations 
of human reason for synthesis in which the imagination plays a huge role. 
From this understanding of philosophy, he excluded the theory of cognition 
and logic, which he acknowledged as possessing full scientific value. Adam 
Mahrburg, on the other hand, combined the philosophical position with 
critical neo-Kantianism, thus being an attempt to analyze the assumptions 
that science takes. The results of such an analysis have contributed to the 
deepening of the positivist doctrine expressed in the cult of science and the 
naturalistic view of the world. Mahrburg adopted a position of extreme 
scientism that criticizes all the presence of metaphysical ideas in science10. 
He believed, however, that metaphysics is of great importance in expressing 
the spiritual and intellectual problems of a given epoch, creating a world 
 8 In the eighties, the growing interest in Kant (neo-Kantianism) in Poland became 
a reaction to the epistemological care of the positivists and their attempts to 
disregard the subject in cognitive acts. The result was a reformulation and deep-
ening of the positivist doctrine referring to the exact sciences, and Kant was 
treated as a modern philosopher boldly putting important and current questions 
about the boundaries of cognition, the nature of a priori elements and the legit-
imacy of metaphysics.
 9 Anna Hochfeldowa, Barbara Skarga, Filozofia i myśl społeczna w latach 1865–
1895 (Warszawa: PWN, 1980), pp. 410–505.
 10 Władysław Spasowski, Adam Mahrburg i jego poglądy na naukę i filozofię: analiza 









of ideals that are neither subject to theoretical nor empirical verification, 
but which guide the progress of humanity.
Mahrburg, being an empiricist, rejected the concepts of taking on the 
path of their hypostasis. His positivist position, however, is not uncritical. 
He states that positivism without criticism is blind. He also rightly departs 
from the concept of science as a faithful reflection of the world along with 
its regularities, which opens up the prospect of developing the theory of 
science. He does not accept the existence of “naked facts” considering that 
we come to the concept of the object of cognition as a result of the rational 
organization of the experimental material. Scientific knowledge for him 
was only an intellectual construction giving a systematic and economical 
description of the experience. In his opinion, the worked out constructions 
must not contain any contradictions between accepted assumptions and 
empirical facts. If there are contradictions, they are usually either the result 
of far-reaching specializations and lack of criticism in scientists inclined 
to absolutize the conclusions they draw; or they are caused by insufficient 
development of scientific knowledge. Mahrburg believes that constructions 
are used to explore the real world, not the invented one. Constructions must 
therefore be in accordance with experience data and allow for the prediction 
of possible effects. Each structure remains hypothetical and open, and is 
able to operate only with probable assumptions. Only formal sciences are 
systems of truths whose negation is unacceptable. In the real sciences one 
should accept a relative truth that amounts to conformity with other theses 
of a given discipline of knowledge. The intersubjective assessment of the 
results of experiments becomes important for the development of science11.
According to Marhburg, positivism was a way of thinking constantly 
present in science, but only Kant made a critical ordering of scientific 
thinking. Marhburg critically refers to the introduction of metaphysics in 
the form of practical reason, to the noumenu of metaphysical content and 
the dogmatic adoption of a priori forms of cognition, without a critical ref-
erence to their actual sources. He claimed that Kant had artificially divided 
man’s mental powers into forms of sensuality, intellect and reason. In turn, 
rational knowledge in the form of pure natural science, in the understanding 
 11 Józef F. Chwal, Metafilozofia Adama Mahrburga (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo 




of Kant, was detached from empirical sources, which, in the opinion of 
Mahrburg, let it acquire a metaphysical character.
In order to build general systems of concepts and judgments that cover 
all empirical data, Mahrburg worked out the pattern of “perfect” (i.e. excel-
lent) science, based on empirical facts and methodically developed concepts. 
Such excellent science, according to Mahrburg, is freed from all imposed 
practical and utilitarian goals. Science deals only with real things without 
evaluating them, and when it treats values, it captures them as facts present 
in human culture. He was in favor of pure scientism. He created an image 
of science that offers a systemic and coherent set of concepts and natural 
laws. There are evolutionary threads in his analyses that are not elements 
of the world image inductively derived from the observed facts of objec-
tive reality, as Ochorowicz did, but constitute an evolution theory treated 
as a heuristic principle that allows the explanation of natural phenomena.
Mahrburg warned against treating philosophy as a general system of 
human knowledge, as a synthesis of the results of research of individual 
scientific disciplines. He believed that philosophy cannot be defined because 
it depends on changes in science. However, he saw in philosophy the 
ever-present problem of the theory of knowledge. He defended scientific 
thinking, arguing that there are no metaphysical elements in it. Concepts 
such as atom, energy, force, time or space, considered metaphysical, are 
only theoretical constructs that organize the material of experience12. The 
task of philosophy is to critically and methodically develop the terms used 
in science and to study their scientific value13. At the same time, he refused 
to build scientific metaphysics. He also strongly opposed any whatsoever 
teleological explanation in science. The use of the concept of purpose makes 
sense to him only in the actions taken by man, which consist of imagining 
a specific goal and striving for it with appropriately selected means14. He 
 12 Adam Mahrburg, “Filozofia i metafizyka,” in: Poradnik dla samouków, part. 
IV (Warszawa: 1902), pp. 109–199.
 13 Adam Mahrburg, “W sprawie naukowości metafizyki,” in:  Pisma 
filozoficzne: Vol. II, ed. Władysław Spasowski (Warszawa: 1914), pp. 206–269.
 14 Adam Mahrburg, “Teoria celowości ze stanowiska naukowego. Studium 









noticed that the concept of natural selection, which was adopted in sci-
ence, is a teleological concept that facilitates explanation of biological phe-
nomena. In turn, monistic positions were accused of the abuse of the data 
of natural sciences for purely speculative purposes, in this way showing 
the contradictions inherent in these positions, which testify to their meta-
physics. Although he criticized these positions, he himself opted for the 
position of psychophysical parallelism, treating it as a purely empirical 
principle.
b) The possibilities and the necessity of metaphysics
At the beginning of the 20th century, in metaphysical inquiries, rec-
ognized as part of a professionally practiced philosophy, he tried to 
use the German tradition of inductive metaphysics by Gustav Fechner, 
Hermann Lotze, Eduard von Hartmann and Wilhelm Wundt, as well as 
neo-scholasticism initiated by Pope Leo XIII with the encyclical Asterni 
Patris from 1979. At this time in Poland we have already had a lively reflec-
tion on the essence and properties of being, made by Henryk Struve, Stefan 
Pawlicki (1839–1916), Maurycy Straszewski, Wincenty Lutosławski and 
Franciszek Gabryl. To a large extent, with the exclusion of Lutosławski 
and Gabryel, the other philosophers sought to agree on the requirements 
of empiricism with the search for answers to fundamental philosophical 
questions.
According to Henryk Struve it was the method of psychological and 
metaphysical studies he had developed for the purpose of releasing science 
to metaphysics. Struve identified logic with the theory of cognition, claiming 
that the forms of logical thinking cannot be abstracted from their content. 
Opposing pure formalism, he sought a theoretic cognitive solution to the 
problem of human abilities and ways of learning things. He sought solutions 
through experimental and rational analysis of the facts of internal and 
external experience, which he called the psychological-and-metaphysical 
method. According to Struve, when we penetrate psychological processes, 
we reveal general laws of thinking and recognize the relationships between 
these processes and the outside world. In this way, combining the subjective 
and the objective, basing upon the psychological and metaphysical method, 
we come to the scientific theory of being as the most important subject of 
philosophy.
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Struve accepted the existence of absolute conformity and parallel laws 
of thinking and the laws of nature, in which he saw the sources of truth for 
our judgments about the world15. Thus he was in favor of monism.
On the other hand, Stefan Pawlicki, resolving the issue of metaphysics 
for science, favored the total autonomy of metaphysics, believing that we 
do not need natural sciences to determine its laws. In every situation where 
metaphysics begins to use scientific data, one turns deduction into an induc-
tion, and thus metaphysics becomes physics. Moreover, the metaphysics of 
specific sciences is a completely different cognition, and therefore cannot 
settle the truth of scientific claims. Pawlicki, however, allows the possi-
bility of mutual control of the results obtained by natural sciences and 
metaphysics in these matters, where the objects of the both sciences are 
mutually converging. Such mutual control protects naturalists against false 
hypotheses and metaphysicists against unnecessary speculation16.
In turn, for Maurycy Straszewski, metaphysics is a philosophical syn-
thesis of human knowledge17. Natural sciences, included in the spirit of 
empirical criticism, in a methodical but simplified way, reveal the real 
course of phenomena and the regularities that occur between them. He 
found it impossible for people to penetrate the principles of the discovered 
order and the realities inherent in the natural sciences18. Man, however, nat-
urally strives to synthesize knowledge, which is why philosophy becomes 
for him a discipline that not only examines the theoretical foundations of 
particular sciences, but also links their results by building a synthetic image 
of the world.
 15 Stanisław Borzym, Poglądy filozoficzne Henryka Struvego (Wrocław: Zakład 
Naukowy im. Ossolińskich, 1974); See also: “Struve Henryk,” in: Filozofia 
i myśl społeczna w latach 1865–1895, ed. Anna Hochfeldowa and Barbara 
Skarga (Warszawa: PWN, 1980), pp. 148–182.
 16 “Stefan Pawlicki,” in: Filozofia i myśl społeczna w latach 1865–1895, pp. 262–
288; See also: Bronisław Dembowski, Spór o metafizykę. Główne poglądy na 
metafizykę w Polsce na przełomie XIX i XX wieku, (Warszawa: 1969).
 17 Maurycy Straszewski, “Pomysły do ujęcia dziejów filozofii w całości,” Roczniki 
Historii Filozofii Polskiej, Vol. 1 (2008), pp. 203–242.
 18 Barbara Skarga, “Antypozytywizm i obrona metafizyki,” in: Zarys dziejów 











Similarly for Wincenty Lutosławski, metaphysics was a postulate of the 
unity of knowledge, but the knowledge organized in a deductive system 
of concepts. Such developed metaphysical system is intended to have had 
a structured and internally consistent united scientific knowledge, while 
philosophical certainties and hypotheses fill in the areas of cognition that 
are not yet available to science.
Regardless of the approaches observed in professional philosophy, 
interest in various forms of metaphysics was also observed in literary and 
artistic circles. The idea of a return to metaphysics, accentuated by many 
representatives of modernism, was associated with the devaluation of the 
positivist scientist myth. Intellectual cognition, ordering the sense of expe-
rience, was treated only as part of the cognition that is available to man. 
However, among the philosophers of modernism there were also those who 
advocated the possibility of synthesis of science and metaphysics. These 
philosophers include Edward Abramowski with his experimental meta-
physics and Stanisław Ignacy Witkiewicz.
Witkiewicz advocates the symbiosis of metaphysics and science. 
Defending the science of metaphysics, he took as a starting point a descrip-
tion of the necessary laws of material existence, a problem that combines 
science and metaphysics. In the work Pojęcia i twierdzenia implikowane 
przez pojęcie istnienia19, he presented a method of practicing metaphysics 
that is neither extremely pure speculation nor extremely empirical science. 
On the one hand, the scientific practice of metaphysics is not deprived of 
the possibility of metaphysical speculation, and he solicited this opportu-
nity by opposing Carnap and Russell, representatives of scientific philos-
ophy, and on the other hand, he criticized speculative philosophers for too 
much departure from science20. In the work Zagadnienia psychofizyczne, 
he described himself as a scientific metaphysician who, by reaching to 
 19 Stanisław Ignacy Witkiewicz, Pisma filozoficzne i estetyczne. O idealizmie i 
realizmie: “Pojęcia i twierdzenia implikowane przez pojęcie istnienia” i inne 
prace filozoficzne, Vol. III, ed. Bohdan Michalski (Warszawa:  Państwowy 
Instytut Wydawniczy, 1977).
 20 Krzysztof Kościuszko, Stanisława Ignacego Witkiewicza spór o naukową 






empiricism, tries to interpret the achievements of modern physics with the 
help of the assumptions of biological monadology.
Witkiewicz spoke in favor of using the axiomatic method in metaphysics, 
resulting in a real description of the world. Considering material existence, 
we recognize, in Witkiewicz’s opinion, a reality disintegrating into two 
kinds of existence: soul and body, consciousness and matter. This duality 
is an expression of the duality of worldviews: idealism and materialism. 
The proper task of metaphysics is to try to understand the relation of con-
sciousness to nature, therefore by eliminating the impossible assumptions, 
we come to the necessary basic notions and theorems. On the basis of these 
concepts and theorems, we determine the necessary primary views and their 
mutual relations, and strive to capture these views into a consistent and 
unified system that preserves the recognized duality of existence.
On the other hand, Mścisław Wartenberg and Witold Rubczyński are 
among the professional philosophers who deal with metaphysics and 
defend its scientific character. Mścisław Wartenberg, in his work Obrona 
metafizyki21, while making an attempt to critically approach the Kantian 
impossibility of practicing metaphysics and carrying out the analysis of the 
concept of causality, worked out the so-called hypothetical metaphysics. 
Wartenberg noted that the opponents of metaphysics accept the non-
verifiability of metaphysical sentences. On the other hand, those who deal 
with science strive to concentrate their research on the so-called pure expe-
rience. According to Wartenberg, this procedure is not correct, since neither, 
as demonstrated by metaphysics, it is a collection of only our beliefs, i.e. 
it does not only refer to the achievements of particular sciences, nor there 
is any possibility of such experience that would be free of non-empirical 
elements.
While presenting the question of the relationship between science and phi-
losophy, Wartenberg notes that science cannot free itself from metaphysical 
assertions, which should be treated as legitimate hypotheses as long as they 
remain consistent with reality and contribute to its explanation. What is 
more, scientific hypotheses are not different from metaphysical hypotheses, 





because in both cases their validity cannot be resolved by the so-called 
pure experience, but by what he defines as the “tribunal of reason”. In 
Wartenberg, metaphysics is to closely correspond with the beings of a truly 
existing reality, and although metaphysical claims are accepted at a higher 
level of abstraction, they should always refer to science and to empiricism.
In turn, according to Witold Rubczyński, there existed and will always 
exist mutual relations between the detailed sciences and philosophy, which 
is why on the basis of the results of scientific research, it is possible to build 
a properly ordered whole of all things22. The synthesis of the whole of the 
universe, the general view of the world, cannot, however, be supported by 
the theoretical achievements of specific sciences only, but must reach for 
elements that do have their practical character, in this way justifying the 
existence of a world of values.
The presentation, the outline of the discussion on the legitimacy of meta-
physical research, allows us to note that in the national philosophy of the 
turn of the 19th and 20th centuries the attempts on the construction of 
such metaphysics was undertaken, as well as that the assumptions of sci-
entific metaphysics were pointed out which, during a period of turbulent 
scientific progress and the creation of a number of new physical theories, 
would satisfy the nascent expectations for getting a full and comprehensive 
understanding of reality. In this context, in my opinion, it was Zygmunt 
Zawirski and Benedykt Bornstein who took the most prominent positions, 
able to fulfil these expectations. The choice is dictated here to show how 
Zawirski, in accordance with the program of the Lvov-Warsaw School, 
developed the concept of scientific metaphysics in the context of research 
on the philosophy of nature and natural sciences. In turn, Bornstein, who 
did not belong to this school, while applying high standards of ontolog-
ical research methodology in the context of algebraic logic and quality 
geometry, developed ontological theory of reality, a general theory of being, 
i.e. scientific metaphysics.
 22 Witold Rubczyński, Stosunek filozofii do nauk szczegółowych (Kraków; 
Towarzystwo Filozoficzne w Krakowie, 1911); See also, by the same 
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The works undertaken in the field of logic, methodology and philosophy 
of science, and in particular the philosophy of nature and natural science 
testify to a solid preparation for the fundamental task of developing con-
temporary scientific philosophy. The emerging mathematical natural science 
did not have those possibilities that emerged in the 20th century and which 
Zawirski used. In the development of scientific metaphysics, he took into 
account both the achievements of modern logic and mathematics as well as 
physics. Zawirski builds scientific metaphysics by referring to empiricism, 
to broadly understood experience. Modern metaphysics should meet high 
standards of precision and uniqueness, which is why Zawirski attempts to 
apply the axiomatic method to both the analysis of the theory of physics 
and the scientific metaphysics.
The study of the concept of scientific metaphysics aims not only to show 
the historical importance of the achievements of native philosophy, but 
above all to pay attention to their timeliness. Conducted research on phi-
losophy and the general theory of reality developed within its framework 
are to show how this project proposed by Zawirski was implemented by 
him, and to what extent it is still valid, due to the continuous development 
of natural science.
The first volume consists of three parts. In the first one, I discuss the 
most important areas of Zawirski’s colloquial research, highlighting many 
detailed issues that particularly demonstrate a very good knowledge of not 
only the ongoing methodological discussion outside of Poland, but also a 
very good knowledge of physical theories: relativity theory and quantum 
mechanics. Reflecting on the second law of thermodynamics, Zawirski 
developed the concept of time cycles, which is now one of the basic concepts 
of understanding the history of the Universe. Zawirski also notices that 
the content of new physical theories changes the understanding of many 
scientific concepts such as: causality principle, space, time, irreversibility of 
natural phenomena, etc. The leading issue, which Zawirski studies, is the 
possibility of applying the axiomatic method to the analyses of particular 
sciences. Zawirski was undoubtedly the first philosopher who used the 




When presenting the first part one cannot forget about Zawirski’s impor-
tant achievements in the field of logical and methodological research. 
Zawirski developed many-valued logic, which he tried to use to develop 
quantum mechanics. In turn, the analysis of the results of methodological 
research is important because they have become recognized as permanently 
useful for the achievements of the philosophy of science. At the end of the 
first part we will go to the central issue of the two-volume monograph – the 
scientific metaphysics developed by Zawirski. At this point, I will discuss 
Zawirski’s views on the relation of scientific metaphysics to particular sci-
ences and classical metaphysics and his position on the possibility of devel-
oping a synthesis of particular sciences.
In the second part, the previously discussed detailed problems of 
Zawirski’s philosophy will be subjected to critical analysis, taking into 
account parallel discussions in Polish academic circles. Confronting the 
results of Zawirski’s research with other methodological proposals and 
positions in the field of the possibility of synthesis of particular sciences 
and the development of scientific metaphysics, it will be possible to eval-
uate all of his scientific achievements and show them significantly for 
contemporary research. In this part we put a lot of questions-problems 
for which we will seek answers. We will be interested in the following 
issues: how and – if yes – whether all the results of Zawirski’s research in 
logic and methodology are in line with important scientific achievements? 
Is and – if yes – to what extent the building of scientific metaphysics 
can be recognized as a current research program? How much is the axi-
omatization of scientific theories still an important research venture? To 
what extent is it possible to build scientific metaphysics as a deductive 
system? Answers to the above questions will serve to compare the sci-
entific results and scientific conception of metaphysics worked out by 
Zawirski with the results of scientific research of Benedykt Bornstein in 
the quest for the elaboration of an algebraic and geometric concept of 
scientific metaphysics.
In the third part, so as to document Zawirski’s research route, I will 
present some of his works from the most interesting areas of logic, meth-
odology and meta-philosophy.
When analyzing Zawirski’s results of scientific research, it should be 
stated that he was a philosopher with a broad spectrum of interests in the 
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philosophical assumptions and consequences resulting from the develop-
ment of natural sciences. So as to arrive at a more complete illustration 
of his scientific involvement, I have made up my mind to present his bio-
graphical data below. This is important because it allows me to show – in 
the form of a critical analysis – many of his achievements and stages of the 
research carried out by him.
From the biography of Zygmunt Zawirski
Zygmunt Michał Zawirski was born on September 29, 1882 in Podolia in 
Berezowica Mała next to Zbaraż and died on April 2 in Końskie23. He was 
a son of Józef and Kamila Zawirska. Zygmunt Zawirski was a better than 
average learner24 in the 3rd Gymnasium in Lvov from 1893 till 1901. From 
1901 till 1906 he studied at the Philosophical Faculty of Jan Kazimierz 
University in Lvov, his mentor being Professor Kazimierz Twardowski 
(1866–1938). During his studies he also attended other lectures delivered, 
among others, by Mścisław Wartenberg (1868–1938) on issues concerning 
metaphysics after Kant and Witold Rubczyński (1864–1938) on history 
of Greek philosophy. He also studied mathematics, physics and philos-
ophy in Berlin (1910) and in Paris (1910). During his Berlin studies he 
attended the lectures delivered by Carl Stumpf, Georg Simmel and Alois 
Adolf Riehl.
In 1904 Zygmunt Zawirski became one of the founder members of the 
Polish Philosophical Society, originally founded by Kazimierz Twardowski 
in Lvov. He was granted the PhD degree in philosophy in July 1906 on 
the basis of his work entitled O modalności sądów, which was written 
under Professor Twardowski’s supervision. Zawirski belonged to the 
 23 Zygmunt’s father, Józef Zawirski (actually Jan Gieysztor-Buchowiecki) after the 
collapse of January Uprising hid himself under the assumed name in the Austria-
Hungarian Part of the partitioned country. Zygmunt’s mother née Strońska 
got married to Józef Zawirski in 1869. They had 10 children. Zygmunt was 
their seventh child. Zygmunt’s nephew was Jerzy Kalinowski (1916–2000), a 
professor of philosophy at the Catholic University in Lublin.
 24 See: Michał Sepioło: Zygmunt Zawirski (1882–1948). Bibliografia, in: Zygmunt 
Zawirski, O stosunku metafizyki do nauki, (Warszawa: Wydział Filozofii i 







first generation of Twardowski’s students. Therefore, he is recognized by 
historians of philosophy as a co-founder of the famous The Lvov-Warsaw 
School (LWS).
After his graduation, he first (up till Septemebr 1906) began to work 
in the 4th Gymnasium25 in Lvov: since 1907 commenced his career as 
a teacher of philosophy, mathematics and physics in Gymnasium no.2 
in Rzeszów. In January 1911, having completed his studies in Berlin and 
Paris, he started teaching in Gymnasium no.3 in Lvov. He also started 
to cooperate with a journal titled “Ruch Filozoficzny” and wrote many 
reports on books and reviews appearing in renowned French and German 
philosophical magazines such as “Revue Philosophique de la France et 
de L’étrange”, “Revue de Métaphysique et de Moral” and “Archiv für 
Geschichte der Philosophie”. Apart from his reporting activities, he par-
ticipated actively in the meetings of the Polish Philosophical Society in 
Lvov, presenting many papers developed in the form of scientific articles 
or more advanced writings. Zawirski achieved the first prize in the 3rd 
competition of “Przegląd Filozoficzny” in 1912 on the basis of his work 
entitled Przyczynowość a stosunek funkcjonalny. Studium z zakresu teorii 
poznania. In this work he demonstrated that it is impossible to reduce 
completely the notion of causality to the notion of functionality.
The period of the World War I resulted in a one-year-long gap in the 
scientific activity of Polish researchers. At that time Zawirski had left Lvov 
and returned in 1915 only to intensify his scientific activity. The subject of 
his interest included the following problems: hypothesis of constant returns 
of all-matters, inductive metaphysics, relations between metaphysics and 
science, detailed issues from logic and their significance in mathematical 
and natural research. The research conducted by him had an impact on the 
development of his opinions that were later expressed in the paper entitled 
Refleksja filozoficzna nad teorią względności (1920), and the following 
treaties:  Relatywizm filozoficzny i fizykalna teoria względności (1921) 
and Metoda aksjomatyczna a przyrodoznawstwo (1923), which were the 
 25 A gymnasium was at that time a type of school with a strong emphasis on aca-




products of earlier written, but unpublished, writings such as O stosunku 
metafizyki do nauki (1919) and Nauka i metafizyka (1920).
Since 1922, till 1928, he used to be lecturing at Politechnika Lwowska, 
leading courses in logic, logic basis of mathematics as well as the courses 
dealing with natural history, theory of deduction, history of philosophy 
and psychology. One year later he also started delivering lectures at the 
National School of Pedagogy, improving his educational experience and 
skills as an academic teacher. He combined his didactic with his scientific 
activity.
During the 1st Polish Philosophical Convention (Lvov 1923), so 
as to share the research he used to carry out as well as the results con-
cerning the implementation of axiomatic method applied in the history of 
nature, he presented a paper entitled Współczesne próby aksjomatyzacji 
przyrodoznawstwa matematycznego i ich znaczenie filozoficzne. In the same 
year he wrote a thesis entitled Metoda aksjomatyczna a przyrodoznawstwo 
and presented it to Władysław Heinrich (1869–1957). This work became 
the basis to initiate the proceedings for the qualification as a university 
professor at the Jagiellonian University, which was completed in 1924 with 
the defence of his postdoctoral thesis entitled The Relations between Many-
valued Logic and Probability Calculus (A Habilitation Lecture).
In the period between 1928 and 1936, Zawirski began to cooperate 
with the University of Poznań. Professor Władysław Mieczysław Kozłowski 
(1858–1935) had retired and Zawirski was appointed a lecturer for the 
courses in the theory and methodology of sciences at the Humanistic 
Faculty; since August 1, 1929, he began his work as an associate professor 
at the Faculty of Mathematics and the History of Science. The classes led 
by Zawirski had a good reputation among students. He was interested in 
students’ access to the basic philosophical works which were the subjects 
of his lectures and seminars. Then, he gathered valuable literature in his 
department, which was destroyed by the Nazis during the World War 
II. During his seminars, his students read such seminal works as Hume’s 
Badania dotyczące rozumu ludzkiego [Research Concerning Human Mind] 
or Hilbert’s Theoretische Logik. During his lectures, Zawirski focused on 
the philosophical problems of the history of nature, basic problems of 
mathematics, issues of epistemology as well as the theory of classes and 
oncoming relations.
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Zawirski got in close touch with his master, Kazimierz Twardowski, in 
the period of his activity at the University of Poznań. He used to send him 
his reports and/or reviews of books for the periodical “Ruch Filozoficzny” 
edited by Twardowski. He also gave lectures during the meetings of the 
Poznań Society of Friends of Sciences, which were later summarized in the 
PTPN Summaries. He participated in the 7th International Congress of 
Philosophers in September 1930 in Oxford where he presented his paper 
entitled On Indeterminism in Quantum Physics, published in the PTF 
Visitor’s Book (1931).
The period of work for the University of Poznań is the most important 
stage in his scientific life. His work entitled L’évolution de la notion du 
temps was awarded the first and very prestigious prize in the Rignan’s 
competition in 1933, announced by the Italian magazine “Scientia”. This 
report was published only in 1936 by the Publishing House of the Polish 
Academy of Skills and Sciences, but earlier it had been summarized in the 
magazine “Scientia”. His work was not translated into Polish in 1936. 
Therefore, its Polish summary entitled Rozwój pojęcia czasu was published 
in “Kwartalnik Filozoficzny” in the same year.
Zawirski was nominated as a full professor in 1934. He stayed two years 
more at the Faculty of Mathematics and Natural Sciences where he was 
the Dean and the Chair of the Department of Theory and Methodological 
Sciences, being an active member of scientific life internationally. He par-
ticipated in the 8th International Philosophical Congress in Prague (1934) 
and presented a paper entitled Znaczenie logiki wielowartościowej dla 
poznania i związki jej z rachunkiem prawdopodobieństwa. He also partic-
ipated in the 9th Congress in Paris in 1934 and presented a paper entitled 
O stosunku logiki wielowartościowej do rachunku prawdopodobieństwa. 
In the same year he welcomed members of the International Convention of 
Thomistic Philosophy held in Poznań instead of absent Michał Sobecki, the 
President of the Poznań Philosophical Society. Zawirski also participated in 
the 1st (Paris, 1935) and the 2nd (Kopenhagen, 1936) Congress of Scientific 
Philosophy where he presented a paper entitled O zastosowaniach logiki 
wielowartościowej w przyrodoznawstwie. He participated in the 3rd Polish 
Philosophical Convention in Cracow in 1936, where he presented a paper 
entitled W sprawie syntezy naukowej.
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Nearby the end of his scientific work at the University in Poznań, he was 
awarded an honorary doctorate by the University of Poznań and the Faculty 
of Mathematics and Natural Sciences on November 12, 1936 and accepted 
it on November 18, 1936 from President Ignacy Mościcki.
He was asked by Władysław Heinrich in 1935 to chair the faculty 
after Tadeusz Grabowski (1869–1940). Zawirski accepted it and as a full 
professor he started his work since January 1, 1937 at the Philosophical 
Faculty. Later, after its division, he worked at the Faculty of Mathematics 
and Natural Sciences. In the period between 1938 and 1939 as well as 
between 1945 and 1946 he was the Dean of this Faculty.
He took over the editorial office of the “Kwartalnik Filozoficzny” after 
Władysław Heinrich in 1936. In the period between 1938 and 1945, he 
was the President of Cracow Philosophical Society and gave papers entitled, 
among others, O działalności naukowej prof. Kazimierza Twardowskiego 
(1938) and Materializm dialektyczny a logika matematyczna (1947). He 
gave two lectures at the University in Bucharest in 1938 entitled Science and 
Philosophy and On the Notion of Time. In the period between 1938 and 
1941 he worked on Słownik filozoficzny, following the model presented 
in Schmidt’s Taschenbuch der Begriff und Denker (1934) and Thormeyer’s 
Teubners kleine Fachwӧrterbücher – 1930. Unfortunately, the censorship 
stopped the printing of the dictionary copies in 1948. A manuscript of this 
dictionary survived in the Polish Academy of Sciences Archives and only 
some terms were published in “Przegląd Filozoficzny – Nowa Seria” (1993).
The Nazis pacifist action “Sonderaktion Krakau” against the Polish 
researchers and scientists took place on November 6, 1939. Zawirski was 
outside Cracow on this very day and due to it he barely avoided trans-
portation to the Nazi concentration camp in Sachsenhausen. During the 
World War II he participated in the clandestine academic teaching. After 
World War II he was a full professor at the Jagiellonian University. He was 
appointed a chairperson of the Cracow Philosophical Society since 1945.
Zawirski was very active in the scientific life in the period between 1945 
and 1948. At that time his works were published as the result of his long 
standing research. Some of them were, for example: Geneza i rozwój logiki 
intuicjonistycznej (1946), O współczesnych kierunkach filozofii (1947). 
When traveling to Zakopane to take part in the Philosophical Conference 
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in winter 1947, a luggage with two manuscripts: O metodzie naukowej and 
manuscript of Patristic Monography26 were stolen from him.
Zawirski prepared a written speech for the 10th International 
Philosophical Congress in Amsterdam in 1948, but unfortunately he did 
not manage to present it. First of all the works of the manuscript recon-
struction, and the work undertaken that year, overstrained his organism, 
moving toward an unexpected catastrophe. Zawirski died suddenly at his 
son Kazimierz’s home in Końskie.
Zawirski’s students
Zygmunt Zawirski by his didactic and scientific work inspired many Polish 
logicians and philosophers. The following students, among others, wrote 
their diploma works under his guidance or worked in these fields: Józef 
Maria Bocheński (1902–1995), Andrzej Grzegorczyk (1922–2014), 
Zygmunt Spira (1911–1942?) and Roman Suszko (1919–1979) and he 
was closest to the last two ones.
Admittedly, Józef Bocheński, listed above, did not write any work under 
Zawirski’s supervision. However, being a student in Gymnasium no. 4 in 
Lvov, before he graduated from it in 1910, he had participated in Zawirski’s 
maths lessons. Bocheński describes Zawirski in Wspomnienia as a pas-
sionate teacher, who can be easily put into contemplative reflections. It can 
be assumed that Bocheński’s interests into mathematics and logics were 
born during Zawirski’s lessons. The second student, mentioned above, 
Andrzej Grzegorczyk, studied at clandestine classes at the University of 
Warsaw. He completed his studies in 1945 at the Jagiellonian University 
achieving an MA degree in philosophy and defending his work on 
Leśniewski’s ontology and Kotarbiński’s reizm under Zawirski’s super-
vision. However, in the following years, in the period between 1946 and 
1948, Grzegorczyk was Władysław Tatarkiewicz’s assistant and secretary 
of “Przegląd Filozoficzny”.
Zygmunt Spira was interested in the natural history sciences, method-
ology and metaphysics. As a twenty-year-old student of the Jagiellonian 
 26 Roman Ingarden in the work Wspomnienia o prof. Zawirskim (1948) wrote 





University, he wrote a letter to Albert Einstein in 1931, asking him about 
the relations between the theory of relativity and some of Berkeley’s and 
Kant’s concepts. When answering the question, Einstein explained that the 
notion of relativity got the physical meanings only when, after one’s having 
sought philosophical inspirations, one could find them in Leibniz’s or 
Mach’s works. Spira wrote his PhD dissertation at the Faculty of Philosophy 
at the Jagiellonian University under Zawirski’s supervision. He published 
his first article entitled Mechanistyka ewolucyjna Kanta w świetle jego 
przedkrytycznej metafizyki in “Kwartalnik Filozoficzny” 14(1937). He was 
interested in methodology and theory of learning presented in Carl Popper’s 
work titled Logik der Forschung. A result of the research done by Spira was 
a work entitled Uwagi nad metodologią i teorią poznania Poppera unpub-
lished during his life time. The first part of this work was published in 1946 
in “Kwartalnik Filozoficzny”. The second part vanished in the backstreets 
of the Cracow ghetto in 1942. Spira was a well-promising philosopher; 
however, the events of World War II made him share the fate of the Cracow 
Jews – he found himself in the ghetto where he died.
Roman Suszko is one of the most outstanding professionals of Polish 
logics. He began his studies in Poznań in 1937 and completed them at the 
clandestine classes in Cracow in 1945 under the direction of Zygmunt 
Zawirski. He wrote his MA work entitled Dorobek logiki polskiej on logics, 
and became Zawirski’s youngest assistant running Zawirski’s designed 
seminars in philosophy at the Jagiellonian University. He arrived in Poznań 
in 1946 and worked for the Department of Theory and Methodology of 
Sciences led at that time by Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz. He gave lectures on 
mathematical logics. He defended his PhD work in 1948 based on the 
systems of axioms and the theory of definitions written under the supervi-
sion of Ajdukiewicz and published in “Kwartalnik Filozoficzny” in a series 
of two papers. The first one was entitled O analitycznych aksjomatach i 
logicznych regułach and the second one had the title Z teorii definicji (both 
parts, when translated into English, appeared in the book entitled: On 
Analytical Axioms and Logical Principles. From Theory of Definition 
published by Polskie Towarzystwo Przyjaciół Nauk, Poznań 1949). In this 
dissertation he offered a general theory of definitions for elementary sys-
tems. He also defended his post-doctoral thesis entitled Canonic axiomatic 
system, which appeared in “Studia Philosophica” 4(1949/1950) in 1951.
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He has worked at the Faculty of Philosophy at the University of Warsaw 
where he achieved a degree of associate professor in 1959. His important 
scientific achievements include works from such areas as the theory of 
models and the theory of consequences, which appeared in the volume 
entitled Sentential Logics (1958), and which had an impact on the devel-
opment of the paradigm that created one’s possibility to enter the realm 
of metalogic. He was one of the first logicians in the world who used the 
theory of models to investigate problems beyond mathematics. Suszko used 
this theory in the analysis of the development of cognition and the formal 
logics used in this research named diachronic formal logics.
The most important Suszko’s achievement was the form of logics devel-
oped by him, later named non-Fregean Logic. The logic is a generalization 
of the classical logics. Its particular example is the classical calculation of 
sentences and predicates, valued completion of Łukasiewicz’s logics and 
some modal logics. Considering its extensionality and dual value, it should 
be stated that non-Fregean logics is the weakest one, while the classical 
logics is the strongest one.
* * *
Zawirski left behind a rich philosophical heritage, which until now have 
not been fully critically examined. Without undertaking such a maximal 
task, I will only pay attention to his attempts to develop scientific meta-
physics, referring to the results of scientific research obtained in the first 
half of the 20th century, which remains a valid and important contribution 
to the understanding of the natural reality we are surrounded by.
Part One:  The philosophy of Zygmunt 
Zawirski
1  Philosophy of natural science and the philosophy of nature
Zawirski was interested in the development of natural sciences and modern 
mathematics. While trying to answer the questions stated and/or the philo-
sophical matters discussed at that time, he has left many original works in some 
ways connected to one of these theories. In his numerous works, Zawirski 
presented new philosophical implications derived from these theories.
1.1  Axiomatization of deductive theories
The axiomatization of deductive theory is the last stage of its development27. 
The axiomatic method does not increase the content of theory. For deduc-
tive reasoning, it is completely out-of-question whether what you deduce 
from is something obvious or not. Whether or not a given assertion is an 
axiom is determined by whether it can be proved by other existing axioms. 
Deductive reasoning based on principles which often obviously contradict 
one another may turn out to be an extremely important scientific achieve-
ment, as evidenced by the existence of non-Euclidean geometries28. It is also 
 27 According to Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz, each deductive science goes through three 
stages in its development: the stage of preaxial intuition, axiomatic intuition 
and the stage of axiomatic abstraction. See: Ajdukiewicz Kazimierz, Logika 
pragmatyczna (Warszawa: PWN, 1975), pp. 181–192. By deductive theory, 
Ajdukiewicz understands the deductive system of sentences A as “[an] ordered set 
of sentences Z, which except sentences A contain only sentences T, deductively 
derived from sentences earlier in this set Z, and sentences D being definitions”. 
See: Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz, “Metodologiczne typy nauk,” in: Język i poznanie, 
Vol. I, ed. Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz (Warszawa: PWN, 1985), p. 292.
 28 Studies of the basics of non-Euclidean geometries were exhaustively carried out 
in 1899 by Hilbert in Grundlagen der Geometrie. The main merit of Hilbert’s 
work is that for the first time in the construction of the axiomatic system he 
was able to distinguish the mathematical and logical aspect from the epistemo-
logical foundations of geometry (demonstrative-spatial views). By the axiom-
atic method, Hilbert understands research activities aimed at separating certain 
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not unusual that science often deviates from the ordinary meaning of collo-
quial speech, creating its own language and its own symbolism.29 According 
to Zawirski, some extreme formalizations of deductive theories may lead 
to absurdity, when it is demanded not only to forget what the individual 
symbols mean and remember only about the rules of the existing counting 
procedures, but also when it is declared that the symbols we operate have no 
meaning. In such situations, we have to do with misunderstandings, because 
by appropriate selection of axioms we create a certain type of objects that 
we deal with in a given deductive theory, and the meaning of the symbols 
we use each time boils down to existing axiomatic relations30.
Understanding the essence of the axiomatic method in the theory of 
deduction can be expressed in three important areas of its application. First 
of all, the set of basic concepts and principles must be complete, which 
means that it cannot lack anything that would be needed to derive theorems 
of the theory and at the same time there cannot be anything that would 
have an effect on the theorems of a given theory. Only the set of axioms 
with the basic concepts introduced in them should define the subject of a 
given deductive theory. Second, the axioms do not have to be obvious; on 
the contrary, they can express something incompatible with the segment 
of obviousness. Thirdly, the terms or symbols we use do not have to have 
an understandable intuitive sense31.
and showing that the system of axioms, because of any sentences about the 
objects of a given deductive theory, is complete and non-contradictory. Such 
determination of the axiomatic method, according to Zbigniew Jordan, remains 
true to the ancient understanding of Plato’s axiomatic method. See: Zygmunt 
Jordan, O matematycznych podstawach system Platona. Z historii racjonalizmu 
(Poznań: Poznań Society of Friends of Sciences, 1937), pp. 180–183.
 29 This is the situation we had at the beginning of the formation of European 
science at the moment of the demythologization of nature made by ancient 
Greeks. See, for example: Olaf Pedersen, Konflikt czy symbioza? Z dziejów 
relacji między nauką a teologią. Trans. Wodzimierz Skoczny (Tarnów: Publisher 
Biblos, 1997), pp. 32–37.
 30 Zygmunt Zawirski, “Metoda aksjomatyczna a przyrodoznawstwo,” Kwartalnik 
Filozoficzny [The Philosophical Quarterly], Vol. 1, No. 4 (1923/1924), p. 514.
 31 Similar to Zawirski, Russell also accepts the meaning of the axiomatic method; 
moreover, while characterizing pure mathematics, Russell states: “Thus mathe-
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According to Zawirski, the axiomatic method leads to the demarcation 
of the formal and logical side of cognition from the overall epistemological 
basis. The use of the axiomatic method is not strictly connected either with 
the obviousness of the adopted principles or with the intuitive meaning of 
the terms used. In Zawirski’s opinion32, the use of the axiomatic method 
is not at the same time a symptom of disregarding the intuitive sources of 
our cognition, without which science would not have arisen at all. What’s 
more, the results that this method leads to cannot be affected by some epis-
temological issues, such as the nature of the courts of mathematics.
The axiomatization of deductive theories brings definite benefits33. One 
of them is the search for an arrangement of axioms, which remains related 
to the search for those properties of objects on which the deductive theory 
really rests. These searches lead to a deeper penetration into the essence of 
a given theory. Another advantage of using the axiomatic method remains 
its role as an economic measure in our thinking34. The axiomatic method 
makes it possible to transfer whole theories from one domain to another, 
if both these theories have the same group of axioms. We save the time 
needed to carry out the evidence of the theorems of the second theory35. 
Moreover, axioms of a certain deductive theory can be used to obtain the 
axioms of a new theory, or by rejecting certain axioms, thus creating more 
general theories, or by denying certain axioms and introducing in their place 
axioms contrary to the first. An example of the first type can be projection 
geometry in relation to metric geometry, and an example of the second 
type – non-Euclidean geometries originating from Euclidean geometry36.
about, nor whether what we are saying is true”. Quotation after: Zawirski, 
Metoda aksjomatyczna a przyrodoznawstwo, p. 513.
 32 Zawirski, Metoda aksjomatyczna a przyrodoznawstwo, pp. 514–515.
 33 Zawirski, Metoda aksjomatyczna a przyrodoznawstwo, pp. 515–521.
 34 Joachim Metallmann, Zasada ekonomii myślenia, jej historia i krytyka 
(Warszawa: Towarzystwo Naukowe Warszawskie, 1914).
 35 More on this subject, see Zygmunt Janiszewski, “Podstawy geometrii,” 
in: Poradnik dla samouków (Warszawa: 1914).
 36 The equations of non-Euclidean geometries approach asymptotically to the 
formulas of Euclidean geometry as some boundary values. The Euclidean space 
has a zero curvature, and the non-Euclidean curve has a curvature different 
from zero. It can, therefore, be assumed that Euclidean geometry is contained 
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The axiomatic method can be used as a reliable heuristic agent in scien-
tific research. An example of this can be the introduction of completely new 
concepts to the theory of deduction. Instead of looking for a set of axioms 
and concepts that are already ready for a given theory, one can look for 
new concepts that satisfy certain conditions, i.e. adopted axioms.
At the beginning of the 20th century, it became obvious that some of the 
natural sciences constitute the area of applied mathematics. If the methods 
of mathematical research are deepened by their axiomatization, it has to 
affect the natural sciences themselves. The axiomatic method, as Zawirski 
notes, is applicable to natural research, for which it is not indifferent what 
a reason is, or how to observe phenomena. The observation concerns an 
accurate quantitative measurement, and the reason is nothing more than 
an expression of certain solid quantitative relations between facts. The laws 
of nature, that express constant relationships of consequences and con-
temporaneity, must be checked if only they contain hypothetical elements. 
In addition, we strive to ensure that the laws of nature can be linked to a 
system free of contradictions, giving the opportunity to develop a unified 
scientific theory. In the natural sciences, therefore, attempts are made to 
link newly observed facts with existing ones.
Zawirski assumes that the inductive method of empirical sciences, con-
stituting an inversion of deduction used by mathematics, has significance 
only for heuresis. In the natural sciences, we create a systematic system of 
acquired messages, which is based on a deductive course, as illustrated by a 
concrete empirical theory, in which general laws result in specific laws, and 
from them specific applications of them. It should be noted that physics, 
being the basis for mathematical natural science, uses seductive methods of 
its departments, although its laws have been acquired through the inductive 
method. The laws of physics can be expressed in mathematical symbols and 
usually take the form of differential equations. Mathematical symbols can be 
assigned to certain specific meanings, certain observed phenomena or certain 
quantities that can be measured. The same applies to the use of geometry in 
natural science. We apply this geometry, which is the geometry of a given 
area of reality, and as such must also be included in the natural sciences37.
 37 Zawirski, Metoda aksjomatyczna a przyrodoznawstwo, pp. 521–525.
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Due to the fact that physics is not a closed science, and its development is 
not free of certain surprises, its axiomatization may be subject to constant 
changes. Each time the mathematical symbols of physics must be selected 
so that some empirical data can be subordinated to them, but this never 
interferes with the attempts of axiomatization of physics. By penetrating 
deeper and deeper into the accepted axioms, we gain an ever-more com-
prehensive understanding of the essence of scientific thinking and we are 
better aware of the unity of our knowledge.
Physics axioms, for many representatives of this science, can be consid-
ered sufficient to capture all physical phenomena, but they certainly cannot 
be regarded as a complete elaboration of the axioms of natural science. The 
change of the axioms of mathematical natural science proceeds in parallel 
with the development of theoretical physics and with the history of efforts 
to obtain the largest number of deduction-based detailed laws explaining 
natural phenomena and draw from them sets of the simplest ever rules, 
logically ordered and transparent38.
The proper philosophical problem arises at the stage of axiomatization 
of natural science, where, apart from the axioms of physics, in which par-
ticular expressions applied to the experience are associated with mathemat-
ical symbols and, additionally, when the conditions and bases on which 
the use of these symbols for experience are to be based. According to 
Zawirski, it was assumed that the laws of logic and mathematical analysis 
exist alongside the general principles of cognition, which natural research 
must follow and on which only the application of mathematics to natural 
science can be based. Search for the so-called constitutive principles of 
mathematical natural science was one of the main goals of Kant’s critique 
of pure reason. Immanuel Kant subjected the study to a sustainable frame-
work, the principles on which all natural laws must be based. The research 
itself was based on the assumption that the distinguished constitutive prin-
ciples must be obvious, intuitively certain and refer to the necessity of 
thought. Consequently, constitutive principles must be such a priori rules, 
which further nature research cannot in any way violate. Kant included to 
 38 Zawirski discusses in a very clear way the development of mathematical natural 
science axioms until the emergence of the theory of relativity. See: Zawirski, 
Metoda aksjomatyczna a przyrodoznawstwo, pp. 521–525.
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the constitutive principles of natural sciences the assumptions about the 
Euclidean character of space and the absolute character of time, the lapse 
of which remained independent of the reference system. The emerging new 
axioms of natural science, transform Kantian aprioristic forms as the fun-
damental concepts of natural science. Naturally, the dynamic principles 
of natural science are also subject to change; and, together with them, the 
fundamental concept of the principle of causality39 closely connected with 
the concept of time40.
At the beginning of the 20th century, physicists were aware of the great 
transformations regarding the understanding of space, time and matter, but 
they were not able to cope with the problem of the relation of physics to 
geometry. Physics for Hilbert and Weyl, thanks to the axiomatic method, 
becomes a kind of geometry. The adoption of such an understanding of 
physics requires explanation, since it cannot be reduced only to an unam-
biguous assignment of the experience of certain mathematical symbols to 
the facts, which for Moritz Schlick is already a sufficient account of the 
essence of natural cognition41. In turn, for Albert Einstein and Max Born, 
the transformations in physics are regarded as evidence of a change in 
geometry into natural sciences.
In the natural science, there was a dispute over whether physics became 
geometry or geometry became physics42. According to Zawirski, the existing 
 39 Zygmunt Zawirski, “Teoria kwantów a zasada przyczynowości,” Przegląd 
Filozoficzny, Vol. 33, No. 4 (1930), pp. 296–301.
 40 Zygmunt Zawirski, “Rozwój pojęcia czasu,” Kwartalnik Filozoficzny, Vol. 12, 
No. 1 (1935), pp. 48–80.
 41 Moritz Schlick, Allgemeine Erkenntnislehre (Springer, Berlin: 1918), p. 56.
 42 There is also a third position that Zawirski draws attention to; actually, for 
the opponent of Aloysi Müller’s theory of relativity, both positions are absurd, 
because on the one hand we assume that geometry deals with ideal timeless 
objects, whereas physics focuses upon real, temporal objects, and on the other 
hand the relationship between matter and the metric of space has an empirical 
basis that cannot be axiomatic. For Müller, science of an authoritarian character 
and, at the same time, empirical nature is impossible. See: Zygmunt Zawirski, 
“Metoda aksjomatyczna a przyrodoznawstwo:  aksjomaty matematyczne 
fizyki wobec intuicyjnych zasad poznania [Axiomatic Method and Natural 
Science:  Mathematical Axioms of Physics against Intuitive Principles of 
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dissimilarity of physics and geometry can be reconciled with each other, 
despite the existing difference between their objects and the methods used 
there43. Geometry constructs its objects, regardless of the concrete reality, 
and justifies its claims by deduction. In turn, physics deals with data subjects 
found in experience and formulates laws mostly by induction. However, 
when we strive to build a unified theory of a certain group of physical phe-
nomena, the difference in the method used disappears44. At the moment 
of creating the theory, the rights acquired in the way of experience can 
be justified by deduction, and unless they can be deduced from previously 
accepted assertions, then they must be accepted in a given theory as axioms. 
The above case concerns only the stage of systematization, not heuretics, 
where the significant difference between physics and geometry is still not 
questioned. In physics, theorems can occur only because they correspond to 
certain facts of the experiment, despite the fact that they cannot be related 
to any previously known laws. In geometry, however, as generally in math-
ematics, although certain ideas of laws can be born under the influence of 
experience45, then such ideas cannot be introduced as geometrical assertions 
until they can be derived from the previously proven theorems.
According to Zawirski, the axiomatization of natural science is not an 
easy matter. After all, you cannot arbitrarily construct objects of physics, 
which are known to us only on the basis of descriptive features. According 
to Zawirski, we tend to assign univocally defined mathematical symbols to 
the objects of physics46. However, we act in such a way that first we con-
sider the simplest, most typical and idealized phenomena and analyze the 
behavior of properly constructed objects only in terms of features strictly 
 43 Zawirski, Aksjomaty matematyczne fizyki wobec intuicyjnych zasad poznania, 
p. 5.
 44 However, the difference in the subject does not disappear.
 45 A useful example can be the generally known law about the area of the parabola 
section, which Archimedes fell on based on the weighting of properly cut 
plaques.
 46 Kant in the Critique of Pure Reason posed the problem of how it is possible 
and on what terms it becomes possible to assign mathematical symbols in an 
unambiguous manner of reality. In Kant, the principles of assignment are then 
synthetic a priori. The main merit of Kant remains, not their formulation, but 
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defined in a given section of physics, abstracting from other features. In 
this way, the analysis starts with the phenomenon of motion, and there-
fore the mechanics obtained the status of a strict science very early. Then, 
taking mechanics analysis as a pattern, similar results were obtained in 
other branches of physics, and so, among other things, Maxwell’s math-
ematical theory was created. In some cases, when attempts were made to 
combine several branches of physics into one theory, hypothetical factors 
were often referred to, specifying in advance their ownership and atti-
tude to the characteristics of objects, or data assumed to be found in the 
description. This was the case in the case of the explanation of thermal 
phenomena by the movement of molecular particles in the kinetic theory 
of matter, or the reduction of light phenomena to electromagnetic phe-
nomena. After completing these partial works, one could strive to create 
a unified scientific theory. However, as one can never have a guarantee 
that we will know all the properties of objects and their relations, and all 
possible ways of behaving in any conditions, therefore theoretical system-
atization is presented as a never-ending task, and thus the axiomatics to 
which such systematization leads, cannot have the character of eternal and 
inviolable truths47. Each time, in a system of mathematical laws created in 
the above manner, abstracted from the physical phenomena to which they 
can be assigned, we obtain the appropriate section of pure mathematics.
An important problem that attracted the attention of physicists was the 
geometry-based arrangement (“geometrization”) of physics. The use of the 
name “geometrization of physics” remains justified by the need to treat the 
time coordinate in relation to spatial coordinates, which means that the 
concept of change is subject to geometrical treatment. It also turned out 
that the components of the metric tensor, determining the metric relations 
in the Riemannian four-dimensional continuum, turned out to be identical 
to the components of the gravitational potential. This means that not only 
spatio-temporal relations, but also dynamic relations can be treated in a 
geometric way. In the laws of physics, apart from the physical meaning of 
the respective symbols, we obtain the representation of relations in a kind of 
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four-dimensional continuum. It is worth noting that in differential geometry 
the same symbols were operated much earlier before it was noticed that 
they may also have physical meaning; later they were only identified with 
the components of gravitational potential.
Not only is it justified to talk about the geometry of physics, but also 
about treating geometry in a sense as a empirical science modeled on 
physics48. Geometry, only in the sense of researching the spatial properties 
of bodies, should be included in the natural sciences. The laws of geometry 
understood in this way must pass as a component of physics. There is close 
formal communication between the laws of body geometry and the laws of 
physics49. In Einstein’s theory of gravity, the laws of body geometry cannot 
be strictly separated from the laws of physics. In this theory, mathematical 
laws expressing the metric of space, and laws expressing the nature of the 
gravitational field are the same50. In isolation from the physical meaning of 
the symbols used in Einstein’s theory, the laws of geometry become nothing 
more than a branch of pure mathematics. According to Zawirski, if the 
laws of geometry are called laws of physics or laws of natural science, it is 
only because they are constructed so that natural phenomena can be unam-
biguously assigned to them. On the other hand, without natural research, 
 48 The “in a sense” claim concerns the appropriate understanding of geometry. 
According to Janiszewski, the three meanings of the word geometry must be 
distinguished: geometry as a study of spatial properties of bodies; geometry as 
a study of empty, ideal space and geometry as a study of sets of ideal objects 
bound by axioms defined by them. Cf. Zygmunt Janiszewski, “Zagadnienia 
filozoficzne matematyki,” Poradnik dla samouków, Vol. 1 (1915), p 462–489.
 49 In 1872, Klein in his Erlangen program, pointed out that the laws of geometry 
can be regarded as a certain section of invariant theory for certain groups of 
transformations. For example, Riemann’s geometry is a theory of invariants for 
all continuous coordinate transformations for which a certain square differen-
tial form passes into itself. In the theory of relativity, the laws of physics are 
nothing more than a part of the theory of invariants. The laws of relativity are 
invariance forms for the Lorentz transformation, whereas the laws of general 
relativity are invariance forms for all continuous transformations.
 50 Moreover, in Weyl’s theory, the dualism of physical-geometrical and purely 
physical laws disappears, which still exists at the stage of Hilbert’s axioms. In 
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we would never be able to choose the right geometry so that it would be 
suited to the sought-after, proper interpretation. The laws of axiomatically 
constructed geometry are at the same time the branch of natural sciences. 
Therefore, geometry becoming a natural science is a science in which laws 
are selected so as to express real relations in the existing world. However, 
claiming that physics is a science modeled on geometry, means that its 
laws, despite empirical origin, can be linked to axiomatically constructed 
deductive theory51.
Zawirski notes that the contemporary axioms of physical theories replace 
the old, intuitive and certain axioms with the ones, where the spatial con-
tinuum depends on the time continuum on the one hand and on the masses 
disposed in it on the other. Zawirski, while not undermining the impor-
tance of intuitive sources of our cognition in the form of obvious princi-
ples, without which the emergence of mathematics and physics would be 
impossible, notes, however, that the results we reach using the axiomatic 
method are the further consequence of the path we follow in cognition of 
reality, where common sense criteria often fail.
1.2  Epistemological foundations of natural science
According to Zawirski, the axiomatic method, which was only sporadically 
used in philosophy, should be significantly acquired for the purpose of phil-
osophical reflection on reality, similarly to the research in natural science. 
Thanks to this, natural science is enriched with the possibility of using the 
axiomatic method in its research.
According to Zawirski, nature remains the subject of natural science 
insofar as there is a specific material of empirical data that we obtain 
either by direct observation or by means of an account, in accordance with 
accepted axioms and based on measurements made52. Zawirski claims that 
the problem of the applicability of the set of axioms to the data of expe-
rience does not exist in the form in which it existed for Immanuel Kant, 
 51 Cf. Zawirski, Aksjomaty matematyczne fizyki wobec intuicyjnych zasad 
poznania, pp. 8–9;
 52 Zygmunt Zawirski, “Metoda aksjomatyczna a przyrodoznawstwo,” Kwartalnik 
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who selected axioms, so that empirical reality would apply to them. Kant 
accepted that forms of phenomena are something that our mind considers 
necessary, common and obvious. These forms are therefore subjective and 
therefore the universe considered in these forms is only a phenomenon. As 
Zawirski notes, the existence of the thing in itself is an assumption adopted 
by Kant, which he could not prove, but could not reject either. According 
to Zawirski, the space-time forms of phenomena, instead of becoming 
obvious to our mind, are mysterious to the mind and seem accidental to it. 
Therefore, there is no need to consider our mind as a co-creator of nature. 
The reality with which we are dealing, remains independent from a subject, 
not only as to its existence, but also as to its essence, which manifests itself 
in certain formal schemes.
Zawirski, however, does not consider, for example, that absolute realism 
should be attributed to the space-time continuum of general relativity 
theory, just as the quasi-spherical form of the world does not have such a 
reality, because the geometrical interpretation is obtained by appropriate 
mathematical formulas only by assigning empirical facts or results of certain 
measurements, and without this empirical content, mathematical formulas 
do not necessarily deserve their geometrical interpretation.
By rejecting apriorism and its phenomenalistic consequences in the Kantian 
sense, Zawirski does not reject the phenomenalistic consequences that con-
temporary physics comes to, regardless of philosophical considerations. 
The phenomenality of physics boils down to the claim that none of the 
attributes of material objects, including those of shape or body mass, can be 
attributed to existence in isolation from the conditions, in which an object 
reveals certain characteristics.
Some of the features revealed by objects can be included in such a 
general mathematical form that does not undergo any changes. Any 
mathematical form treated independently of these features, i.e. aspects 
of nature, can be given a different interpretation. However, the form that 
is the result of agreeing on all possible aspects of nature, presents itself as 
one of the possible constructions to which the sensual aspects of nature 
apply by accident, because this form does not seem to be of the shape 
necessary for the mind. Such a mathematical form, as long as it finds its 
reference to the adopted set of axioms in the field of natural sciences, 
should be regarded as something in which the nature of absolute reality 
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is manifested53. The absolute reality can be treated here as an assumption 
adopted in many systems of natural philosophy which concerns one and 
the same world. All efforts of Copernicus, Galileo and Newton went in the 
same direction to capture this one, independent from our senses, reality. 
According to Zawirski, any allegations raised against such a determined 
striving to capture reality ultimately amount to misunderstandings54.
If the set of axioms is treated as a kind of symbolic definition of absolute 
reality by enumerating symbols of essential features, then the formal-logical 
system of assertions resulting from axioms can be considered as symbols 
of derivatives of this absolute reality. Derivative symbols are symbols of 
everything that results from the nature of absolute reality, as indicated by 
symbols of axioms. The admission of absolute reality is attested by existing 
specific laws, which on the one hand result from accepted axioms, and on 
the other hand do not depend on their empirical interpretation. Therefore, 
without paying attention to the intuitive meaning of symbols used to formu-
late axioms, the axiomatic method of mathematics shows us how to build 
a deductive diagram of the whole theory of natural science.
Zawirski notes that natural cognition does not exclude the possibility 
of possession by objects experienced sensually, apart from the properties 
available to measurements, properties that cannot be determined experi-
mentally. In addition, natural cognition does not exclude the possibility of 
the existence of knowledge, and even remains indifferent to this knowledge, 
whether there is a completely different, separate world outside the world 
of sense objects, whose logical and formal order is reflected in the accepted 
axioms of natural science55. The existence of a reality that goes beyond the 
world of sensory objects, however, does not remain indifferent to minds 
prone to metaphysical speculation. The metaphysical search is directed 
 53 Zawirski, “Metoda aksjomatyczna a przyrodoznawstwo,” pp. 130–131
 54 An example, of one of many misunderstandings, is the charges put forward by 
Planck towards Mach who, in Planck’s opinion, reduces natural cognition to 
the adaptation of our thoughts to impressions and does not accept any other 
possibility. It turns out, however, that Mach, however, states that physical theo-
ries may come to assertions that “would be important and for beings with other 
senses, if they could translate them into their own sensory impressions” – quote 
after: Zawirski, “Metoda aksjomatyczna a przyrodoznawstwo,” p. 131.
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toward the knowledge of the essence of being, and the sensual world often 
plays the role of a means leading to the discovery of the supersensitive 
world. The use of the axiomatic method in natural science indicates the 
possibility of building such a metaphysics that is based on experience and 
at the same time can preserve the nature of deductive theory.
For Zawirski, the application of the axiomatic method to solve meta-
physical problems is the implementation of the old metaphysics’ search, to 
bring the whole reality out of one or several of the highest principles. The 
principles adopted in metaphysics would be presented to the human mind 
in such a way that all the rich and varied content of the cognized reality can 
be deduced from them. However, the axiomatic method applied in natural 
science does not lead to the knowledge of the real essence of this reality, 
but it only gives the possibility of symbolic recognition of it. The axiom-
atic method makes it possible to develop a certain closed view of the world 
without resolving issues that have been subject to metaphysical disputes. 
Based on the subject of positivized natural sciences, we obtain that the 
axioms of this natural science do not exclude a different interpretation of 
them. On the other hand, how to find this “right” interpretation is always 
a matter of a given metaphysical system.
If two different theories have a strict dependence in formal and logical 
terms, both can be reduced to a common way of treating them. Assuming 
that there is a certain commonality of their logical-formal side between the 
sensual world and the post-emergent world, it means that the given order of 
the one side corresponds to the specific order of the other one. According 
to Zawirski, in this situation, all metaphysical issues boil down to the con-
tent of the logical-formal schemes of the natural order, in order to be able 
to read from them the laws of the extrasensory world56.
Zygmunt Zawirski points out that every attempt to apply the axiom-
atic method to metaphysical cognition is usually supported on quite any 
assumption. In particular, he refers to the use of the axiomatic method 
in developing a scholarly picture of the world by Schlick and Eddington. 
For Schlick, cognition consists in assigning specific objects to the appro-
priate mathematical symbols, used in the axiomatic method, regardless of 
 56 Zawirski, “Metoda aksjomatyczna a przyrodoznawstwo,” p. 134.
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whether these objects are the so-called phenomena, or things in themselves. 
According to Schlick, if, apart from the phenomena available for our cogni-
tion, there are things in themselves then, while making an attempt to know 
the phenomena, we also know things in themselves, because “the sign of 
the sign is after all the sign of the thing marked”57. Zawirski disagrees with 
such a view, believing that assigning objects to symbols each time produces 
a concrete cognition, expressed in sentences with a certain meaning. If we 
use symbols for phenomena, we always get a specific content that we asso-
ciate with specific symbols. On the other hand, because specific things are 
rich in content, the use of symbols to mark them does not deprive us of 
any interpretation58.
Eddington, in the work Space, Time and Gravitation59, points out that 
the concepts of new physical theories are treated first as axiomatic defined 
symbols, and only then we assign a particular sense to them60. According 
to Eddington, objects or physical phenomena, in addition to the mathemat-
ical form that can be attributed to them, have a deeper meaning. On closer 
familiarization through experience, objects turn out to be complexes of 
some of the simplest elements that cannot be defined. Each time, by building 
complex concepts from these indefinite elements, we bring something that 
is undefined to these concepts. In this way, we come to a series of concepts 
that are defined in form, but are not defined as to the content, and which 
we use to explain all properties of matter. As an example, you can enter the 
concept of a point-event. Initially, such a “point event” is considered to be 
the name of something that cannot be determined in ordinary speech, the 
name signifying a certain moment in a certain place of space. We realize 
that the “point event” is something that is outside the realm of human 
reason. In turn, the set of point events begins to be called the world. Then, 
to express that this world is four-dimensional, one should first notice the 
 57 Quotation: Zawirski, “Metoda aksjomatyczna a przyrodoznawstwo,” p. 134.
 58 Zawirski, “Metoda aksjomatyczna a przyrodoznawstwo,” p. 138.
 59 Arthur Eddington, Space, Time and Gravitation: An Outline of the General 
Relativity Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1921).
 60 Eddington’s use of the axiomatic-deductive model can be found in the work 
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ordering of its elements, and this requires the use of the concept of interval, 
which, as the author notes, does not have to be treated as the equivalent 
of the real relationship between each of the two neighboring point events, 
but as something lying beyond the ability of our understanding. Finally, 
Eddington, arriving at the basic equations of the gravitational field without 
matter and with matter, allows himself to his own interpretation, in which 
he does not treat matter as a factor disturbing the gravitational field, but 
vice versa – he interprets the field disorder as matter61.
In Eddington’s interpretations of formal patterns, one can feel certain 
metaphysical tendencies that are very clearly related to the interpretation 
of the physiological processes of our brain. But does matter adopted in rel-
ativity by the coefficient gμν explain the processes of our thinking? Probably 
not. The coefficient gμν, like the interval mentioned above, contains an unde-
fined element, defined in form, but not specified in content. The matter of 
the brain in its physical aspect is only a form, but the reality of the brain 
contains a certain content. Therefore, one cannot expect the form to be 
sufficient to explain this content62.
Zawirski, citing Schlick and Eddington, argues that the axiomatization 
of natural science can be used for metaphysical speculation. However, 
although he does not attach much importance to such attempts to use the 
axiomatic method for metaphysical purposes, he does not deny the validity 
of such attempts63. In terms of accepted physical theories, formulated math-
ematically, individual physics sections can be reduced to their common, 
mathematical treatment; in this way, for example, a vector algebra was 
created, allowing for the treatment of all directional quantities like force, 
speed or acceleration. The appropriate mathematical operations performed 
on vectors led physicists to formulate consecutive concepts such as gradient, 
potential or rotation. Further mathematical operations allowed to detect 
some invariant forms obtained from vector quantities and in this way a 
tensor account was created. It turns out that the search for mathematical 
laws of nature is a search for certain invariant forms.
 61 Eddington, Space, Time and Gravitation, pp. 191–196.
 62 Eddington, Space, Time and Gravitation, p. 191







The philosophy of Zygmunt Zawirski48
In physics, the same mathematical symbols subjected to an appropriate 
interpretation allow to define its individual sections. Metaphysical specu-
lation in relation to the entirety of mathematical natural science attempts 
to behave similarly, but one should consider whether there is a key to 
the metaphysical interpretation of the basic concepts and principles of 
natural science. The applied axiomatic method in mathematical natural 
science can be used to more fully understand the existence of reality 
independent of our consciousness. There are, however, some reservations 
about this project, if we remain only in the area of knowledge in the field 
of physics. One should agree with Zawirski that due to the ignorance of 
the proper interpretation of these laws of nature, the mathematical form 
and the mathematical meaning of this form are of no interest to the physi-
cist. Physical knowledge does not reveal absolute reality to us, it indicates 
it at most, and this is not the subject of physicists’ knowledge. The math-
ematical form of the laws of nature determines the subject of physics as 
much as it is possible to assign to it some sensual or sensory elements, 
which can be reached through the performed account. Sensory phe-
nomena are not a starting point in the knowledge of the laws of nature, 
but they provide specific content to the mathematical forms of the laws 
of nature.
It should be noted that Zawirski accepts two assumptions on which the 
possibility of using the axiomatic method for metaphysical issues is based. 
The first assumption concerns the existence of a reality independent of 
the human mind, and the second assumption is that not all metaphysical 
problems can be solved through a different interpretation of the laws of 
the phenomenal world.
Against Zawirski’s acceptance of the existence of a reality independent 
of the mind, one can raise a charge of unlawful ontologies of concepts 
and violation of the intuitive meaning of names. The charge of forma-
tion of hypothetical notions remains valid, as long as it concerns those 
metaphysicists who, based on a simple analysis of concepts, without paying 
attention to experience, created any images of reality, while treating the 
concept of existence equally with other concepts at the same time. The solu-
tion to the problem of reality is also difficult when we develop conceptual 
constructions to interpret specific facts of the experience. The constructions 
we use have only a conventional value, they are only a useful fiction that 
Philosophy of natural science and philosophy of nature 49
we use for a specific cognitive purpose. However, the use of conceptual 
constructions leads to the breakdown of the unity of reality into the multi-
tude of worlds. Zawirski notes that one cannot treat existence as a feature 
of any whatsoever concept, nor can one treat the notion of being as a qual-
itative sense inherent in sense qualities. In no way can it also be treated as 
a given quality64.
In various philosophical systems, a different emphasis on the accep-
tance of the existence of external objects can be observed. At this point, 
one should ask the question whether in the sense of the existence of these 
objects we leave the intuitive meaning of the word “existence”, or can the 
intuitive meaning of this word be maintained? For example, Berkeley’s 
immaterialism is a departure from common sense, but also representatives 
of positivism, proclaiming the slogan of returning to naive realism, as well 
as representatives of metaphysical realism, advocating for the existence of 
the extrasensory world, change the intuitive sense of the word “existence”. 
None of the positions mentioned retains some original, intuitive meaning 
of the word “existence”.
Analyzing the problem of existence, one can recall the concept of 
Zawirski regarding the existence of absolute reality, which is a good jus-
tification of how the axiomatic method can be used to study metaphysical 
problems. Actually, a physicist considers as real only what can be measured. 
Undoubtedly, this is a symptom of their healthy scientific instinct, without 
which physics would lose the proper sense of learning about nature. The 
physicist also realizes that the results of his/her measurements in different 
conditions fall differently. In this way, the physicist creates the concept 
of the existence of relative features relative to a given system, but at the 
same time assumes the existence of properties independent of any system. 
The latter is achieved through an account based on the axiomatic method. 
According to Zawirski, both objects with variable features and certain 
unchanging forms, which can be achieved mathematically, have their deeper 
base in the sphere of absolute reality. A physicist who each time, on the 
basis of his/her professional knowledge, makes judgments about the depen-
dence of the object of research on the whole of the cognized being, should 
 64 Zawirski, “Metoda aksjomatyczna a przyrodoznawstwo,” p. 152.
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not forget about the existence of absolute reality, although the concept does 
not belong to physical concepts65.
The second assumption, which Zawirski accepts regarding the applica-
bility of the axiomatic method to metaphysical problems, boils down to 
the fact that not all metaphysical problems can be resolved by a different 
interpretation of the laws of the phenomenal world. In addition to the sub-
ject of mathematical natural science, the psychological world, the world of 
spiritual life, remains.
Zawirski assumes the existence of a reality independent of the human 
mind. This reality indicates the existence of absolute reality, the existence 
of a deeper unity of the world. Due to the fact that all of the properties and 
relations of the learned objects remain relative; the clearer, according to 
Zawirski, is the need to adopt a reality independent of the subjective and rel-
ative manifestations of the objects learned for the human mind. Otherwise, 
one would have to accept an infinite multitude of subjective worlds and 
one could not explain where the source the possibility of unambiguously 
assigning specific, subjective data to a specific object and on the basis of 
adjudging on the identity of an object comes from. The invariant form of the 
laws of nature indicates a real unity of the world. While not accepting the 
invariant nature of natural laws, which in the light of modern knowledge 
becomes impossible, the world would be strange and incomprehensible.
It must be said that the question still remains whether contemporary 
mathematical natural sciences reveal to us the nature of absolute reality. 
According to Zawirski, physical knowledge does not present absolute 
reality to us, but it indicates it at most. Both the objects with relative traits 
and invariant laws belonging to the world of phenomena must have their 
deeper base in the sphere of absolute reality.
1.3  Analysis of time, space and cosmology
Zawirski was interested in the development of natural sciences and, first of 
all, the theory of relativity and quantum mechanics. Constantly trying to 
answer the questions stated and the philosophical matters discussed at that 
time, he has left many original works linked with these theories. Zawirski 
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presented new philosophical implications derived from these theories in 
his numerous works and their impact on wider understanding of reality.
At the beginning of the 20th century, while conducting a research on 
the nature of time, space and cosmology, Zawirski was interested in the 
philosophical principles and implications linked with the general theory 
of relativity. Not much time behind, as it was only five years after Albert 
Einstein had presented his theory, Zawirski published his paper entitled 
Refleksje filozoficzne nad teorią względności which appeared in “Przegląd 
Filozoficzny” in 192066. Not only did he notice crucial importance of 
Einstein’s theory, but also made an attempt to explain the existence of 
absolute necessity to eliminate a number of philosophical premises out of 
science, especially the ones which had been accepted earlier by a number 
of physical theories and kept functioning in the notion of absolute time, 
space and movement. Zawirski paid close attention to, as well as followed 
the development of research undertaken within Einstein’s theory. Such an 
approach is evidenced by his numerous reviews of books on this theory 
published at that time (10 reviews in total). However, first of all, it is 
evidenced by his work entitled Relatywizm filozoficzny a fizykalna teoria 
względności67 published in 1921 in Lvov, as well as three smaller studies 
on this matter entitled respectively Rzecz o ‘obronie absolutu’68, Czas i 
przestrzeń w przedstawieniu wielkich filozofów69 and Fizykalna teoria 
względności a relatywizm filozoficzny70 having published them in the same 
year in Słowo Polskie.
 66 Zygmunt Zawirski, “Refleksje filozoficzne nad teorią względności,” in: Przegląd 
Filozoficzny, Vol. 23 (1920), pp. 343–366.
 67 Zygmunt Zawirski, Relatywizm filozoficzny i fizykalna teoria względności 
(Lwów: Drukarnia Słowa Polskiego, 1921).
 68 Zygmunt Zawirski, “Rzecz o ‘obronie absolutu’,” in: Słowo Polskie, Vol. 26, 
No. 19 (1921), p. 3, Vol. 26, No. 21 (1921), pp. 3–4.
 69 Zygmunt Zawirski, “Czas i przestrzeń w przedstawieniu wielkich filozofów,” 
Słowo Polskie, Vol. 26, No. 41 (1921), pp. 3–4; No. 43, pp. 3–4; No. 45, p. 3.
 70 Zygmunt Zawirski, “Fizykalna teoria względności a relatywizm filozoficzny,” 
Słowo Polskie, Vol. 26, No. 94 (1921), p. 3–4; No. 96, p. 3–4; No. 98, p. 3–4; 
No. 100, p. 3; No. 102, p. 3–4; No. 104, p. 3–4; No. 106, p. 5–6; No. 108, 
p. 3–4; No. 110, p. 3–4; No. 112, p. 3–4; No. 114, p. 3–4; No. 116, p. 3–4; No. 











The philosophy of Zygmunt Zawirski52
One of the first issues that did not directly relate to the philosophy of 
nature raised by Zawirski was a hypothesis on the so-called eternal returns 
of the worlds. He published a series of three papers on these matters in 
Kwartalnik Filozoficzny in the period between 1927 and 1928. He had 
already thought these problems over, studied them and was ready for the 
publication of the issues for the last fifteen years. The first drafted versions 
were presented on the May 27 and June 24, 1911 at the meetings of Polish 
Philosophical Society in Lvov, as well as during the Convention of Polish 
Medicals and Naturalists in Cracow in the same year.
Zawirski came back to this motive of “eternal returns” in his main work 
entitled L’évolution de la notion du temps, which was published in 193671. 
His work is still worth considering due to the clear and deepened presenta-
tion of history linked with the notion of time; it starts with the Pythagoreans 
and ends with the modern philosophical concepts of his time, including 
the claims of H. Bergson and E. Husserl, and the latest relativists and 
researchers in quantum physics. L’évolution de la notion du temps is still 
a work worth reading and studying by anybody interested in philosophy.
Zawirski’s most important achievements circulated around a number 
of issues related with time. He wrote many papers dealing with time and 
two books which we shall discuss later. The first book, Wieczne powroty 
światów. Badania historczno-krytyczne nad doktryną ‘wiecznego powrotu’, 
was published in Cracow in 192772. In this work, the issues of eternal 
return, involving a rather odd theory, were awakened in his mind as a 
profound interest in the problem of time which, as if shaped in the form of 
enigma, became his focus of investigation almost since.
Human curiosity about the eternal return of the world could be observed 
as vividly awakened in the earliest stages of culture. We have often to do is 
to think about the mystery of the past, the future and the present. The past 
has already ceased to exist but the future has not arrived yet. In addition, 
the only way present remains is a point of contact between the past and the 
 71 Zygmunt Zawirski, L’évolution de la notion du temps (Kraków:  Librairie 
Gebethner et Wolff, 1936); Zygmunt Zawirski, “L’évolution de la notion du 
temps.” Scientia, Vol. 28, No. 55 (1934), pp. 249–261.
 72 Zygmunt Zawirski, Wieczne powroty światów. Badania historyczno-krytyczne 
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future. This problem can be found in the ancient philosophy and the ancient 
books, the Bible included. Many thinkers were fascinated by the mystery 
of time; it is enough to mention Anaximander, Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, 
Thomas Aquinas to Pascal, Leibniz and Bergson where the problem of 
time could be found to remain the center of philosophical and scientific 
discussions. In Wieczne powroty światów, Zawirski deals with the theory of 
eternal universe and the idea of cyclic time. Following Zawirski’s concepts, 
it means that after a relatively long period, the universe returns to its initial 
point and from this point its old order is re-shifted, so as to begin a new 
history which is identical with the previous one. Zawirski’s book consists of 
two parts. The first one is highly instructive and of the historical character. 
The second part is a critical analysis of the theory of cyclical time, adopting 
the issues observed in the light of contemporary science.
In Modern Times, we can observe that the discussion about the idea of 
returns was particularly favorable due to the laws of mechanics. These laws 
are recognized as symmetrical to the direction of time – all the phenomena 
may run from past to future and from future to past. Kant was also an 
adherent of the laws of mechanics and the theory of returns, which can 
be found in his work titled Allgemeine Naturgeschichte and Theorie des 
Himmels (1755). Other adherents of the idea of returns were: the author 
of a discourse L’Eternité par les Astres, Auguste Blanqui (1805–1885)73, 
and Friedrich Nietzsche, the author of the seminal work Also sprach 
Zarathustra74. The idea of eternal return, as approached form the point of 
view of the direction of time was observed to be prevailing in science almost 
until the mid-19th century.
The situation radically changed in the second half of the 19th cen-
tury, when in 1824 Nicolas L. Sadi Carnot discovered the Second Law 
of Thermodynamics. In the seventies of the 19th century Rudolf Clausius 
presented thermodynamic trans-formations, where thermal energy got 
transformed into mechanical work, currently known as the so-called law of 
 73 Auguste Blanqui. L’Eternité par les Astres. Paris: Librairie Germer Baillière, 1872.
 74 Friedrich Nietzsche, Also sprach Zarathustra, p. 182, “…dass alle Dinge ewig 
wiederkehren und wir selber mit, und dass wir schon ewige Male dagewesen 
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the increase of entropy. It means that, after we have applied the Second Law 
of Thermodynamics to the entire universe observed as an isolated system, the 
universe itself moves toward the state of maximum entropy, i.e. to thermal 
death. Zawirski, who clearly leans toward the cycles of time, extensively 
analyzed the theory of universal thermal death and drew a conclusion from 
the extrapolation of the second law. He began with the arguments which 
undermined the validity of universal thermal death (found in the philosoph-
ical approaches of Ernst Mach, Henri Poincaré and Ludwig Boltzmann).
The strongest arguments against the theory of the thermal death of the 
universe were suggested by Poincaré and Boltzmann. Poincaré, in the work 
Le Mécanisme et l’Expérience (1893), wrote that our observations can 
appear to be incompatible with mechanics and thus unable to formulate 
the differences between irreversible and reversible phenomena. Irreversible 
phenomena possess a relatively long period of return to the preceding state, 
while the time of return in respect to the reversible phenomena is relatively 
short. The time of all observation is too short, so our conclusions about 
the thermal death of the universe can be simply short-sighted. At the same 
time, Boltzmann suggests a statistical formulation of the second law and 
suggests an equal probability of all possible micro-states. This Boltzmann’s 
idea of fluctuation connects the reversibility of the phenomena in the entire 
universe with the irreversibility of processes within the fluctuation range.
An experimental confirmation of the statistical interpretation of the 
second law was found within the micro-system. Marian Smoluchowski 
assumes that, where the number of particles is relatively small, that anti-
entropy processes can be observed most easily. Up till now, the statistical 
character of the second law of thermodynamics had been confirmed exper-
imentally by Böhi, Chaudesaigues, Dąbrowski, Perrin, Seddig, Svedberg 
and Zangger. Zawirski, on the basis of Poincaré’s, Boltzmann’s and 
Smoluchowski’s theorems, adopts the concepts of quasi-return phenomena. 
In this way Zawirski, in Wieczne powroty światów, accepts the theory of 
eternal return of the universe only because it cannot be denied with com-
plete certainty75.
 75 Zygmunt Zawirski, Wieczne powroty światów. Badania historyczno-krytyczne 
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Ten years after 1927, Zawirski decided to publish his new work titled 
Rozwój pojęcia czasu. It appeared to be his opus magnum. In an inter-
national competition under the auspices of Italian Scientia Zawirski was 
awarded the First Prize for it. No other publication known at that time 
was so up-to-date as Zawirski’s book. Up till 1936, we knew only about 
Duhem’s Le temps selon les philosophes hellènes76 that was devoted to the 
ancient period only; Werner Gent’s Die Philosophie des Raumes und der 
Zeit77 included the period from Aristotle to the end of the 17th century, 
whereas Baumann’s Die Lehren von Raum, Zeit und Mathematik78 ends 
with Hume.
Zawirski’s book contains the development of the idea of time up to the 
latest period and discusses the problems of time in relativistic physics and 
quantum mechanics. This work is semantically clear but its style is char-
acteristic of the mental formation to which Zawirski belongs as a faithful 
disciple of Kazimierz Twardowski. Rozwój pojęcia czasu consists of two 
parts. The first contains the history of theories from the ancient philosophy 
up to Zawirski’s period of time. The second one is critical in nature and 
devoted to the analysis of some aporias of the notion of time. We will con-
fine ourselves to a very short review of these aporias.
The first group of aporias contains all the questions connected with 
problem of absolute time and – connected with that – the a priori or a 
posteriori elements naturally contained within the idea of time. Zawirski’s 
answers to these problems are as follows: “[…] all the elements of the 
idea of time are of empirical origin, but the idea of time is nonetheless the 
product of our mental activity, because our mind’s attitude in the formation 
of this idea cannot be a solely passive and receptive one. […] We reject the 
a priori idea as a blind and mysterious force which weighs heavily upon 
us, just as did the fatum of the Ancients. Such a conception of the a priori 
has nothing in common with science or with philosophy of science. It is 
 76 Pierre Duhem, “Le temps selon les philosophes hellènes. ” Revue de Philosophie, 
Vol. 19, 1911, pp. 5–24, 128–145.
 77 Werner Gent, Die Philosophie des Raumes und der Zeit. Bonn: Verlag Friedrich 
Cohen, 1926.
 78 Julius Baumann, Die Lehren von Raum, Zeit und Mathematik. Berlin: Druck 
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the great merit of Husserl to have modified the sense of Kant’s a priori, 
by limiting it to the consciousness of what is necessary and essential in the 
structure of an object. However, when penetrating the essence of objects, 
Husserl fell into the errors of the old metaphysics. Discrimination as to what 
is essential to, or accidental in, an object may change with the progress of 
science and, according to our opinion, it depends solely upon the definition 
of an object, which can also vary with experience. The point is that all a 
priori truths undergo a limitation of their application. Phenomenological 
investigations can in no way settle the problem of the reality of an object, 
or of its origin. The progress of sciences gives us the respective warning. 
It is from this point of view that the phenomenological axiomatization of 
time should be considered”79.
The second group of aporias concerns the question of the psychological 
origin of the idea of time and relation between intuitive and physical time. 
This part includes the critique of Bergson and discusses the role of memory 
in the formation of the idea of time, temporal illusions and the relation 
between ideas such as the temporal order, the interval and the instant80.
The third group of aporias concerns the problems raised by modern 
physics. All these aporias belong to the problem of the uniformity of the 
temporal flow and all those questions created by the theory of relativity. 
Zawirski concluded that metrical time and physical time are not identical 
notions. He concentrated upon these problems which led to two opposed 
orientations. One of them considers the ideas of the uniformity of time and 
the one of simultaneity as completely relative and conventional, while the 
other defends their intuitive and absolute character. Zawirski admitted that 
intuitionism found itself in a more difficult position after the advent of the 
theory of relativity. He does not exclude it, and indeed shall try to assume 
an intermediary position which takes into account the results of modern 
physics while not neglecting the data of intuition.
 79 Zygmunt Zawirski, “The Evolution of the Notion of Time,” in: Zygmunt 
Zawirski: His Life and Work. With Selected Writings on Time, Logic, and the 
Methodology of Science, ed. Irena Szumilewicz-Lachman (Dordrecht-Boston-
London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1994), pp. 277–279.
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The truth is that the axioms are often used in modern theories. We can 
formulate a series or propositions wherein we find the primitive terms of the 
constructed theory, connected to each other by means of logical terms. The 
primitive terms are defined implicitly by the role they play in these axioms or 
primitive propositions. We know that this method of defining issues implic-
itly has been used by Peano, who defined the notion of the integer in this way 
by means of five axioms and three primitive terms, but it was Hilbert who 
applied this method to geometry. Zawirski, making an attempt to provide 
this third group of aporias an end, focused his attention upon the attempts of 
such philosophers like Carnap and Whitehead, for example, who sought to 
axiomatize the science of time. Carnap gives several examples of the appli-
cation of the axiomatic method to the topology of space-time, according 
to the theory of relativity; whereas Whitehead adopts axiomatizing as the 
basis of his theory, not the points of the universe, but the natural elements 
which are the events, and constructs the geometry of the events81.
The last group of aporias is devoted to problems of continuity, of the 
infinity of time and of its irreversibility. Zawirski has decisively solved none 
of these problems, since the state of modern science did not permit it. He 
said that the problem of continuity could be distinguished in future but 
now the result of quantum physics renders the mathematical continuity of 
time unverifiable; nevertheless, the intuitive notion of continuity should be 
maintained as different forms of atomism of time are not verifiable. The 
problem of the infinity and irreversibility of time provides the occasion for 
considering the value of the second law of thermodynamics and of other 
laws of physics. He suspected that by far modern physics did not reveal new 
possibilities which could be able to resolve the problem of determining the 
conditions and the direction of change82.
2  Logic and methodology of science
2.1  Methodological problems in science
Zawirski developed many methodological problems such as causality, 
determinism, axiomatic method and experimentum crucis. He investigated 
 81 Zawirski, “The Evolution of the Notion of Time,” pp. 307–347.
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problems of casual relation from various perspectives during all his scientific 
research. He was certain about the importance of this principle for scientific 
research. In his work entitled Przyczynowość a stosunek funkcjonalny83,  
published in Lvov in 1912, he demonstrated that the notions of “casual 
relation” and “functional relation” differ in terms of content. As casual rela-
tion is a real relation, considering the influence and time relations between 
reasons and consequences, it cannot be replaced with functional relation. In 
his paper entitled Teoria kwantów a zasada przyczynowości84 from 1930, he 
presented an opinion clearly polemical to Heisenberg’s theory claiming that 
the principle of uncertainty proves the falsity of the principle of causality.
Zawirski paid attention to any signal of philosophical thinking out-
side the borders of his mother country. He reacted violently to the meth-
odological research included in Karl R.  Popper’s work entitled Logik 
der Forschung. Zur Erkenntnisheorie der modernen Naturwissenschaft, 
published in Vienna in 1934. Zawirski criticized Popper’s falsificationism, 
which claimed that lack of agreement between some law and one of rec-
ognized and elementary opinions can be regarded as a sufficient reason 
for the rejection of this law. Zawirski notices that a single empirical law 
hardly ever is tested as perceived separately from the other laws. The whole 
system of opinions or theories is either tested or invalidated. Moreover, the 
number of laws and independent hypotheses becomes constantly smaller 
and smaller during such a test. Then, each general empirical task “becomes 
itself responsible” for the whole system to which it belongs. In this way, 
development of real sciences constitutes a continuation of the theory, which 
fight with each other and modify themselves constantly85.
In an interesting paper Doniosłość badań logicznych i semantycznych 
dla teorii fizyki współczesnej86 Zawirski was rather critical with Popper’s 
 83 Zygmunt Zawirski, “Przyczynowość a stosunek funkcjonalny,” Przegląd 
Filozoficzny, Vol. 15, No. 1 (1912), pp. 1–66.
 84 Zygmunt Zawirski, “Teoria kwantów a zasada przyczynowości,” Przegląd 
Filozoficzny, Vol. 33, No. 4 (1930), pp. 296–301.
 85 Zygmunt Zawirski, “Doniosłość badań logicznych i semantycznych dla teoryj 
fizyki współczesnej,” Przegląd Filozoficzny, Vol. 41, No.1 (1938), p. 26. This 
article was read out at the Paris Philosophical Congress in 1937
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concept of falsibility as the most important criterion of a scientific aspect 
in a theory, but he agrees with Popper as to the rejection of induction to be 
recognized as an appropriate method in science. Zawirski also states that 
there exists asymmetry in falsification on the one hand and verification on 
the other. The falsification of a theory is a proof, based on modus tollendo 
ponens that the theory is false, but empirical verification of a theory does 
not prove that the theory is a true one. Notwithstanding, Zawirski in 
his paper is openly critical to Popper’s analysis and he expresses some 
arguments. Zawirski claims that induction and deduction are indispensable 
for science. Induction is important when a law or a theory is formulated 
in statu nascendi, but deduction plays its part during the processes aimed 
at testing any of them. He also states that falsification, like verification, is 
never of final character. We never test a singular theory, but always a group 
of theories or laws. We never know which theory has exactly been recog-
nized as false, because falsification and verification are based on protocol 
sentences which do not form bottom of the rock. The protocol sentences 
depend on a number of factors: of theoretical, methodological or linguistic 
character. Summarizing, Zawirski concludes that “[…] a falsification by 
way of an experiment or an observation has the same relative character 
as verification […] so we shall find that between them no apparent asym-
metry can exist”87.
A problem of testing hypotheses in empirical sciences was also undertaken 
by Zawirski in the paper entitled Uwagi o metodzie nauk przyrodniczych88. 
In a way similar to Popper’s, Zawirski assumes that we derive consequences 
 87 Zawirski, “Doniosłość badań logicznych i semantycznych dla teorii fizyki 
współczesnej,” p. 29.
 88 Zygmunt Zawirski, “Uwagi o metodzie nauk przyrodniczych,” Przegląd 
Filozoficzny, Vol. 44, No. 4 (1948), pp. 315–318. According to Jan Woleński, 
during one of Zawirski’s tips in 1947, this manuscript containing a comprehen-
sive academic textbook on the methodology of empirical sciences was stolen 
from Zawirski. One can only assume today that the monograph was a synthesis 
of many positions held by quite a number of methodologists, the ones presented 
by Polish methodologists included. For details, see Jan Woleński, Filozoficzna 
Szkoła Lwowsko-Warszawska (Warszawa: PWN, 1985), p. 268. Most probably, 
the paper that appeared in Przegląd Filozoficzny was a part of the monograph 
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out of the accepted hypothesis. Then, we make an attempt to test it whether 
it agrees with the facts concerned with it. The hypothesis is found as cor-
rect when there is an agreement between the facts directly observed and 
the conclusions derived out of it. If there is found some form of disagree-
ment, the hypothesis should be rejected due to its invalidation. In this 
paper, Zawirski does not mention the name of Popper, but still criticizes his 
concept of falsification and impossibility to achieve experimentum crucis. 
Currently, it can be stated that what he criticized was the so-called naive 
Popper’s falsificationism.
Zawirski agrees with asymmetry to possibly appear between positive and 
negative result when testing a hypothesis. A question whether the negative 
result is to be considered as more serious than the positive one remained a 
problem for him. It is clear for Zawirski that the positive result still does 
not prove rightness of the particular hypothesis because it can always be 
changed in a minute; whereas, at the same time, the negative result does not 
always lead toward a complete withdrawal of the hypothesis. Invalidation 
of the hypothesis might be a decisive moment only when none of the notions 
describing an experiment remained unchanged. Every single change of 
meaning in the terms used leads to another undertaking of the particular 
hypothesis, in spite of the fact that it was invalidated. The example of 
such a situation can be earlier rejected by means of wave-particle theory of 
light that came out after Foucault’s experiments and was later introduced 
with the help of the theory of quantum. A similar situation occurs in the 
experiments related to experimentum crucis and instantia crucis when we 
select the one which includes some newly-revealed fact out of two com-
peting hypotheses or theories.
Zawirski notices an analogy between a verification of the particular 
hypothesis and acceptance of the one out of two competing hypotheses. 
As long as we expect a positive or negative answer in the first case, the 
positive answer linked with one of the hypotheses in the second case is 
simultaneously the negative answer for the other one. In the situation of 
experimentum crucis it rarely occurs that two competing hypotheses were 
of the opposite opinions. There are usually more complicated hypoth-
eses. Therefore, logical conjunctions of sentences whose negation is their 
alternatives are often checked, Popper does not notice it in his concept of 
falsification. Zawirski agrees here with Duhem for whom experimentum 
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crucis has never invalidated one isolated hypothesis but only the whole 
theory full of linked tasks.
The comments presented above refer only to the theoretical testing of 
hypothesis. In practice, the situation does not look to be complicated so 
much. Each theory, apart from the formulated laws, also includes numerous 
defined terms, as well as a number of agreements. The simplest way of 
testing a hypothesis is usually selected. However, more complicated cases 
occur and may trigger “[…] a revolution in science”. “The cases occur 
when it is difficult to select which way is surely the simplest”89. Such a 
situation occurred during the development of the theory of relativity and 
quantum mechanics, when a number of negative experiences increased con-
stantly together with the one of supporting hypotheses which explained 
these experiences. After some time, the edifice of classical physics had to 
be reconstructed, which appeared to be the best solution in this difficult 
situation90.
2.2  Many-valued and intuitionistic logic and 
their applications in physics
After the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th centuries, the clas-
sical logic of Aristotle represented a small fraction of modern logics, whose 
basic part was the one of sentential calculus. The development of logic 
enabled the work of Aristotle to be understood better and more profoundly. 
The discovery of the structure and function of deductive systems was an 
inspiration for further impressive development of logic.
Jan Łukasiewicz devoted many years to study Aristotle’s syllogisms. He 
started his studies on this problem with the publication of his monograph 
On the Principle of Contradiction in Aristotle. In this book, Łukasiewicz 
 89 Zawirski, “Uwagi o metodzie nauk przyrodniczych,” pp. 317–318. Zawirski 
completed his research practice and historical analysis of the development of 
scientific theories with a logical analysis. In this way, he was the one who noticed 
the cumulative development of scientific theories, often taking place in the course 
of a scientific revolution, at a time when the number of negative experiences 
for the scientific theories in force at the given stage of knowledge development 
increases.
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represented the first sustained questioning of the assumptions of traditional 
Aristotelian logic. The results of these studies were presented at the session of 
the Department of History and Philosophy of the Polish Academy of Sciences 
and Letters in 1939. Łukasiewicz demonstrated that Aristotle’s syllogism 
is a deductive system constructed by the axiomatic method. He completed 
this system and accurately defined its theorems by using the modern formal 
method. His studies of Aristotle’s original texts also made possible to dis-
cover new problems in the domain of modal sentences and the possibility 
of attributing a different value to some such sentences (Cf. On three-valued 
logic, 1920; Two-valued logic, 1921). He wrote about it in more detail in 
Aristotle’s Syllogistic from the Standpoint of Modern Formal Logic (1951).
Zawirski followed the debate about a possibility of attributing a different 
value to sentences. In 1914 he published O modalności sądów91 where he 
critically analyzed the said discussion of the modality of judgments starting 
his analysis from the ancient philosophers up to the ideas observed in the 
time of Sigwart’s, Windelband’s, Wundt’s, Twardowski’s and Husserl’s phil-
osophical activity. In this work Zawirski presents his own point of view, 
strongly speaking in favor of the two-valued logic. When Jan Łukasiewicz 
formulated the three-valued logics, where – in addition to true (1) and false 
(0) values, he introduced a third value (1/2) – Zawirski took part in the 
discussion of Łukasiewicz’s bold new idea by publishing a series of papers 
in this field of logic. He was interested in the possibility of using the idea 
of manyvalue logic for solving numerous difficulties which appeared along-
side the development of quantum mechanics and mathematics. Zawirski 
sees that Łukasiewicz’s idea makes it possible to eliminate certain logical 
antinomies, and he believes that this idea is a better one for removing the 
said antinomies than Russell’s theory of types.
The indeterminism of quantum mechanics appears to supply a field 
of applicability to the new logic, i.e. many-valued logic. In 1920, while 
discussing the notions of modality and, in particular, possibility, Jan 
Łukasiewicz introduced the third value in his first published paper titled 
On the Concept of Possibility. This paper was based on a talk given by him 
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on June 5, 1920 in Lvov. Two weeks later, a second talk given by him (also 
in Lvov) was more transparently titled On Three-valued Logic.
Zawirski pointed at two potential uses of many-valued logic in 1932 in 
the paper entitled Les logiques nouvelles et le champ de leur application 
which appeared in “Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale”92. The first one 
focused on the link between the theory of probability and many-valued logic. 
The second one focused on the use of Łukasiewicz’s three-valued logic in the 
analysis of wave-particle duality. Nevertheless, Zawirski admitted that this 
attempt was too early. In further works, Zawirski spoke in favor of the use 
of the theory of probability in the description of quantum phenomena. He 
stated that various degrees of probability can be assigned to such quantities 
of feedback as time, energy, position and momentum elemental particles.
Zawirski sees that three-valued logic provides better understanding of the 
complementary theory in micro-physics but he also notices the difficulties 
in the application of the notions of three-value logic to modern physics. 
The difficulties that are found in this application are compared with the tra-
ditional way of handling marks that are mainly associated with compound 
sentences. One problem that is concerned is that the negation of a sentence 
with a logical value of ½ can also obtain the same value of ½. Some other 
problem concerns the postulate of correspondence observed in the require-
ment that any later theories ought to be recognized as corresponding to 
the earlier theories. It means that the equations of the later theory should 
pass into equations of the earlier theory in the limited cases. In this time, 
scientists used to be convinced that this principle of correspondence pro-
vided a kind of guarantee that nothing will be lost from what is valuable 
in the achievement of the development of science. At the same time, this 
principle makes it possible to conduct a critical analysis from a new point 
of view. Zawirski writes that some time ago scientists simply adopted this 
postulate which was assumed to be intuitively certain, but now one ought 
to admit that such a new principle would be valid93.
 92 Zygmunt Zawirski, “Les logiques nouvelles et le champs de leur application,” 
Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale, Vol. 39, No. 4 (1931), pp. 503–579.
 93 Zygmunt Zawirski, “W sprawie indeterminizmu fizyki kwantowej,” 
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Zawirski produces a table for the implication p ⊃ q in Łukasiewicz’s 
logic and Brouwer’s logic (Tab. 1.)
One can see from the table (cf. position 8) that although ½ in Łukasiewicz’s 
logic is possible, it turns to be false in Brouwer’s logic. In intuitionist logic, 
when the antecedent has a higher value than the consequent, the implica-
tion is false. The same notion is observed in the traditional logic. So we 
can see that Brouwer’s logic comes nearer to the traditional one. There are 
no propositions that the two-valued logic ought to reject the intuitionist 
logic as being false. The situations appears to be different in Łukasiewicz’s 
logic, the law of negation of the equivalence of two contradictory sentences 
~(p ≡ ~p), for p = 1/2 and ~p = 1/2, is false but in Brouwer-Heyting’s logic 
this law continues to be true94.
Łukasiewicz’s logic had only three values and these were not enough for 
the interpretation of probabilistic laws observed in quantum mechanics, 
so Zawirski tries to form its alterations and works out his own variant of 
a many-valued logic which is to fulfill this interpretation. Zawirski deals 
with this problem in two works: Znaczenie logiki wielowartościowej dla 
poznania i związki jej z rachunkiem prawdopodobieństwa (1934)95 and 
Stosunek logiki wielowartościowej do rachunku prawdopodobieństwa 
 94 Zygmunt Zawirski, “Geneza i rozwój logiki intuicjonistycznej,” Kwartalnik 
Filozoficzny, Vol. 16, No. 2–4 (1946), pp. 199–202.
 95 Zygmunt Zawirski, Znaczenie logiki wielowartościowej dla poznania i związki 
jej z rachunkiem prawdopodobieństwa (Warszawa: I. Pyz i S-ka, 1934).
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(1934)96. He sees that as any connection of logic and probability calculus 
is impossible a priori, so he introduces new logical factors. He has increased 
the number of logical operators of the sum and of the product in such a 
way that only logical value corresponds to each of these factors; this can be, 
for example, the logic of five values, symbolized by the series of numbers 
0, ¼, 2/4, ¾, 1. In this logic the different formulae of the sum are justified 
by the difference in the order in which the true propositions follow the 
false propositions in these classes. If the values of the arguments v(p)=2/4 
and v(q)=2/4, the corresponding classes, containing two true propositions 
for four true or false ones, can have the form: p=(0,0,1,1), q=(0,0,1,1) or 
else p=(1,1,0,0), q=(0,0,1,1), or p=(0,0,1,1), q=(1,0,1,0). The logical sum 
p^q as a number of two-valued logical sums was formed by joining the 
first members of the first series with the first member of the second series, 
so in the first case p^q=(0^0, 0^0, 1^1, 1^1)=(0,0,1,1), the value of this 
sum will be 2/497. Zawirski’s results were presented at the Prague Conference 
in 1934 and at the First International Congress of Scientific Philosophy 
in Paris in 1935. During this Congress Hans Reichenbach, independently 
of Zawirski, spoke about the logic of probability. There are differences 
between Zawirski’s and Reichenbach’s conceptions of the calculus of proba-
bility and many-valued logic. Reinchenbach interpreted the probability cal-
culus as a kind of generalized logic. At the same time, Zawirski underlined 
the importance of the notion of a parallelism between the formulae of the 
calculus of probability and Łukasiewicz’s and Post’s many-valued logic.
In 1938 Zawirski published Doniosłość badań logicznych i semantycznych 
dla teorii fizyki współczesnej98. In this paper, Zawirski analyzes the rela-
tionship between logic and science. The new developments in the field of 
deductive systems are of high importance for the understanding of the 
theories in science, but it is the new theories in physics, such as the theory 
 96 Zygmunt Zawirski, “Stosunek logiki wielowartościowej do rachunku 
prawdopodobieństwa,” Prace Komisji Filozoficznej Poznańskiego Towarzystwa 
Przyjaciół Nauk, Vol. 4 (1934), pp. 155–240.
 97 Zawirski, “Stosunek logiki wielowartościowej do rachunku 
prawdopodobieństwa,” p. 4.
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of relativity and quantum mechanics, that contribute to the development 
of logico-semantical investigations. When Zawirski analyzed the status of 
physical theories, he concluded that they are based on both arithmetic and 
logic. Furthermore, the developments in many-valued and intuitionistic 
logic give rise to some important problems. In addition, the development of 
many-valued logic and intuitionistic logic leads to the emergence of certain 
problems relating to the legitimacy of applying the excluded measure rule 
or the existence of undecidable sentences in properly rich formal systems, 
which Kurt Gödel pointed out. 99.
3  Meta-philosophy
The scientific interests of Zawirski were also linked with more general 
problems of truth and being. The point of departure for his interests were 
the profound cognition of classical metaphysics and natural sciences within 
which more and more often the problems that previously had been reserved 
for philosophers only, were undertaken.
In the first decades of the 20th century, Zawirski witnessed an argument 
and a dispute concerned with the role of natural sciences in the development 
of general outlook on life. He noticed that both the metaphysicians and 
the opponents of metaphysics that took part in the said debate expressed 
a need to develop a scientific outlook on life. This fact made him ponder 
over a possibility to design metaphysics based on experience. He realized 
very quickly that metaphysics understood in this way would not be able to 
completely replace classical metaphysics perceived as scientia entis. It would 
not have been balanced only with the synthesis of natural sciences admitted 
by positivists. However, considering the mutual struggle of the most oppo-
site reasoning movements, he undertook an attempt to develop a middle 
path leading toward the formation of the scientific metaphysics – both crit-
ical and open when using the results of the empirical experience. Zawirski 
presented his first ideas on the relations between metaphysics and science 
during a lecture given on May 5, 1917. His lecture, entitled O stosunku 







metafizyki do nauki, was presented at the meeting of the Philosophical 
Society in Lvov100.
The issue concerning the relations between metaphysics and science 
on the one hand and possibilities of developing a general theory that 
would embrace the notion of reality dominated in Zawirski’s research 
till 1923 when he published his post-doctoral thesis entitled Metoda 
aksjomatyczna a przyrodoznawstwo. The work was a summary of the 
research conducted earlier that focused on the possibility of axiomatiza-
tion of metaphysical systems. Before 1923 Zawirski had also written two 
more works that discussed the said issues, entitled O stosunki metafizyki 
do nauki (1919)101 and Nauka i metafizyka (1920). Both works remained 
in the manuscript form and only in the period between 1995 and 1996 
Nauka i metafizyka was published in the periodical “Filozofia Nauki”102. 
Then, the second work O stosunku metafizyki do nauki waited for its 
publication till 2003.
3.1  Ontological structure of reality
Reflecting on an important ontological issue regarding the relationship 
between the sensual and extrasensory world, Zawirski developed the con-
cept of three worlds. A sensual world that is given to us directly in the 
sensual experience and guarantees a permanent opportunity to experience 
sensory perceptions (we may call it the permanent possibility of sensation). 
This is a world that I would call – following Zawirski – a “mental world”, 
the one that guarantees the permanent possibility of feelings. This world 
contains a permanent opportunity to experience and feel sentient beings; 
 100 Zygmunt Zawirski, “O stosunku metafizyki do nauki,” in:  O stosunku 
metafizyki do nauki. Próba wytyczenia nowych dróg filozofii teoretycznej, 
ed. Michał Sepioło (Warszawa: Wydział Filozofii i Socjologii Uniwersytetu 
Warszawskiego, 2003), pp. 21–51.
 101 Zawirski, “O stosunku metafizyki do nauki,” in: O stosunku metafizyki do 
nauki. Próba wytyczenia nowych dróg filozofii teoretycznej, pp. 21–189.
 102 Zygmunt Zawirski, “Nauka i metafizyka (I)  [Science and Metaphysics],” 
Filozofia Nauki, Vol. 3, No. 3 (1995), pp. 104–135; and also: “Nauka i 
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this is the world of subjective experiences. In turn, the objective world is 
to some extent an imposed part of the subjective worlds.
Knowledge of the objective world is dealt with by the natural sciences, 
in this way providing more and more accurate messages about it, as well 
as more and more powerful tools for action to transform the world of 
sensory experiences and the real transformation of contemporary cultures. 
According to Zawirski, success in transforming our lives and providing 
powerful tools of action is primarily owed by the objective world to the fact 
that “theories and hypotheses submit to the constant control of experience; 
for each dispute, he (i.e. Zawirski) tries to detect any experimentum crucis 
that would tip the scales of victory in favor of one of the rival hypotheses; 
as soon as new facts become known, he improves his theories and in this 
way, thanks to the arduous work of tens and hundreds of minds, he con-
stantly moves his work”103.
It should be agreed with Zawirski that until today in natural science the 
issue of the essence of the objective world is still unresolved. Indeed, this 
unresolved issue continues to this day, some scholars point to the issue 
of mathematics of nature pointing to the objective nature of the world of 
mathematics (e.g. M. Heller, R. Penrose), others point to the objective exis-
tence of the field of rationality (e.g. J. Życiński), yet others strongly accept 
the original nature of God (Whitehead) or the so-called objective world 3 
(K. Popper), etc.
Zawirski, however, approximates the understanding of the objective 
world he has selected to honor; in this way, for example, he draws the 
reader’s attention onto the problem of apriority of the axioms of logic; 
he analyzes this issue by referring to the views presented by, among 
others, B. Russell and I. Kant. According to Russell, the axioms of logic 
exist independently of the human mind; they are endowed with an ideal, 
timeless and eternal being. In this case, we are dealing with a platonizing 
view, according to which Zawirski describes the objects of the objective 
world as entia rationi, which do not mean to reveal either potentiality or 
timeliness. Each transition from the potential to the current state occurs 





only in the mind of the subject, as presented by Kant in the construction 
process.
Zawirski attempts to develop his own position, which would be some-
where between Russell’s and Kant’s. He speculates how the Platonic view 
of entia rationis can be reconciled with the idea of Kant, who conditions 
the apriority of knowledge with the forms of the mind. While reflecting on 
this issue, he believes that, for example, the Pythagorean Theorem did not 
change because it was formulated as a law, which means that the fact that 
the human mind knows the geometry’s judgments does not affect the shape 
of these judgments. This, in turn, means that we do not establish the laws 
of geometry, but discover what occurs “in the womb of the All-Eternal” 
as an eternal opportunity. The world of eternal opportunity in the form 
of entia rationis is an infinite multitude of possibilities, of which only the 
selected ones are updated in the world of existence, described by Zawirski 
as entia naturea104.
According to Zawirski, this entia rationis world is infinite and inex-
haustible, and it is not limited by human thought. From this infinite field, 
human reason should, on the one hand, draw only as much as needed and 
necessary to understand this world of entia nature; but on the other hand, 
while being, for example, unable to predict what new areas of mathematics 
will be useful in understanding the world of existence, we should remove 
the nominalistic warning of Ockham – entia non sunt multiplicand praeter 
necessitate – which would then be the principle limiting scientific research. 
“We do not create the world of enties, but we recognize it and discover it 
as everything else; the newness is only its existence in our mind, and there-
fore its appearance in our mind in the forms of psychological existence, 
not as eternal timeless entia, in which the possibility is not different from 
the actuality in any way”105.
Zawirski, while opposing the two worlds, labeled by him entia rationis 
and entia naturae, formulates his own definition of reality. In his opinion, 
reality, which is only one, can be described as something more than the 
world of existence, namely as the world of entias as well as the relations 
that take part between them. At the same time, however, the relationships 
 104 Zawirski, “O stosunku metafizyki do nauki,” pp. 159–160.
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in the world of enties are ideal, whereas these occurring in the world of 
existence are dynamic106. In the sense of these two worlds, it is also impor-
tant that one cannot link truths about the world of entia rationis with the 
truths about naturae. There is only one truth, but the objects of this truth 
are many. The claim that is true about the object as ens rationis is not real 
about the object as ens existens. Not distinguishing entia from existence is 
the reason for, for example, accepting the ontological proof of God. One 
cannot, therefore, accept assertions that are right in the world of entia, to 
be absolutely true for the world of existence.
According to Zawirski, the existence of a cognizing subject causes a fuller 
understanding of the relationships occurring between the worlds of entia 
rationis and entia naturae, i.e. when the subjective psychic world is being 
formed. Then, it is the sense objects constructed by us that become the con-
tent of our consciousness. Zawirski, when speaking about objects, however, 
is aware of the ambiguity of this issue; this is because by agreeing in our 
statements about reality, we either show that we are dealing with some-
thing essentially one, or we succumb to the power of something that stands 
above us, some reality which is over-individual. This reality is presented 
as an absolute being, which is also ens rationis. This reality that we seek 
outside of nature, but also within us, is defined as the absolute reality by 
Zawirski. At the same time, by nature he understands events occurring in 
time in the world of existence, which are being related to the psychological 
order of time. In the world of existence, therefore, everything that takes 
place in time, enters into proper relations between each other, creating both 
certain interdependencies and order between empirical data, which is why 
these relations are dynamic in contrast to the ideal relations concerning 
the world of entia.
3.2  Relations between the theory of reality 
and metaphysics, and science
The relationship between metaphysics and science were presented by 
Zawirski in two areas, the relation of the theory of reality to particular 
sciences and the relation of the theory of reality to classical metaphysics. 






Zawirski begins the analysis of the first area with the adoption of a strong 
assumption that there is an undeniable need to have a general theory of 
knowledge about reality, which cannot be squeezed down to the sum of 
the results of particular sciences. If such a situation did take place, the 
subject of the general theory of reality would not differ from the sum of 
subjects of particular sciences and one could not speak of the existence of 
a new science. Thus, all attempts to synthesize knowledge, when limited 
to storing the results of detailed science research do not deserve on the 
name of the new science. One cannot also accept a position proclaiming 
the impossibility of formulating such a new science about reality only on 
the basis of observation that the detailed sciences are still developing, what 
naturally makes it difficult to talk about permanent, unchangeable results 
of their research.
Zawirski, while making an attempt to avoid any misunderstandings that 
regard the possibility of building a general theory of reality, undertakes a 
variety of epistemological issues concerning psychology or the critique of 
cognition and focuses on the determination of such a part of general phi-
losophy that does not only pursue the whole of knowledge, but also could 
be able to replace classical metaphysics. When talking about the whole of 
knowledge, one should not mean the never-to-be-achieved absolute whole 
of knowledge, but such a spectrum of the whole of knowledge that is actu-
ally achieved at a given stage of development. The search for such a striving 
to acquire the entirety of knowledge is also justified by the fact that abso-
lutely isolated phenomena will nowhere be encountered; that is why, the 
division into particular sciences is largely an artificial procedure, justified 
by the necessity of division and the economics of research work. In con-
clusion, Zawirski states that the ratio of the theory of the whole of reality 
to particular sciences cannot be different than the ratio of one particular 
science to its individual sections107.
The arguments supporting the need to build a general theory of reality 
remain in force. Taking into consideration the development of individual 
scientific disciplines, there is no doubt that specialists within a given science 
are not able to cover all its divisions evenly. Nevertheless, we cannot say 
 107 Zawirski, “O stosunku metafizyki do nauki,” p. 26.
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that specialists functioning within their sections do not observe the ways 
of functioning of other scholars in other sections. If this were the case, then 
in modern times (and nowadays) the progress of knowledge would not be 
what it is. In the scientific literature, we have many examples of how pro-
gress in one field revolutionizes, or modifies research in other fields, some-
times the ones that are far apart; for example, discoveries observed within 
the area of the science of electricity have changed the perception of optical 
and mechanical phenomena.
Zawirski also analyzes the relation that exists between his proposition 
of the general theory of reality and classical metaphysics. In his opinion, 
the theory of reality could be such metaphysics, only if it could do every-
thing that was expected from classical metaphysics; i.e., if it could give a 
full answer to all questions of interest to humanity; the sense of existence of 
the world and man; the validity of the axiological order; the origin of evil; 
or the ultimate resolution of the mystery of being – why it is that there is a 
thing. However, as it happens, in vain would we be waiting for answers to 
these and similar questions from the science and theory of reality. This does 
not mean, however, that the theory of reality, which does not identify with 
classical metaphysics, is devoid of the raison d’être. In the era of modern 
natural science, the theory of reality can be a science coming out from the 
knowledge of the sensual world and striving to get to know the super-
sensory world. In this theory, there is a fundamental difference between 
the science-derived meanings of the terms that relate to the world of phe-
nomena, and those that we refer to the super-sensory world. According to 
Zawirski, the first concern and describe the patterns of possible experiences, 
whereas the second have the meaning of symbols created according to the 
analogy of something known to something completely unknown108.
Zawirski notes that there are a number of misunderstandings between 
the positions of supporters and opponents of metaphysics. Opponents point 
to the alleged separation of metaphysics research methods and baseless 
conclusions from the metaphysics’ acceptance of the principles of existence, 
or the formulation of the hypotheses that were not checked empirically. 
It should be noted that the opponents of metaphysics, while combating 




the metaphysics conceived in this way, do not exclude hypotheses from 
science, accepting the fact that such hypotheses also often go beyond the 
sensual reality. Quite the contrary, such hypotheses are treated as a means 
to search for new facts.
Despite the different interpretation of the role and importance of hypo-
thetical factors in cognitive processes, there can, however, be found a 
common ground for both opposite directions of thought. Both of them 
speak of a reality that is not invented arbitrarily, but that is studied and 
gained either on the direct or indirect path through a series of arguments. 
One should therefore, agree with Zawirski that opposing the extrasensory 
world with the sensory one remains a naive mindset which, following (and 
accepting) the philosophical divagations that result from the studies of 
Hume, Kant and Mill, remain unacceptable by many positivists.
Zawirski, pointing to the benefits of an inductive research method, based 
on experience, in the natural sciences, notices the process of gradual waking 
up in many minds of the belief in the possibility of basing metaphysics on 
scientific achievements and, in this way, building the so-called scientific view 
of the world; the view that appeals to experience and satisfies the results 
even if only they were thought of as probable ones. Such a construction of 
knowledge, in spite of the claims of positivism and neo-Kantianism of the 
late 19th century, was, among others, supported by Fechner, Hartmann, 
Lotze, Schopenhauer and Wundt. Their proposals for the construction of 
metaphysics based on experience, i.e. inductive metaphysics, accepting the 
existence of probabilities, the one that is led “from below”, from experi-
ence, allow for gradual acquisition of general knowledge about reality. 
These proposals were also accompanied by the awareness that for meta-
physical problems experimentum crucis is usually impossible, in contrast 
to – always admissible – a thought experiment. This experiment is also 
permissible when checking certain hypotheses in detailed sciences. On this 
basis, Zawirski confirms the correspondence between the particular sciences 
and metaphysics in areas that concern the subject and method of reality 
research109.
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Seeing the above convergences between specific sciences and metaphysics 
prompted Zawirski to further research on this relationship. As Zawirski 
notes, the difference between inductive metaphysics and inductive sciences 
does not boil down to the criterion of generality, because the development 
of particular sciences in the 19th and 20th centuries showed that these sci-
ences sometimes deal with very general issues that were previously classified 
as philosophical. Confirming Zawirski’s thought, I have in mind the issue of 
time, space, matter, the issues of the continuity of macro- and micro-world 
processes, or the reversibility and irreversibility of certain processes. Such 
important and general issues studied in inductive sciences bring results that 
go far beyond the conclusions of classical metaphysics. It turns out that 
these issues do not disappear from science; but what changes is the way they 
are treated. What’s more, agreeing with Zawirski, it should also be stated 
that philosophical issues are not only present in the study of particular 
sciences, but also often play an inspiring role in undertaking new research 
challenges. Still some general science is needed that would take into ac-
count the entire human experience; that is why despite the development of 
particular sciences, metaphysics, no matter how we specify it, be it “exper-
imental”, “scientific”, “general”, “synthetic” or “inductive”, or other, has 
a legitimate right of existence to help develop general theories of reality.
Following Zawirski, scientific metaphysics that refers to experience uses 
the inductive method and feels satisfied with the results of probability. 
However, it is not strictly scientific because it does not use the theory of 
probability. At this point, it is difficult to agree with the scientific criterion 
accepted by Zawirski, reducing it to the applicability of the theory of prob-
ability, although, at the time, mostly due to the dominance of statistical 
studies in the mechanistic descriptions of many natural phenomena, the 
adoption of such a criterion was a kind of model of science. This fact is 
incomprehensible as, at the time, Zawirski knew the quantum theory and 
the theory of relativity; he was also convinced of the changing criteria in 
scientific research. Despite everything, he did not include that in the descrip-
tion of the general theory of reality sought by him.
According to Zawirski, the work concerning the development of a sci-
entific pictures of reality should be developed according to the methods of 
specific sciences, maintaining such a relation to these sciences as to their 
respective sections. Such metaphysics should combine the results of these 
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teachings in a system free of contradictions with the awareness that it is 
provisional and incomplete110.
3.3  The problems of scientific metaphysics
While analyzing the relation of the general theory of reality to particular sci-
ences and classical metaphysics, Zawirski added more detail to his theory, 
i.e. the theory of scientific metaphysics he kept elaborating for a number 
of years. Zawirski distinguished two areas of proper empirical sciencesand 
meta-empirical knowledge out of the field of metaphysical research, heading 
toward the general knowledge about the whole reality. The empirical sci-
ences proper were for him the sciences not undertaking the main problems 
of classical metaphysics while meta-empirical knowledge was recognized as 
the science on of the principle of being. Assigning and giving priority to the 
empirical sciences proper in the research on the issues of reality, he did not 
discredit the need of going in for meta-empirical knowledge. He assumed 
that the notion of science observed in empirical sciences proper does not 
consist of a simple sum-up of the results from the detailed sciences and 
also is not their highest generalization. Its paragon is the transformation 
into the axiomatic and deductive system that ought to follow mathematics.
However, each system of axioms and statements that originates out 
of them ought to tolerate the possibility of many interpretations of their 
symbols. Then, many interpretations of the results are possible within 
empirical sciences proper, which occur in the process of meta-empirical 
knowledge. Although all the interpretations of science in meta-empirical 
knowledge that lead to various metaphysical systems possess the same 
learning value, Zawirski followed the idealistic concept criticizing the indi-
vidual metaphysical system. The concept is worth attention and the most 
credible meta-empirical interpretation of the scientific results defined by the 
empirical sciences proper111.
Both empirical sciences and meta-empirical knowledge were linked with 
the use of hypotheses which went beyond experience. These hypotheses in 
empirical sciences contributed to the development of science and served for 
 110 Zawirski, “Nauka i metafizyka (I),” p. 135.
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simpler depiction of content in experience. These hypotheses in the meta-
empirical knowledge are used in learning about objects and metaphysical 
problems linked with them, which do not belong to the experience such as 
the existence of the absolute and transcendent being, the issues connected 
with life after death or taking up decisions about the notions of learning 
about the world.
Zawirski notes that the development of scientific metaphysics, referring 
to experience, would solve numerous philosophical problems present in 
the natural sciences. He also noticed that scientific metaphysics, would 
never completely replace classical metaphysics. A possibility of numerous 
interpretations originates from the fact that universal science about reality 
is an instance of inductive theory. The authenticity of such a theory, or any 
other type of such a theory cannot be proved and its absolute reliability 
cannot be shown112. The symbols of induction theory allow for an unlim-
ited number of their interpretations. However, none of these interpretations 
can be attributed to a greater or lesser probability. This means that induc-
tive metaphysics should not refer to the calculation of raw similarities. It 
indicates that inductive metaphysics should not refer to the probability 
calculus. Taking it into consideration, Zawirski postulates in the studies 
on the universal theory of reality that the scientific face of empirical sci-
ences should be linked with the results of detailed sciences into the system 
freed from contradictions and remain in such relation to these sciences in 
which detailed sciences remain in relation toward their particular areas and 
fields113. Empirical sciences, i.e. scientific (experiential) metaphysics, can in 
no way replace classical metaphysics. Statements formulated in empirical 
sciences have got the nature of temporary hypotheses and are constantly 
put to a test of arranging them into the previous experiences in the proce-
dure of experimentum crucis. These hypotheses are important supplements 
of the scientific picture of the world in the empirical sciences, which is still 
not able to give us its complete picture. There are numerous and impor-
tant issues for a human being, such as ethical postulates, outside the area 
of scientific metaphysics.
 112 Zawirski, “Nauka i metafizyka (I),” p. 113.






In the definition of the universal opinion of reality within meta-empirical 
knowledge, Zawirski achieved an interesting differentiation between entia 
rationis, the world of ideal beings and entia naturae, the world of existence. 
Entia rationis exists independently of the learning subject. The world of 
these beings includes, among others, mathematical objects and the content 
of mathematical natural history. Entia rationis is not designed, but learned 
and discovered as everything else. Any novelty constitutes only their life in 
our mind as mental existences and as the defined content of our conscious-
ness, but not as eternal existences beyond time. This world also includes 
figments of our thoughts; it embraces, among others, metaphysical systems 
as well as all sorts of logical mistakes having the ideal being and both true 
and false theories114. However, if these systems or mistakes exist only in our 
thoughts, they truly belong to the world of mental existence.
The world of senses is also an example of mental construction. Speaking 
about mental subjects, and/or producing similar statements about reality 
are possible because there is absolute being, above individual one that, fol-
lowing Zawirski’s opinion, belongs both to the world of everlasting beings 
and to the world of existence.
The world of entia rationis is infinite and inexhaustible, beyond time and 
endless, unlimited by human thoughts. Human mind should, in Zawirski’s 
opinion, following Ockham’s principle, obtain out of this unlimited world 
of eternal beings only as much as it is necessary and indispensable to under-
stand the world of existence115. Moreover, it is forbidden to make a mistake 
and come down to a blind transfer of relations linked with entia rationis 
into the relations linked with entia naturae. The relations among entia 
rationis are ideal, while the relations among various forms of existence 
are dynamic. Considering an argument that the world of eternal beings 
incorporates the world of various forms of existence, indicates that all 
possible relations belong to entia rationis. The difference between the one 
and another relation is that entia naturae relations refer to psychological 
and temporal orders, what cannot be stated about the relations occurring 
between eternal beings. Then the relations, which can be implemented in 
 114 Zawirski, “O stosunku metafizyki do nauki,” p. 164.
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the sense picture of the world, define interdependence and temporal order 
among the empirical data.
Once again Zawirski referred to the problems presented in the post-
doctoral thesis in 1936 during the session of the 3rd Polish Philosophical 
Convention when he presented the paper entitled W sprawie syntezy 
naukowej116. In this presentation he introduced different argumentation 
in the defence of scientific metaphysics than the one presented in the work 
entitled Metoda aksjomatyczna a przyrodoznawstwo. Following Gӧdel’s 
statements on the incomplete systems, he argued that we should not refuse 
the sense of existence of metaphysical issues only because they are not 
subjected to empirical testing. He also pointed to the tasks of philosophy, 
stating that it should not undertake the issues for which it is not possible 
to find methods of their solution.




Part Two:  Critical remarks and comments 
on the concept of the scientific 
metaphysics of Zygmunt  
Zawirski
We are now going through the critical analysis of the philosophical 
results of Zygmunt Zawirski’s research. In the introduction to this work, 
I presented a discussion on the legitimacy of developing metaphysical is-
sues, which were undertaken by native philosophers of the turn of the 19th 
and 20th centuries. This presentation is a kind of justification for the ratio-
nale for discussing two approximations of scientific metaphysics, showing 
the timelines of philosophical research problems undertaken by Zawirski 
and Bornstein in the context of the turbulent development of formal and 
natural sciences.
Critical analysis of Zawirski’s philosophical achievements will be carried 
out by comparing the results of his research with other proposed results 
concerning the areas of research we are interested in at the time. In the 
analyses, I will pay special attention to the research of Polish philosophers 
of the first half of the 20th century.
1  On problem-rising axiomatization of 
mathematical natural science
Referring to the work Metoda aksjomatyczna a przyrodoznawstwo, it 
should be noted that among many analyses carried out by Zawirski, at-
tention should be paid to the strong desire to indicate all the philosophical 
consequences resulting from the axiomatization of mathematical natural 
science. In the whole work, Zawirski is looking for basic principles for this 
kind of natural science, while critically referring to the solutions proposed, 
among others, by Kant. According to Zawirski, in mathematical natural sci-
ences, one cannot rely on the principles perceived by the mind as necessary 
and common, to search for what Kant accepts as obvious and intuitively 
certain. In the era of the progress of particular sciences, the philosopher 
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respect, Zawirski aptly evaluates Kant’s philosophical research. He notes 
that Kant, in search for the principles of natural science, has referred to the 
philosophical consequences of Newtonian mechanics: the absoluteness of 
time and Euclideanism of space, and not the actual empirical content of this 
theory. Zawirski proposes to look at the Kantian philosophy in the context 
of the theory of relativity in the similar way as Kant noticed the value of 
Hume’s philosophy: “[…] if Kant said once, that Hume’s philosophy has 
woken him up from his dogmatic nap, the theory of relativity should wake 
up some philosophers to stop dreaming about Kantian system, as well as 
to distract them from blind trust in the a priori truths […]”117.
As Zawirski points out, the axiomatization of mathematical natural sci-
ence does not make references to any of Kantian assumptions. Based on 
these assumptions, one can consider Zawirski’s statement as consistent 
both with empiricism – since it makes references to experience – and apri-
orism, as it lacks any justification. Zawirski only ensures his readers that 
he makes references to mathematical axioms, but he neither formulates 
it anywhere, nor demonstrates the source of its origin. In his work, one 
can find only the observations that such axioms exist and that he “takes 
them into consideration”. Nevertheless there are questions that still need 
to be answered: where do these axioms come from and what is their con-
tent? Zawirski does not answer these questions. In his work Metoda 
aksjomatyczna a przyrodoznawstwo one can only find statements that: “The 
axiomatisation of natural science is possible thanks to the fact that we 
attribute the compatible verbal or mathematical symbols to certain char-
acteristics of the phenomena, which repeat themselves continually, aiming 
to achieve the complete unambiguousness through the smallest amount of 
these symbols”118. However, we cannot find there any formulation, dis-
cussion or identification of the source of origin of given axioms. What 
one can only find there are his claims that the fundamental axioms of the 
mathematical natural science are not obvious, and, moreover, they are very 
often inconsistent with or even contradictory to the intuitive obviousness119. 
 117 Zygmunt Zawirski, “Metoda aksjomatyczna a przyrodoznawstwo,” 
Kwartalnik Filozoficzny, Vol. 2, No. 1 (1923/1924), p. 44.
 118 Zawirski, “Metoda aksjomatyczna a przyrodoznawstwo,” p. 55.
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According to Zawirski, philosophers not only omitted this possibility, but 
even eliminated it. Therefore, Zawirski discusses extensively the argumen-
tation that philosophical research should not only seek intuitively obvious 
assumptions.
Zawirski notices that while performing the research on the fundamentals 
of science and philosophy what one should do is to move away from their 
mind any assumptions that seem to be obvious and certain, as they were 
already taken into consideration in initial stage of the development of sci-
ence. The progress in formal and natural sciences underlines unambiguously 
the fact of exceeding the intuitive obviousness in research. In order to make 
this question clearer, he formulates the postulate to gradually modify the 
principles, which in fact means that what matters is only the transmission 
of things which manifested themselves during the development of contem-
porary physics to the epistemology120. He claims that the significance of the 
fundamental concepts and principles of natural science, intuitively adopted 
in the past, should be rejected; otherwise, if we adopt them to describe our 
experience, we would not understand or interpret the mathematical axioms 
of the contemporary physics.
The formulation of the collection of axioms for given natural sciences 
and, even more, for scientific metaphysics is not an easy task to perform. 
On the ground of Polish philosophy such an endeavour was undertaken by 
Henryk Mehlberg, who strove to formalize the language of empirical science. 
Therefore, he suggested to translate a specific passage of the language of 
empirical science into a reistic language, namely such a structural language 
Jr, which would contain, apart from given logical constants, the individual 
names of material things and a certain number of constant name-forming 
functors. Reproducing in a structural language the division of sentences of 
the colloquial language into the ones that are directly finistically, inductively 
and probabilistically verifiable and unverifiable, Mehlberg introduced four 
kinds of constant name-forming functors: P, Q, R and S121.
Without going into greater details regarding given kind of functors, 
which were described in two articles Science et Positivisme, published in 
 120 Zawirski, “Metoda aksjomatyczna a przyrodoznawstwo,” p. 45.
 121 Henryk Mehlberg, “O niesprawdzalnych założeniach nauki,” Przegląd 
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“Studia Philosophica”122, one should notice the results of the operation 
of formalizing language of empirical sciences undertaken by the philoso-
pher. Mehlberg did the analysis of the verifiable and unverifiable sentences 
construed of the four functors, which showed that the lack of unverifiable 
functors in the sentences of language Jr does not constitute either the suffi-
cient or necessary condition for the verifiability of given sentences. It means 
that such a situation still remains independent from the specific structure 
of the language, which was used to characterize unverifiable sentences 
in Jr and, when translating the colloquial language into this language, it 
manifests the role of unverifiable sentences in the colloquial language. The 
results of the analyses are significant when it comes to the understanding of 
the postulate of verifiability of the theorems, underlined by the adherents of 
the neo-positivistic concepts of science, who bound the realization of this 
postulate with the construction of given language, in which it would not 
be possible to formulate any unverifiable sentence of the language of the 
empirical sciences. Rudolf Carnap in his works, i.e.: Logische Syntax der 
Sprache123 as well as Testability and Meaning124 did the research on the con-
struction of verifiable language. The formalized language of empirical sci-
ences presented by Carnap, corresponds to the part of language Jr described 
by Mehlberg, which does not contain functors of the group R and S.
The other important result of Mehlberg’s analyses is the fact that the 
language possessing only the functors that are verifiable does not guarantee 
that the empirical science theorems formulated in this language are verifi-
able125. Moreover, the language that lacks unverifiable sentences would be 
too poor to formulate empirical theories, based on unverifiable assumptions, 
which play a vital role in contemporary science. Consequently, eliminating 
the metaphysical elements out of science during a process of implemen-
tation of the postulate of verifiability does not immediately remove the 
 122 Henryk Mehlberg, “Science et Positivisme,” Studia Philosophica, Vol. 3 
(1948), pp. 211–293.
 123 Rudolf Carnap, Logische Syntax der Sprache, (Vien, Springer: 1934).
 124 Rudolf Carnap, “Testability and Meaning,” Philosophy of Science, Vol. 3 
(1936).
 125 The sentences which are construed of verifiable functors can be unverifiable, 
but also the functors, which contain unverifiable sentences can turn out to be 
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unverified sentences out of the properly construed language of the science. 
Eliminating the metaphysical theses from science is merely possible thanks 
to the research on logical structures of the specific scientific theories that 
is a research which is related to the identification of the role of verifiable 
and unverifiable sentences in these theories. Mehlberg’s analyses of the 
foundations of the nature of mathematical studies should be treated as the 
appropriate research on the logical structure regarding the present scien-
tific theories126.
When one expects a theory to be empirically verifiable, they encounter 
a possibility suggesting that the set of verifiable sentences, taken to consti-
tute a given theory, may stem from a non-contradictory and finite subset 
of verifiable sentences, which belongs to this theory as well. Such a theory 
consists of a verifiable axiomatic basis and can be called a theory with an 
internal basis. When the theory does not have a verifiable axiomatic basis, 
which means that this theory can be formulated only with the help of unver-
ifiable sentences, which can be used to derive all the verifiable consequences 
of this theory, then such theory should be called a verifiable theory with 
an external basis127.
An example of such an empirical theory of an external base is Euclidean 
geometry, which is to be understood in a physical sense. In geometry, 
understood as empirical science, not all synthetic theorems are empiri-
cally verifiable. For example, the volume of a real solid remains a testable 
synthetic one. In turn, synthetic theorems are unprovable regarding the 
position of points on the straight line, because there is no such directly 
verifiable sentence by which it would be possible to justify or disprove 
the theorem that there is always a third point between the two points on 
the straight line. It should be remembered that every definition attached 
to the axioms of geometry, in order to give it the character of an empir-
ical science, does not entitle us to treat the analyzed spatial compositions 
in an ideal manner. The straight line is not the same as the ray of light, 
which always remains a three-dimensional electromagnetic disorder in the 
physical space. Thus, the position of points on the straight line cannot be 
 126 Mehlberg, “O niesprawdzalnych założeniach nauki,” pp. 330–331.
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either confirmed or refuted. There is no doubt, however, that the axioms 
of geometry, supplemented by appropriate definitions, result in theorems, 
some of which remain empirically verifiable, and the whole theory becomes 
physical geometry.
According to Mehlberg, the role of unverifiable axioms in empirical 
geometry is typical for the whole mathematical nature studies. In this kind 
of natural science, one uses, for example, idealized notions of function: elec-
tric point charge, ideal gases or rigid bodies, which can be used to formulate 
unverifiable sentences, namely external basis of the individual empirical 
theories. Each of these bases contains verifiable consequences, which con-
stitute the core of the given empirical theory128.
The occurrence of unverified assumptions in empirical science is a fact; 
therefore the removal of unverified assumptions proposed by neo-positivists 
as devoid of meaningfulness by constructing such a language in which unto-
ward sentences cannot be constructed is for Mehlberg a non-objective oper-
ation for at least two reasons. The first reason is that in properly constructed 
languages, neo-positivists would not be able to formulate theories about the 
external base, and yet such theories played and play a significant role in the 
development of science. The second reason is that neither mathematicians 
nor physicists, when using geometry based on unproven assumptions auto-
matically become metaphysicists129.
Physicists limit themselves to recognizing only empirically verifiable 
results that stem from given assumptions, but they do not assess them. 
Empirically unverifiable sentences in science have only an auxiliary role, 
which is simultaneously essential to verifiable scientific theories, not vio-
lating Mehlberg’s postulate of verifiability130.
Methodological studies of empirical theories by Mehlberg strengthen 
the natural science analysis of Zawirski. In modern scientific theories, we 
point not only to intuitively unobvious assumptions, but also assumptions 
that, without being verifiable, play a fundamental role in these theories, 
designating their so-called external database.
 128 Mehlberg, “O niesprawdzalnych założeniach nauki,” pp. 333–334.
 129 Mehlberg, “O niesprawdzalnych założeniach nauki,” p. 334.
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Returning, however, to the main question of the possible axiomatiza-
tion of mathematical and scientific metaphysics, let us also pay attention 
to the attempts of the Polish philosophers to use the axiomatic method to 
systematize certain specific metaphysical issues undertaken in the 1930s. 
These studies also provide arguments regarding the possible building of 
metaphysics using the axiomatic method. Such research-based arguments, 
regarding the construction of metaphysics with the use of axiomatic method 
were offered by i.e. Jan Salamucha131, Jan Franciszek Drewnowski132 and 
Józef Maria Bocheński133. They were convinced that introducing this method 
into metaphysics could make it a deductive science based on mathematical 
logic. Such metaphysics could become a branch of logic, containing condi-
tional claims that can be obtained from theorems of logic by substituting in 
them for variables of metaphysical terms. Metaphysics could also become a 
separate science with its own primary dates and axioms. Any introduction 
of a new date would be based on a definition that goes back to the original 
terms, and any new claim, when accepted, would be justified on the basis 
of accepted axioms.
The above-mentioned philosophers, using the method of axiomatization 
to study or construct a specific deductive system, draw attention to the 
difficulty of formulating a complete set of axioms sufficient for all scien-
tific deduction. For example, Jan Salamucha, when studying the concept 
of deduction in Aristotle and St. Thomas states that these philosophers, 
 131 Jan Salamucha, “Dowód ex motu na istnienie Boga. Analiza logiczna 
argumentacji św. Tomasza z Akwinu,” in:  Jan Salamucha, Wiedza i 
wiara. Wybrane pisma filozoficzne, ed. Jacek Juliusz Jadacki and Kordula 
Świętorzecka (Lublin: Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 1997), pp. 333–364. First 
printing: Collectanea Theologica, Vol. 15, No. 54 (1934), pp. 53–92.
 132 Jan Franciszek Drewnowski, “Zarys programu filozoficznego,” Przegląd 
Filozoficzny, Vol. 37 (1934); and idem, “O potrzebie ścisłości,” Verbum, Vol. 
3, No. 3 (1936), pp. 455–472.
 133 Jan Maria Bocheński, “Zagadnienie przyczynowości u Neoscholastyków,” 
Przegląd Filozoficzny, Vol. 38 (1935); and: Jan Maria Bocheński, “Tradycja 
myśli katolickiej a ścisłość,” Myśl katolicka wobec logiki współczesnej, Studia 
Gneznensia, Vol. 15 (1937); and: Jan. M. Bocheński, “O metodzie teologii 
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although they did not present all the assumed theories that they regarded as 
axioms, still left some explanations on the basis of which we can see what 
character these basic principles, which we now call axioms, have.134. The 
classic metaphysical concepts do not easily succumb to the modern rigors of 
the exactness of the deductive system. In my opinion, however, we should 
not give up trying to refine and systematize the earlier results of human 
thought. The fact that these concepts using mathematical logic disintegrate, 
as Jan Łukasiewicz sees it, like “houses of cards” does not mean that they 
are devoid of cognitive values.
Zawirski struggles with the same difficulty when trying to axiomatize 
mathematical natural science. However, he was unable to formulate a set 
of axioms of this natural science, but he focused upon a discussion of their 
character and the role they should fulfil in a given theory treated as a deduc-
tive system. To this day, from what it is known, only a few researchers have 
managed to formulate a complete set of axioms of specific scientific theories. 
I am referring here to the results obtained by R. Montague in the traditional 
(i.e. in formal language) axiomatization of classical mechanics and the many 
axiomatizations made in a structuralist approach (so-called axiomatization 
by the definition of a theoretical predicate, made in an informal language), 
e.g. classical particle mechanics (Suppes, Sugar, McKinsey, 1953135) of 
classic rigid body mechanics (Adams, 1959136), classical equilibrium ther-
modynamics (Garrido, 1986137). However, the proposal to build the axi-
omatization of mathematical natural science should be treated as an open 
problem for scientific research.
 134 Jan Salamucha, “Pojęcie dedukcji u Arystotelesa i św. Tomasza,” in:  Jan 
Salamucha, Wiedza i wiara. Wybrane pisma filozoficzne, ed. Jacek Juliusz 
Jadacki and Kordula Świętorzecka (Lublin: Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 
1997), p. 277.
 135 John Charles McKinsey, A.C. Sugar, Patrick Suppes, “Axiomatic Foundations 
of Classical Particle Mechanics.” Journal of Rational Mechanics and Analisis, 
Vol. 2, 1953, pp. 253-272.
 136 Ernst W. Adams, “The Foundations of Rigid Body Mechanics and the Derivation 
of its Laws from Those of Particle Mechanics,” in: The Axiomatic Method, 
Henkin, Suppes, Tarski (ed.), North-Holland, Amsterdam: 1959, pp. 250–265.
 137 Julian Garrido Garrido, “Axiomatic Basis of Equilibrium Classical 
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Moreover, Zawirski was the first philosopher who tried to use the 
axiomatic method in physics, and his work, Metoda aksjomatyczna a 
przyrodoznawstwo was widely discussed. On October 24, 1924, the 
Institute of Philosophy in Warsaw organized a public discussion on the 
axiomatization of physics, with active participation of, among others, Cz. 
Białobrzeski, B. Bornstein, B. Gawecki, S. Kobyłecki, T. Kotarbiński and 
J. Łukasiewicz. Not everyone agreed with the suggestion to use the deduc-
tive system to develop physical theories. The principles of the construction 
of the deductive system in the phase of axiomatization seemed to be too rig-
orous and incompatible with physics, i.e. an empirical science. B. Gawecki 
claimed that such formal proceeding would make the given phenomena 
subject to general principles, whilst physics, being an empirical science, 
should not depend on formal principles138.
To evaluate Zawirski’s words about the importance of the research on 
the use of formal science methods in theories of physics and scientific meta-
physics, one should compare his studies with works of some other out-
standing researchers. For instance, the topics concerning the axiomatization 
of physical theories were often analyzed by, among others, M. Heller139, 
F.S.C. Northrop140, K.R. Popper141, P.  Suppes142, M.  Przełęcki143 and 
R. Wójcicki144. It should be mentioned that M. Przełęcki claimed that, 
when looking at it from the perspective of logical research, every scien-
tific theory can be perceived as a methodological structure. Moreover, 
 138 Bolesław Gawecki, in:  Biuletyn Posiedzeń Naukowych Warszawskiego 
Instytutu Filozoficznego (Warszawa: 1924–1925), pp. 24–26.
 139 Michał Heller, “Kryterium falsyfikacji a ogólna teoria względności,” Studia 
Philosophiae Christianae, Vol. 6, No. 1 (1970), pp. 41–67.
 140 Filmer Stuart Cuckow Northrop, The Logic of the Sciences and the Humanities 
(New York: Macmillan Co., 1960), pp. 61–63, 135.
 141 Karl Raimund Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discavery (London: Hutchinson 
Publishing Group Ltd., 1959), pp. 42–75.
 142 Patrick Suppes, “Axioms for Relativistic Kinematics with or without Parity,” 
in: Studies in the Methodology and Foundations of Science (Dordrecht: 1969), 
pp. 194–196.
 143 Marian Przełęcki, “Teorie empiryczne w ujęciu logiki współczesnej,” in: Marian 
Przełęcki, Fragmenty filozoficzne (Warszawa: PWN, 1967), pp. 75–101.
 144 Ryszard Wójcicki, Metodologia formalna nauk empirycznych (Wrocław-
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the approach of the empirical theory in the form of a formalized axiom-
atic system is not its faithful representation, but a logical reconstruction. 
Such proceedings are acceptable because not only these reconstructions, 
but also structural analyses of particular issues, do not lead to erroneous 
consequences. According to Przełęcki, very often in the study of empir-
ical theories in a formalized form a mistake of identifying the relation of 
logical relation with the relation of justification is made; therefore, it is 
impossible to ascribe logical assumptions from axioms that are to justify 
other empirical assertions145.
Modern philosophy of science increasingly talks about the axiomatiza-
tion or formalization of empirical scientific theories146. Such a reconstruc-
tion consists in a modification of the theory where each element of it is 
unambiguously defined conceptually. In this way, the conceptual apparatus 
of a given theory is developed. In addition, the reconstruction clearly defines 
a set of sentences that are to be recognized as rules in a given theory and 
determines the evidence used on the basis of a given theory.
The reconstruction of issues of physics can be found in the M. Heller’s 
work Fizyka ruchu i czasoprzestrzeni147. Considering the formalization of 
movement, time and space from Aristotle to the end of the 19th century, 
presented in the work of Heller, it should be admitted that the problems 
and theories of physics are subject to development and their axiomatization 
is progressing with them. Thus, the construction of deductive systems of 
empirical science proposed by Zawirski remains valid today. However, at 
the same time, it is difficult to agree with the statement that the axiomat-
ization (formalization) of all physics will be possible, and thus, it will be 
possible to formalize all mathematical natural science.
2  Justification in natural sciences and metaphysics
The starting point in the methodological discussions conducted by Polish 
philosophers of the first half of the 20th century is the strict, definition-like 
description of the terms used for analyses and the definition of the forms 
 145 Przełęcki, “Teorie empiryczne w ujęciu logiki współczesnej,” pp. 76–84.
 146 Wójcicki, Metodologia formalna nauk empirycznych, pp. 19–67.
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of refinement of the applied research procedures. It was assumed that it 
was only then that one could responsibly undertake attempts to critically 
refer to other methodological positions, (thus showing their value), but 
also to pay attention to inaccuracies present in the forms of reasoning that 
were carried out. Each precisely formulated definition of the terminology 
of a given field contributes to the development of specific research, at the 
same time making it impossible to conduct unclear, often sterile, philo-
sophical disputes. This situation expresses a tendency present among Polish 
philosophers to practice scientific philosophy based on strong, solid cul-
ture of logical thinking, as exemplified by methodological analyses of Dina 
Sztejnbarg, Maria Kokoszyńska, Henryk Mehlberg and Jan Łukasiewicz, 
that concerned the problems of explaining various phenomena and nat-
ural laws, as well as inevitability of the occurrence of metaphysical theses 
in science
It is worth noting that many empirical critics and positivists, when 
expressing opposition to the possibility of using metaphysical theses in 
the natural sciences formulate arguments that are meant to prove that 
metaphysical theses are unprovable, unprofitable, accidental, arbitrary 
and are not an economic way of presenting facts; therefore, they do not 
contribute to the development of science. Such an opinion was presented 
by Józefa Kodisowa who, from the position of an empirical critic, pro-
posed a program of scientific philosophy based on the theory of cognition. 
Władysław Heinrich was also of a similar opinion. Kodisowa sought to 
establish a form of experience that was to be “pure”, deprived of indi-
vidual and accidental admixtures, free from contamination with meta-
physical “views on the world”148. Zawirski, as well as the other Polish 
methodologists, did not agree with this statement. While analyzing each 
of the abovementioned arguments, they were able to demonstrate that the 
claims suggesting omitting metaphysical hypotheses in natural sciences were 
unjustified149. For instance, Dina Sztejnbarg in her analyses discussed the 
 148 Józefa Kodisowa, “Metafizyka w nauce,” Przegląd Filozoficzny, Vol. 16 
(1913), pp. 433–442.
 149 Dina Sztejnbarg, “Zagadnienie wyjaśniania zjawisk i praw przyrodniczych w 
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statements of positivists and critics of empiricism, with reference to works 
by E. Meyerson150, S. Jevons151, E. Navill152 and H. Poincaré153.
The results of analyses regarding the noxiousness of metaphysical 
hypotheses for the development of science, presented by Sztejnbarg, are 
undoubtedly a reinforcement for empiricism developed by Zawirski, but 
also for meta-empiricism. In her opinion, a metaphysical thesis is not 
a factor delaying the development of science. The role of metaphysical 
hypotheses lies in translating and predicting facts. Only the uncritical use 
of metaphysical hypotheses is dangerous, but if experience confirms or 
refutes the consequences of the adopted hypotheses, then each time our 
knowledge about reality increases and this is a predicative value. Science 
tends not only to explain the greatest number of laws and facts, but also 
strives to discover new laws and anticipate new facts154.
Zawirski explains in an insufficient way the legitimacy of accepting this 
kind of general, as he calls, synthetic philosophy155. In 1948, he returns 
 150 Dina Sztejnbarg refers also to arguments that can be found in:  Emil 
Meyerson, Identité et réalité (Paris: F. Alcan, 1908), p. 439. More generally 
on the assumptions of Meyerson’s epistemology see: Izydora Dąmbska, “Emil 
Meyerson. Główne założenia jego epistemologji,” Przegląd Filozoficzny, Vol. 
37(1934).
 151 Stanley Jevons, The Principle of Science (London – New York: Macmillan, 1877).
 152 Ernest Neville, La logique de l’hipothese (Paris:  Librairie Germer 
Bailliere, 1880).
 153 Henri Poincaré, Nauka i hipoteza, tłum. Maksymilian Henryk Horowitz 
(Warszawa: Jakob Mortkowicz Press, 1908).
 154 Dina Sztejnbarg writes also on the criteria and characteristics of nature 
laws, with reference to a wide range of methodological literature in: Dina 
Sztejnbarg, “Zagadnienie indeterminizmu na terenie fizyki współczesnej,” 
Przegląd Filozoficzny, Vol. 35 (1932), pp. 34–69. The critical analysis of the 
notion of the nature law in Mill can be found in: Dina Sztejnbarg, “Pojęcie 
prawa przyrodniczego u J. St. Milla,” Przegląd Filozoficzny, Vol. 34 (1931), 
p. 17–38. Apart from abovementioned works, these topics are interestingly 
described in works by Izydora Dąmbska and Joachim Metallmann: Izydora 
Dąmbska, O prawach w nauce (Lwów: Wyd. Gubrynowicz i Syn, 1933); 
Joachim Metallmann, Determinizm nauk przyrodniczych (Kraków: Nakładem 
Polskiej Akademii Umiejętności, 1934).
 155 Zygmunt Zawirski, O stosunku metafizyki do nauki, ed. Michał Sepioło 
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to these issues in his work Uwagi o metodzie nauk przyrodniczych. It is 
only in this work where one can find the arguments that justify the forms 
of empirical knowledge that Zawirski presented in his previous works. It 
can be stated that in the first decades of the 20th century, Zawirski did not 
yet have methodological arguments referring to mathematical logic in the 
full elaboration of scientific metaphysics. For its justification, he referred 
only to the views of earlier philosophers, including Leibniz, Hume, Kant, 
Schopenhauer and Mill.
We have to note that in the 1930s a breakthrough in the methodological 
studies of Zawirski was made, which can be concluded while studying his 
work W sprawie syntezy naukowej. The interest in this study area was due 
to the comments made in the native environment by Popper’s Logik der 
Forschung from 1934. This work came across a well-prepared ground for 
methodological research, a good example of which are the methodological 
analyses of science development elaborated in 1929 by Sztejnbarg. I think 
that in the work of Sztejnbarg we are getting acquainted with the strong 
enough arguments that Zawirski could have invoked in the study of empir-
ical sciences, but he did not. It turned out that he preferred to verify and/or 
refute the issues related to the oncoming hypotheses and scientific theories, 
which he gave a more developed character than Popper originally had pro-
posed, which was a topic of discussion in the first part of our manuscript.
I think that it is would be useful to have a look at a few examples of 
the works of Polish methodologists, so as to show their value on the one 
hand, and to indicate their importance for the solid construction of scien-
tific metaphysics consistent with Zawirski’s proposal. These works provide 
solid arguments for the presence of metaphysical theses in detailed sciences.
Dina Sztejberg, in her works, Zagadnienie wyjaśniania zjawisk i praw 
przyrodniczych w nowej literaturze metodologicznej (1929), Pojęcie prawa 
przyrodniczego u J. ST. Milla156 (1931) and Zagadnienie indeterminizmu 
na terenie fizyki współczesnej157 (1932), not only critically comments on 
some selected theses presented by both positivists’ and critics’ of empiri-
cism, but also formulates arguments that justify the presence as well as 
 156 Sztejnbarg, “Pojęcie prawa przyrodniczego u J. ST. Milla,” pp. 17–38.
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the importance of metaphysical theses in natural science. She also draws 
attention to the usefulness of his arguments in predicting new phenomena, 
if we anticipate this by: X predicted the phenomenon of Z on the basis of 
the natural thesis T, if and only if X stated that from the thesis T results 
(inferentially within the system of natural sciences) a natural thesis, of 
which Z is a special case158.
According to Sztejnbarg, the metaphysical hypotheses are constructed 
in such a way that they have the highest degree of probability and in this 
respect do not differ from non-metaphysical hypotheses used in science. 
Sztejnbarg disagrees with the positivists proclaiming the unpredictability 
of metaphysical theses by justifying or disproving them in the experimental 
way. According to Sztejnbarg, it is necessary to notice the dependence of 
the degree of justification of explanatory theses on their value of explaining 
facts or natural laws. The dependence of the degree of justification on 
the value of explaining a given hypothesis does not depend on whether 
it is a metaphysical or natural thesis. Sztejnbarg justifies this statement 
referring to Bayes’s theorem on the probability of hypotheses due to their 
consequences159.
The positivist postulate of disregarding metaphysical thesis to explain 
facts or natural laws, only due to the lack of full justification of these theses 
is, in Sztejnbarg’s opinion, insufficiently justified and is inconsistent with the 
development of natural sciences, in which metaphysical thesis often play a 
key role and contribute to their unquestionable progress in getting to know 
nature. In the development of knowledge on nature, the hypotheses cannot 
be justified at the very beginning; it is only after some time when they can be 
justified through experience as well as with the use of inductive method160.
Another methodological problem is the inevitable penetration of meta-
physical issues into scientific research. According to Maria Kokoszyńska, 
 158 D. Sztejnbarg, “Zagadnienie wyjaśniania zjawisk i praw przyrodniczych w 
nowej literaturze metodologicznej,” pp. 85–86.
 159 Charlie Dunbar Broad, “On the Relation between Induction and Probability,” 
Mind, Vol. 27 (1918), p.  401; and Adam Grobler, Metodologia nauki 
(Kraków: Wyd. Aureus – Znak, 2006), pp. 46–51.








Justification in natural sciences and metaphysics 93
this can be done in two different ways. One of them is the adoption of 
certain methods of recognition of theorems in science, which leads to a 
specific way of acquiring scientific beliefs. The second possibility of pene-
trating metaphysics to science is the presence of certain types of terms and 
theorems, which in turn affects the use of a specific language of science161.
When reaching the scientific conclusions, Kokoszyńska distinguishes 
two methods: a method of an a priori evidence and an empirical method. 
Using the first method, one derives theorems from adopted axioms. When 
it comes to the empirical method, Kokoszyńska formulates the definition 
of a sentence which is empirically verifiable:
„the sentence S is acknowledged on the basis of the empirical method, if there 
exists a finite sequence of classes C1, C2, …, Cn, which consists of sentences that 
meet the following conditions:
 1) S is adopted due to non-contradictory sentences of the class C1, from which it 
results or due to the sentences of the class which stem from it;
 2) every sentence of the class Ci (i = 1, 2, …, n-1) remains in such a relation to 
the next class Ci+1; and
 3) every sentence of the class Cn remains in this relation to the class C, that is to 
the already adopted perceptive sentences162.
One can assign a specific degree of credibility to every verifiable sentence 
due to a given assumption, which is based on the probability theory or 
inductive logic163.
In addition to these two methods of reaching scientific beliefs, 
Kokoszyńska mentions a dogmatic method that introduces metaphysical 
elements to scientific knowledge. The dogmatist acts, on the one hand, as 
if the sentence he considers was in the opinion of a given language, which 
should be recognized by the rules of being, and this is not the case. On 
the other hand, the same sentence gives the character of a sentence that 
concerns reality. Otherwise, such a sentence would only be a linguistic 
 161 Maria Kokoszyńska, “W sprawie walki z metafizyką”, Przegląd Filozoficzny, 
Vol. 41 (1938), pp. 9–13. The translation of the paper titled On the Fight 
against Metaphysics, was read at the International Philosophy Congress, which 
took place in Paris in 1937.
 162 Kokoszyńska, “W sprawie walki z metafizyką,” p. 14.
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convention. Where only the language rules are decisive about the truth or 
falseness of sentences, the same logical value of these sentences is accepted 
based on the meanings of language expressions taken into consideration164. 
The close relationship that exists between the meaning of expressions and 
language rules, which in turn determine the way of using these expressions, 
was noted by Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz165. In the case of assigning a greater or 
lesser degree of credibility to a sentence than – because of the premises – the 
logic of induction is entitled to, we also have to use the dogmatic method 
to reach our beliefs. This means that in cases where metaphysical elements 
appear, in addition to the methods of acknowledging theorems, i.e. the 
method of a priori proof and the empirical method, dogmatic methods are 
introduced, which are often understood as unscientific ways of reaching 
convictions, or as irrational and unlawful methods of recognizing certain 
theorems166.
If, through metaphysics, we understand a set of sentences consisting 
exclusively of synthetic sentences with a non-empirical content, introduced 
by dogmatic means, metaphysics understood in this way is rightly rejected 
by the supporters of the Vienna Circle. In the face of such metaphysics, 
they take a negative attitude, claiming that the sentences of metaphysics 
are meaningless, or that they are not interested in science from a theoretical 
point of view. With this in mind, Zygmunt Zawirski and Jan Łukasiewicz 
argue that metaphysics has to refer to sentences having an empirical char-
acter, and thus a confirmable character. Although metaphysical problems 
have a general dimension and are not easily solved, their resolution ulti-
mately comes down to resolving sentences that are perceptive. Metaphysics 
understood in this way gains full citizenship rights in science.
In his works, Zawirski elaborates on the issue of verifiability of hypoth-
eses in natural sciences. For the supporters of neo-positivism it was clear 
 164 Maria Kokoszyńska, “O pewnym warunku semantycznej teorii wiedzy”. 
Przegląd Filozoficzny, Vol. 44, No. 4 (1948), pp. 372–381.
 165 Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz, Język i znaczenie, trans. F. Zeidler, in: Język i poznanie 
(wybór pism z lat 1920–1939), t. I (Warszawa: PWN, 1985), pp. 145–174.
 166 Izydora Dąmbska, “Irracjonalizm a poznanie naukowe,” Kwartalnik 







Justification in natural sciences and metaphysics 95
that the verifiability is the right criterion and all of the scientific statements 
are subject to it, whilst the metaphysical theorems that do not comply with 
this postulate are being excluded from the range of scientific theorems167. 
Henryk Mehlberg solved this issue in an interesting way, drawing the 
readers’ attention not only to the introduction of metaphysical elements 
to science, but also proving that not all theorems of the empirical science 
are verifiable.
As Mehlberg rightly notices, another very important issue is the question 
whether unverifiable sentences are present in science and if they are vital 
for science. When it comes to a new significance of unverifiable sentences, 
Mehlberg underlines all of the possible consequences that stem from the 
fact of not including the unverifiable sentences in science168. Mehlberg 
showed that not only in metaphysics, but also in scientific theories, unver-
ifiable sentences play vital role, even when we assume that in verifiable 
sentences one can include, apart from the statements that can be proved 
or disproved through a finite or infinite set of observations, even such 
statements, which can be made possible or impossible by observations169. 
Acknowledging the presence of unverifiable statements in science one does 
not resign from the possibility of isolating it from metaphysics170. Similar 
remarks on the presence of metaphysical issues in science were presented 
by Maria Kokoszyńska. She claimed that one should demonstrate to what 
extent the metaphysical elements that are present in science are acceptable 
and/or unacceptable171.
According to Mehlberg, it is first necessary to clearly define what we 
mean by verbal sentences, since the existing terms of the verbal sentence 
are not satisfactory and there are many discrepancies in this respect. In 
his opinion, both analytical and synthetic sentences are verifiable172. At 
 167 Izydora Dąmbska, “ ‘Koło Wiedeńskie’. Założenia epistemologiczne ‘Koła’ 
i niektóre ich konsekwencje,” Przegląd Współczesny, Vol. 125 (1932), 
pp. 379–388.
 168 Mehlberg, “O niesprawdzalnych założeniach nauki,” p. 320.
 169 Henryk Mehlberg, “Science et Positivisme,” Studia Philosophica, Vol. 3 
(1948), pp. 211–293.
 170 Mehlberg, “O niesprawdzalnych założeniach nauki,” p. 320.
 171 Kokoszyńska, “W sprawie walki z metafizyką,” pp. 9–24.
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the same time, only synthetic sentences can be called empirically verifi-
able sentences. Among these sentences, due to the type of procedure that 
verifies their truthfulness or falsity, directly verifiable and indirectly verifi-
able sentences are distinguished. The indirect verifiability of a given sentence 
boils down to its being derived from certain directly verifiable sentences. 
Each positively verifiable sentence results from certain directly verifiable 
sentences, whereas each negatively verifiable sentence results from the 
denial of certain directly verifiable sentences. Therefore, one should affix 
the name of empirically verifiable sentences only to those sentences which 
are simultaneously positively and negatively verifiable.
Mehlberg’s testability criterion is stronger than that presented by 
Zawirski, who does not take into account the simultaneous positive and 
negative checking of a given sentence or hypothesis, but only evaluates 
between these methods of checking. Zawirski accepts the asymmetry 
between the positive and negative results of testing the hypothesis with the 
reservation of no change in the concepts included in a given hypothesis or 
sentence being checked. Valuable, however, is Zawirski’s remark regarding 
Duomen’s observation of experimentum crucis i.e. that physical experience 
can never refute one isolated hypothesis, but only the entire set that creates 
the whole theory of a given phenomenon, Zawirski states that although 
Duhem is theoretically right, in practice the situation is not that hopeless. 
Recalling the history of physics, Zawirski notes that although initially there 
were two inconsistent theories, a corpuscular and a wave one, in quantum 
mechanics, one is not a negation of the other173.
Coming back to Mehlberg’s criterion of verifiability one should agree 
that the core of the empirical nature of an indirectly verifiable sentence is 
the possibility to justify and disprove through the appropriately chosen and 
directly verifiable sentences. Thus, one can be sure that they do not introduce 
the metaphysical sentences to the set of empirical sentences. It cannot be 
done only with the help of positive verifiability, where one can understand 
the empirical verifiability as an alternative constructed of the directly veri-
fiable sentence and any metaphysical sentence. The metaphysical sentences 
 173 Zygmint Zawirski, “Uwagi o metodzie nauk przyrodniczych,” Przegląd 
Filozoficzny, Vol. 44, No. 4 (1948), pp. 317–318.
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introduced in such a way to empirical sciences could not be deleted out of 
them, as they cannot be disproved through experience. The same applies to 
the situation in which one uses only the negative verifiability of empirical 
sentences. In these cases, one should treat as verifiable only the empirical 
sentences built of the conjunction of any directly verifiable sentence and a 
metaphysical sentence.
According to Mehlberg, in more complex cases, appropriate sets of 
immediately verifiable sentences are needed to ensure positive or negative 
verifiability. For example, for a positive check of the product of directly 
verifiable sentences, a few directly verifiable sentences are needed, and one 
directly verifiable sentence suffices for its overthrow. On the other hand, 
one directly verifiable sentence suffices to justify an alternative formed from 
immediately verifiable sentences, and the refutation of it requires a set of 
such sentences. Sentences that can be justified and refuted by means of 
two consistent and finite sets of directly verifiable sentences were called by 
Mehlberg as being finistically verifiable174.
However, it remains an issue unexplained by Mehlberg: what exactly 
means that a given sentence can be proved or substantiated by referring to 
a given set of sentences that are directly verifiable. It is not so rare that some 
concepts of speculative metaphysics work out their theoretical constructions 
based on empirical data. There is no shortage of such representatives of phi-
losophy, for whom the facts of regeneration or autoregulation of organisms 
remain a sufficient argument for vitalism, and the achievements of quantum 
theory support spiritualist positions. In each of these cases, the representa-
tives of metaphysical positions accept the possibility of proving or at least 
substantiating the theses derived from directly verifiable sentences.
The results of methodological research by Zawirski, presented in the 
perspective of only selected elements of the methodological discussion of 
the 1930s and 1940s, allow for an overall assessment of the use of this 
research to build a scientific metaphysics referring to experience. Certainly, 
I must say that the advancement of methodological research of native 
philosophers gave the basis for using them to more fully present the con-
cept of empirology. Unfortunately, Zawirski did not attempt such a test. 
 174 Mehlberg, “O niesprawdzalnych założeniach nauki,” p. 323.
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Among metaphysical reflections outlined in Nauka i metafizyka, as well 
as in O stosunku metafizyki do nauk, he become interested only in the 
possibility of the development of the synthesis of natural science, which 
we are going to critically comment on in what follows. We will do this by 
paying attention to the area of discussion from the 1930s regarding the 
elaboration of a general theory of reality referring to the results of detailed 
scientific research.
3  Disputes over the synthesis of particular sciences
In the thirties in the works and speeches of, among others, Zygmunt 
Zawirski, Jan Łukasiewicz, Maria Kokoszyńska, Roman Ingarden, Bolesław 
Gawecki, Tadeusz Garbowski and Joachim Metallmann, one can notice 
a very clear polemical tone with the views of the representatives of the 
Vienna Circle regarding the synthesis of scientific knowledge. This issue 
was taken at the Third Congress of Polish Philosophy in 1936 in Krakow. 
However, the philosophical position in this regard was not agreed, but the 
discussions at this congress were to set the direction for further research 
into the relationship between science and philosophy and to build scientific 
metaphysics based on the axiomatic method175, as Jan Łukasiewicz notes. 
Such attempts have already been undertaken by Zygmunt Zawirski (in the 
work The Axiomatic Method and Natural Science176, and in particular in 
the fourth chapter titled: Axiomatic Method and Reality) and by Benedykt 
Bornstein, in the first volume of The Architectonics of the World (we will 
critically look into this work in the second volume).
The opponents of the generally understood metaphysics often drew at-
tention to the need to synthesize human knowledge. The synthesizing views 
of their knowledge constituted, after all, some kind of substitute for meta-
physical decisions. Representatives of the neo-positivism of the 1930s, in 
the unification of knowledge, referred to the representatives of classical 
positivism, such as Comte and Spencer, but on the other hand, they tried 
 175 Jan Łukasiewicz, “Co dała filozofii współczesna logika matematyczna?,” 
Przegląd Filozoficzny, Vol. 39, No. 4 (1936), pp. 325–326.
 176 Zygmunt Zawirski, “Metoda aksjomatyczna a rzeczywistość,” Kwartalnik 
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to refer to the concept of Leibniz’s mathesis universalis, which Zawirski 
also points out177. This second reference is unfortunate up to the point, 
as it introduces some metaphysical elements to the constructed system of 
knowledge. It should be noted, however, that in the vast majority, the 
representatives of neo-positivism, while considering the synthesis of scien-
tific knowledge, generally proposed an encyclopedic approach rather than 
constructing a synthesis for which non-scientific and metaphysical elements 
should be introduced.
Zawirski, resolving the problem of the synthesis of human knowledge, 
is in favor of the impossibility of carrying out a demarcation line between 
scientific synthesis and metaphysics. According to Zawirski, the funda-
mental undecidability of metaphysical hypotheses cannot be recognized. No 
metaphysical or scientific hypothesis can be directly verified. We can only 
talk about the verifiability of the consequences of the accepted hypotheses. 
In this respect, metaphysical and scientific hypotheses do not differ from 
each other. This situation is not altered by the acceptance of the Popperian 
criterion of falsifiability of hypotheses178. Zawirski agrees that falsification 
is an effective method of testing hypotheses.179
It is impossible to build a synthesis of human knowledge without the par-
ticipation of science and metaphysics. According to Zawirski, in constructing 
a synthesizing approach to knowledge, all scientific terms, as well as terms 
of scientific metaphysics under the control of experience are used. Zawirski 
defends such a metaphysics in which deadlines must be subject to the con-
trol of experience, and all its theses should fall under the criterion of veri-
fiability. The scope of metaphysics understood in this way should include 
the issue of temporal-spatial structure and dynamic reality, as well as the 
problem of determinism, indeterminism or purpose180. In building the system 
 177 Zygmunt Zawirski, “W sprawie syntezy naukowej,” Przegląd Filozoficzny, 
Vol. 39, No. 4 (1936), p. 347.
 178 It should be noted that the methodological decisions of Popper were well known 
to Polish philosophers in the 1930s, cf. Krzysztof Śleziński, “Dyskusje nad 
popperyzmem w filozofii polskiej pierwszej połowy XX wieku [Discussions on 
Popperism in Polish Philosophy of the First Half of the Twentieth Century],” 
Studia z Filozofii Polskiej, Vol. I, 2006, pp. 243–259.
 179 Zawirski, “W sprawie syntezy naukowej,” pp. 347–348.
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of scientific metaphysics, Zawirski does not rule out the inclusion of intuitive 
cognition. However, due to the possibility of uncertainty and even contra-
diction of intuitive data, one should always consider intuitive convictions 
in an axiomatic system. Only then can you be sure of what you want to say 
and that what is said is well understood by others. Recognition of beliefs in 
a system including an appropriate arrangement of sentences together with 
their consequences never exonerates us from the obligation to look for the 
equivalent beliefs in the experience. The system created must be susceptible 
to verification, but also to falsification181. This approach to building a system 
is nothing new. Zawirski notes that even in building the simplest deductive 
system we deal with the intuitive adoption of its assumptions.
It is worth noting that Zawirski does not remove a priori or intuitive 
elements from learning about reality. What he demands above all is that 
the intuitive data can be included in the system, which then should be 
confronted with experience. According to Zawirski, such systems can be 
constructed more and each of them can be accompanied by an equally 
strong degree of obviousness. Zawirski accurately expresses the fact that 
the same set of intuitive data can equally speak for many theories built and 
related to these data. The final decision, after which one should back the 
theoretical preparation of intuitive data, is decided by experience182.
What’s more, Zawirski notes that scientific knowledge as well as scien-
tific metaphysics are devoid of Leibniz’s illusions regarding the possibility 
of resolving any scientific problem. Only in the case of complete systems, 
it can be assumed that the decidability and reasonableness overlap. We 
are dealing with incomplete systems much more often. Therefore, when 
investigating such systems, one should take into account the achievements 
of Kurt Gödel. In elaborated systems containing arithmetic you can con-
struct such sentences, which – on the basis of this system, when referring 
to its valid methods – cannot be either proved or refuted. Decisiveness of 
sentences will, however, be possible in the case of enriching the language 
system with higher-order variables of logic types. Gödel’s discovery reveals 
 181 Zawirski, “W sprawie syntezy naukowej,” p. 348.
 182 In contemporary methodological solutions, however, this matter is not easy 
to resolve; for example, it is boiled down to the problem whether experience 
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the importance of modern logic and the results of research in the field of 
semantics in determining a language for a system unifying our knowledge. 
According to Zawirski, the so-called limitation assumptions have changed 
the cognitive situation. Traditional epistemology must be reborn by consid-
ering research in the field of semantics and metalogics183. A similar renewal 
should meet traditional metaphysics, which is to establish closer links with 
the achievements of particular sciences184.
Bearing in mind the critical assessment of proposals for developing a 
synthesis of particular sciences, I have to refer to many analyses of this 
issue undertaken at that time. It is only in this perspective that it will turn 
out in what scope Zawirski presented valuable analyses, and at what level 
there was a discussion concerning the synthesis of particular sciences in the 
Polish philosophical community. We will therefore go on to discuss selected 
concepts, critical analyses of this issue, the possibility of synthesis of partic-
ular sciences and – in the next subsection – the relationship between science 
and metaphysics, to show the richness of thought and, on this basis, assess 
the position presented by Zawirski.
A concept proposed by Roman Ingarden, completely different from the 
ideas that referred to the synthesis of detailed sciences discussed so far, paid 
attention to such aspects, which are different from the issues of particular 
sciences. The said issues include ontological problems and these metaphys-
ical aspects that concern the actual essence of the objects being studied185. In 
the detailed sciences, particular facts are taken into account concerning the 
occurrence of appropriate physical and psychological processes as well as 
the detection and justification of relevant claims. As part of these teachings, 
one cannot capture the actual essence of actually occurring processes or 
merely capture the essential content and nature of individual claims. Since 
sensory experience does not teach us which features of objects are relevant 
and which are not, it follows that these kinds of issues do not belong to 
 183 See: Zygmunt Zawirski, “Doniosłość badań logicznych i semantycznych dla 
teoryj fizyki współczesnej,” pp. 25–30. The paper mentioned here was deliv-
ered at the International Philosophical Congress in Paris in 1937.
 184 Zawirski, “W sprawie syntezy naukowej,” p. 349.
 185 Roman Ingarden, “Czy zadaniem filozofii jest synteza nauk szczegółowych,” 
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particular sciences. According to Ingarden, it is a mistake to argue that 
attempts to understand the essence of the subject of particular sciences are 
meaningless and insoluble186.
Following Ingarden, there should be noticed the difference between the 
development of the synthesis of particular sciences and the epistemological, 
ontological and metaphysical studies. The task of the theory of cognition is 
to detect the general view of cognition. This theory examines the existence 
of fixed and variable content in the general idea of cognition. This theory 
also detects the relationships between the components of this idea content 
and determines the range of their variability187. Research conducted in the 
field of the theory of cognition should ultimately lead to the formulation 
of a certain system of axioms and the recognition of elementary terms of 
cognition in it. Another task of the theory of cognition is to study the less 
general ideas falling under the general idea of cognition, and to determine 
the relationships between these ideas. The solution of these tasks allows 
to determine the conditions that certain individual objects must meet, 
including ideal or mathematical objects, or possible relationships between 
these objects. This way one will be able to obtain a system of statements 
able to serve as criteria for the cognitive value of the results obtained in the 
fields of other sciences, particular sciences included188.
According to Ingarden, ontological issues do not assume any whatsoever, 
objective or real, fact, or a fact related to the existence of a field defined 
by a given system of axioms. These issues only “[…] relate to pure possi-
bilities or necessary relations between the possibilities detected in direct a 
priori knowledge”189. All solutions to these problems are, in comparison 
 186 Ingarden, “Czy zadaniem filozofii jest synteza nauk szczegółowych,” p. 204.
 187 Roman Ingarden, “Stanowisko teorii poznania w systemie nauk filozoficznych,” 
in: Sprawozdanie Państwowego Gimnazjum w Toruniu za rok szk. 1924/25 
(Toruń: 1925); reprinted in: Roman Ingarden, U podstaw teorii poznania 
(Warszawa: PWN, 1971), pp. 381–406. Ingarden distinguishes the theory of 
pure and applied cognition. The first provides the system of the principia of 
cognition in general, the second applies these principia to particular realms of 
real accidents.
 188 Ingarden, “Stanowisko teorii poznania w systemie nauk filozoficznych,” 
pp. 382–383.
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to the results of the detailed sciences, theoretically earlier, more general 
and do not entail any claims about real facts; they only set limits to their 
possibilities. On the other hand, formal teachings provide the basics of 
explanatory concepts that are basic and demonstrate the truthfulness of 
accepted axioms190.
Metaphysical research, according to Ingarden, leads to the ultimate, 
absolute demonstration of the modus existentiae, the actual existence of 
all possible domains of existence, with particular reference to the real world. 
After solving these issues, metaphysical research seeks to detect the actual 
essence of entire living domains and their individual elements. The solutions 
of metaphysical issues are based on the assumption of solvability of certain 
ontological issues, such as the occurrence of the necessary relationships 
between elements or features of possible objects. The final solution to the 
metaphysical problems would be possible only if such a form of experience 
was available, different from the one adopted in particular sciences, which 
would guarantee the actual existence of the subjects studied and capture 
the actual essence of the existing objects191.
Ontological, metaphysical and epistemological research are fundamen-
tally different from the research of the particular sciences in that they are 
not dogmatic but critical, which means that they do not adhere to existential 
assumptions. The common moment connecting ontology, metaphysics and 
the theory of cognition with particular sciences is that the ultimate goal 
of the research undertaken is to obtain cognitively justified answers to the 
issues under examination. Therefore, not only detailed science, but also the 
entire philosophy can be treated as broadly understood science, provided 
that there are no significant differences between these fields of knowledge192. 
Ingarden recognizes three areas for such differences. The first one relates 
to seeing the dogmatic nature of the particular sciences in relation to the 
critical studies of ontology, metaphysics and the theory of cognition. The 
second area is concerned with the non-attachment of particular importance 
to the difference between significant and irrelevant features of the subjects 
 190 Ingarden, “Czy zadaniem filozofii jest synteza nauk szczegółowych,” 
pp. 205–208.
 191 Ingarden, “Czy zadaniem filozofii jest synteza nauk szczegółowych,” p. 208.
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under study, which in turn, plays a very important role in ontological and 
metaphysical research. The third area concerns the limitation of research 
observed within specific sciences only to elements of one’s own field of 
research. At the same time, in ontology and metaphysics, we strive to pro-
vide general, final solutions to the issues addressed, concerning either the 
entire living domains or the whole of all possible domains of existence193.
In the theory of cognition, we strive to discover the content of the general 
idea of cognition regardless of what kind of object it concerns. Moreover, 
the theory of cognition is not dependent on other philosophical sciences 
or particular sciences. If the theory of cognition were indeed dependent 
on particular sciences, then it would also have to be as dogmatic as they 
are. The theory of cognition does not accept any claims from other philo-
sophical sciences, let alone particular sciences, yet, according to Ingarden, 
it loses nothing of its field of research194. The independence of the theory 
of cognition from the particular sciences comes down to the fact that the 
general idea of cognition does not belong to learning about the real external 
world only. Accepting such a supposition would be an unjustified limita-
tion of the general idea of cognition, making it impossible to discover the 
principles of cognition.
Another argument posed by Ingarden, that regards the independence of 
epistemology from positive sciences is that all knowledge about the real 
external world is obtained through external perception, which – in no way – 
is able to provide us with the existence of objects. Moreover, the external 
perception is in itself inadequate and may be supplemented or corrected 
in subsequent experiments. According to Ingarden, the field of the real 
external world must remain outside the scope of epistemological research. 
If, then, we accept a theory of cognition that will assume the existence of the 
real world, then such a theory must be as doubtful as the natural sciences195. 
In this moment it is worth observing that the opinion on the said issues 
backed by Czesław Znamierowski is of exactly the opposite nature, as he 
 193 Ingarden, “Czy zadaniem filozofii jest synteza nauk szczegółowych,” p. 210.
 194 Ingarden, “Stanowisko teorii poznania w systemie nauk filozoficznych,” 
pp. 389–392.
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recognizes the possibility of conducting epistemological research based on 
the study of particular sciences. For Znamierowski, the theory of cognition 
remains dependent on these teachings196.
Roman Ingarden, speaking of the synthesis of particular sciences, 
distinguishes five types197. Each of the selected types of synthesis refers to 
the results of these sciences. Such synthesizing intakes do not violate either 
accepted assumptions or obtained results of a given field of research, un-
less errors occur in the course of the conducted analyses in a given science. 
Each synthesis presented by Ingarden is a scientific task that preserves the 
research methods appropriate for a given field. Individual syntheses cannot 
be moved beyond the scope of particular sciences, but should be treated as 
a continuation of research on these sciences.
One of the syntheses highlighted by Ingarden is concerned with the 
simple arrangement, remaining in close agreement to a given principle, 
of the cognitive results of a given science in a system of related theorems. 
This arrangement may concern one, many and even all detailed sciences 
about facts.
Another possible synthesis appears when the problems, boundary for the 
relevant fields of particular sciences, are detected and solved. Such a situa-
tion makes it possible to overcome the accepted limitations for individual 
particular sciences, resulting most often from the methodologies developed 
for them and from their fragmented knowledge about the world. The devel-
opment of particular sciences, however, leads to the emergence of new areas 
of research, most often of an interdisciplinary nature. If it were possible to 
solve boundary issues for all detailed sciences about facts, then the whole 
of related facts would give a synthetic, scientific image of the world.
Another type of synthesis is the attempts to discover a common principle 
or principles for many different claims. In mathematics, the system of ax-
ioms is reached this way. The same can be expected in physics, biology or 
other scientific disciplines. In this synthesizing approach, some new, more 
general theorems for states of affairs or more general rules are created, 
 196 Czesław Znamierowski, “Stanowisko teorii poznania wśród nauk 
filozoficznych,” Przegląd Warszawski, Vol. 21 (1923).
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taking into account the perceived logical relations occurring between the 
ordered claims of a given science. Regarding this kind of synthesis, doubts 
may arise as to the adoption of a specific set of axioms for a number of a 
priori found statements that, for example, would entail introducing onto-
logical issues explaining the basis of a given science to the synthesis. In 
Ingarden’s opinion, the very attempt to explain the foundations of a given 
deductive theory, able to detect certain simplest states of things among 
the elements of the content of the idea of a certain field must undoubtedly 
refer to ontological solutions. We would like to note that, following the 
stance offered by Ingarden, this kind of synthesis boils down to finding 
such a system of the highest assumptions, from which some existing sets 
of theorems would be deducted. At this point, Ingarden does not reflect 
on the truthfulness of accepted axioms and the assumed sense of the orig-
inal concepts. In the a priori sciences, the highest principles that Ingarden 
refers to are usually chosen from known mathematical theorems, and there-
fore they only fulfill the appropriate logical function in a given deductive 
system198.
Another possible synthesis of the results of particular sciences is to build 
a more general theory, the detailed case of which would be scientific the-
ories of a lesser generality. An example of this is non-Euclidean geometry, 
of which Euclidean geometry is a borderline case. It is also possible to 
distinguish a synthesis that reduces the expressions of a certain group of 
sciences to the language of one of them. One of such forms of synthesis 
is physicalism. Ingarden’s discussion about this kind of possible synthesis 
of the results of particular sciences is very clearly cut off from the onto-
logical problem of whether and under what conditions such a reduction, 
maintaining the equivalence of expressions, is possible.
In accordance with the solutions proposed by Ingarden, it should be 
stated that the tasks of ontology and metaphysics should not include the syn-
thesis of the results of particular sciences. However, there are such tasks of 
ontology and metaphysics that relate to these teachings. These are primarily 
the tasks of epistemological evaluation of the cognitive value of results 
obtained in particular sciences and the ontological tasks of interpreting the 
 198 Ingarden, “Czy zadaniem filozofii jest synteza nauk szczegółowych,” p. 213.
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original terms found in axioms and the highest scientific principles199. The 
ontological interpretation of scientific results may lead to giving to theorems 
of particular sciences the sense clearly different from that adopted within the 
framework of these sciences. Thus, in ontology, one cannot just accept the 
messages found in the assumptions and/or recognized scientific theories, and 
conduct further research in a dogmatic way. According to Ingarden, both 
the tasks of ontological interpretation of the original terms as well as the 
epistemological evaluation of the cognitive value of the obtained results let 
us assume that some results of ontological and metaphysical studies will be 
acquired independently of the particular sciences. Thus, the philosophical 
synthesis of the results of detailed science research cannot be carried out200.
Considering the above possible types of syntheses of particular sciences, 
one may attempt to recognize the position of Zawirski. Undoubtedly, for 
Zawirski, the closest kind of synthesis of particular sciences is the combi-
nation of several types distinguished by Ingarden. It is important for him, 
to observe such a synthesis being able to order appropriately, according to 
a given principle, the cognitive results of many detailed sciences about facts 
thus putting them into a system of related theorems. Zawirski is convinced 
that the existing divisions of disciplines observed within natural sciences are 
artificial, because we are dealing with one world of natural phenomena. The 
possibility of using the axiomatic method is also important, hence he would 
support the attempt to discover a common set of principles, an arrange-
ment of axioms unifying physics, biology and other natural disciplines. In 
this synthesizing approach, some new, more general theorems for states of 
affairs could be created, or more general rules that take into account the 
perceived logical relationships between the statements of the syntactized 
realities of facts.
4  On the relationship between science and metaphysics
Many native philosophers sought to capture the unity of reality in accor-
dance with the accepted models of accuracy of analyses and constructions 
 199 Ingarden, “Stanowisko teorii poznania w systemie nauk filozoficznych,” 
pp. 382–393.
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carried out by them. At this point, it is worth pointing out the philosophical 
achievements of Leon Chwistek, whose works in the field of logic and math-
ematics occupy an important position among the achievements of Polish 
philosophers. In the field of the philosophical theory of reality, he takes 
the opposite position from such philosophers as: Joachim Metallmann, Jan 
Łukasiewicz, Tadeusz Czeżowski or Bolesław Gawecki. Chwistek, while 
walking alone in his own ways, that often took him far from the form 
of precision he adopted in mathematical analysis, proposed the idea of a 
multifaceted reality201. This concept has not been welcomed due to the lack 
of scientific reliability of its formulation, but also because the proposition 
of many realities has introduced relativism, and this stood in conflict with 
the rather common desire to combine the multiplicity of phenomena and 
realities of the real world into something that would speak for the existence 
of only one reality.
Despite the above reservations, Chwistek was of the opinion that the 
starting point in building our view of the world should be simple and clear 
truths, based on experience and strict reasoning. In the initial period of 
research, Chwistek assumed that one could build deductive systems within 
the area of philosophy. In science and philosophy there should be used a 
construction method, based on the analysis of intuitive concepts that, in 
turn, lead to the definition of fundamental concepts. These concepts, by 
means of definitions or axioms, can be introduced into the empirical system, 
built in accordance with the laws of formal logic202. Later, however, noticing 
the complex nature of philosophical research and disagreeing with the pos-
sibility of formalizing philosophical systems, he stated that such forms of 
conduct are useless (in the work Granice nauki). In this connection, the 
final form of the theory of the multifaceted reality is drawn as possessing 
 201 The theory of the multifaceted reality was presented by L.  Chwistek in 
1917 in the article “Trzy odczyty odnoszące się do pojęcia istnienia,” 
Przegląd Filozoficzny, Vol. 20, No. 2–4 (1917), pp. 122–151, and then in 
an expanded form presented in the work Wielość rzeczywistości, which 
appeared in 1921 in Krakow. The final shape of the theory was presented 
in 1935 in the work Granice nauki. Zarys logiki i metodologii nauk ścisłych 
(Lvov: Książnica – Atlas, 1935).
 202 Leon Chwistek, “Zastosowanie metody konstrukcyjnej do teorii poznania,” 
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negligible values of a strict and scientific description of reality, but such an 
approach should be adopted together with far caution, because many phil-
osophical issues appearing in this concept have gained a new perspective 
for analysis, which should be thoroughly examined. Without undertaking 
further analyses of the theory of the multifaceted reality, I would like to 
proceed with the presentation of other voices and/or points of view to be 
found in the ongoing discussion regarding the relationship between science 
and philosophy.
The approach presented by Czesław Białobrzeski concerned the appro-
priately shaped relationship of science and philosophy. In a completely 
different perspective, i.e. starting from the study of natural sciences, he 
aimed to develop a unified image of the world that could not be limited 
to the synthesis of these sciences only. While conducting research in new 
areas of physics, Białobrzeski noticed the need to understand the reality 
that only philosophy can give. In his opinion, where science stops, the 
search is to be taken over by philosophy, and the answers regarding the 
“mystery of being”, given by it, cannot be contradicted by the postulates 
and results of science. In the work Synteza filozoficzna i metodologia nauk 
przyrodniczych, Białobrzeski proposes that philosophy should be given 
the traditional term philosophiae naturalis203. In this spirit, by conducting 
further research and paying attention to the views of C.F v. Weizsäcker, 
A.S. Eddington, H. Reichenbach, D. Błochincew, N. Hartmann and other 
philosophers that analyzed the relationship between science and philos-
ophy, he developed an ontological interpretation of wave-particle duality 
and an ontological interpretation of the foundations of physics atomic 
world204. In a lecture delivered at the Philosophical Commission of the 
PAU on March 15, 1951, he presented the problem of stratification of 
 203 Czesław Białobrzeski, “Synteza filozoficzna i metodologia nauk 
przyrodniczych,” Nauka Polska, Vol. 25 (1947), pp. 44–45.
 204 Czesław Białobrzeski, “Ontologiczna interpretacja dualizmu fali – korpuskuły 
[the work written in  1952],” in:  Czesław Białobrzeski, Wybór pism 
(Warszawa: PAX, 1964), pp. 49–104, and the reading delivered at the PAU 
Committee on Philosophy on June 15, 1950; see: “O interpretacji ontologicznej 
podstaw fizyki świata atomowego,” in: Podstawy poznawcze fizyki świata 
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reality205, where he distinguished the physico-chemical layer of non-living 
bodies, the organic layer of living beings and the psychic layer.
Many philosophers dealt with the possible relationship between science 
and philosophy. Of these, one should mention Kazimierz Twardowski, 
Jan Łukasiewicz, Zygmunt Zawirski, Joachim Metallmann, Tadeusz 
Czeżowski, Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz, Tadeusz Kotarbiński and Bolesław 
Gawecki206. All the philosophers mentioned above place great emphasis on 
the precision, reliability and clarity of philosophical argumentation. They 
claim that philosophy, when being a science itself, should refer to certain 
patterns of specific sciences while maintaining “connectivity” with reality 
at the same time. In their opinion, a scientific philosophy should not only 
fulfill meta-scientific tasks, but also involve learning about the real world. 
They also emphasized the dissimilarity of the approach to the study of the 
subject and the differentness of research methods for philosophy and par-
ticular sciences. The non-identification of philosophy, either with logic or 
with specific sciences, testified to the autonomy of these scientific disciplines.
As was shown by Jan Łukasiewicz, the method of analysis and con-
struction could lead to scientific metaphysics, understood by him as a 
general theory of objects. Priority in philosophical considerations was 
given by him to ontology, and not epistemology, that, in his opinion, not 
only inevitably led to psychologism but also was the source of numerous 
errors identified by him. The application of the analytical method leads 
to solving individual problems, which was presented in a model manner 
in the work titled Analiza i konstrukcja pojęcia przyczyny207. At the 
 205 Czesław Białobrzeski, “Problem uwarstwienia rzeczywistości,” in: Wybór 
pism, pp. 127–145.
 206 Bolesław Gawecki, “Nauka ścisła a metafizyka,” Przegląd Współczesny, 
Vol. 10 (1936), pp. 103–112; and Bolesław Gawecki, “Współczesne zadania 
filozofii,” Droga, 1936.
 207 Jan Łukasiewicz, “Analiza i konstrukcja pojęcia przyczyny,” Przegląd 
Filozoficzny, Vol. 9, 1906, pp. 105–179; also see: J. Łukasiewicz, “Analiza 
i konstrukcja pojęcia przyczyny,” in: Z zagadnień logiki i filozofii. Pisma 
wybrane, ed. Jerzy Słupecki (Warszawa:  PWN, 1961), pp.  9–62. Also 
see:: Krzysztof Śleziński, “Logiczne zasady badania naukowego a krytyka 
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same time in his other work, titled O determinizmie208, he notes that the 
mathematical logic practiced in Poland has yielded abundant and more 
valuable fruits than in many other countries. It was better understood 
what the deductive system is and how such systems should be built, and, 
above all, a measure of scientific accuracy that exceeded many previous 
requirements was achieved.
Łukasiewicz, just like Kotarbiński, Czeżowski or Ajdukiewicz, was a 
supporter of the reform of philosophy. Without denying the possibility of 
the existence of scientific philosophy, he was convinced that the creation 
of a complete philosophical system requires enormous effort and commit-
ment of many philosophers who should gradually approach the synthesis 
of views that regard not only the world, but also our lives. On the other 
hand, while analyzing Czeżowski’s philosophical approaches, the accep-
tance of scientific philosophy is not strictly connected with respecting the 
axiomatic principles of scientific conduct within its framework. He rec-
ognized as scientific these metaphysical theories, which reach beyond the 
field of possible experience. In his work titled O metafizyce, jej kierunkach 
i zagadnieniach, he gave arguments for the possibility of treating meta-
physics as a science209.
Remaining in the same perspective of understanding philosophy as 
the representatives of the Lvov-Warsaw School210, Joachim Metallmann 
notes that in the 1930s, both science and metaphysics, put in opposition 
to each other, are increasingly tightening their relationship. On the one 
hand, philosophy is more and more evidently recognized as a function of 
science. Philosophy cannot underestimate the results of science without 
detriment to its deliberations. Disregarding science would be tantamount 
 208 Jan Łukasiewicz, “O determinizmie,” in: Z zagadnień logiki i filozofii. Pisma 
wybrane, pp. 114–126. This is an article written in Dublin in 1946, and the 
basis of this article is the Rector’s speech, which Łukasiewicz delivered at the 
University of Warsaw at the inauguration of the academic year 1922/1923.
 209 Tadeusz Czeżowski, O metafizyce, jej kierunkach i zagadnieniach (Kęty: Antyk, 
2004). The first edition was published by the National Bookstore T. Szczęsny 
i S-ka, Toruń 1948.
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to ignoring reality. According to Metallmann, philosophy faces unusual 
transformations that take place in science, related to Einstein’s theory 
of relativity, the work on radioactivity or the emergence of quantum 
theory. These transformations are associated with the relevant philosoph-
ical consequences of understanding reality. On the other hand, there are 
numerous reservations and doubts in accepting the physical ideal of the 
unity of science that strictly refer to the supposedly unshakeable founda-
tion of mathematics211.
In connection with the above, according to Metallmann, more and more 
often attempts are made to develop a scientific philosophy or scientific 
metaphysics212. Such metaphysics would be influenced by the development 
of science. According to Metallmann, as there is no technique without sci-
ence, although science is far from serving technology, there is also no way 
today to address the philosophical issues inflicted on us by our innermost 
spiritual life that would not lead necessarily through science. Thus philos-
ophy should keep its “roots” in science.
In his work Nauka, pogląd na świat, filozofia213 Joachim Metallmann 
attempts to determine what we expect today from philosophy in the per-
spective of changes taking place in it. This does not mean that philosophy 
is reduced to a general science that combines the results of individual real 
sciences. Philosophy is to go far beyond the field of science, aiming at the 
 211 Joachim Metallmann, O budowie i właściwościach nauki [the Jagiellonian 
Library No 555698 II], p. 1.
 212 Although Metallmann does not use the term “scientific metaphysics” but only 
“scientific philosophy”, it seems possible to define his philosophical position 
in this way. In his works, Metallmann clearly cuts himself off from speculative 
metaphysics, advocating for such a general picture of the world that remains 
in close relation to science and – through it – reality. Moreover, research on 
reality led Metallmann to discover the existence of structural reality and to 
present an attempt to determine the role of the cognizing subject in this reality.
 213 Joachim Metallmann, “Nauka, pogląd na świat, filozofia,” Przegląd 
Współczesny, part. I: Vol. 49 (1939), pp. 72–95; part II: Vol. 49 (1939), 
pp. 120–145. According to Janusz Mączka, this is the last article published 
by Metallmann before his arrest in 1939 and his death in a concentration 
camp in 1942. See: Janusz Mączka, “Filozofia jako funkcja nauki: Joachim 
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construction of the synthesis of knowledge, which becomes the basis for 
formatting a holistic image of reality precisely defined for a given era. It 
means, similar to Zawirski’s concepts, that such syntheses can never be 
completed. New questions are posed and new research is carried out as 
part of scientific research, and these result in a direct enlargement of the 
areas of the reality under investigation. According to Metallmann, there is 
a constant need to transform philosophy and adapt it to the new challenges 
that keep appearing before it.
Philosophy of a given era, works out a holistic view of reality, also taking 
into account the cultural context of science as well as different aspects of 
non-scientific human activity. For Metallmann, an important component of 
the image of reality, apart from our scientific creativity, is also artistic and 
religious creativity, as well as the axiological attitude.
Although philosophy and detailed sciences are subject to mutual influ-
ence, they still retain relative autonomy and research independence. 
However, this is not a complete autonomy, because – in such cases – the 
philosophy would be detached from science, and thus also from reality, 
which can be observed in respect to H. Bergson’s philosophy. According 
to Metallmann, philosophy should retain a realistic approach to scientific 
problems and to reality. Philosophy practiced in the context of science 
is confronted with the concepts and methods found there, as well as the 
results adopted by science, at the same time making them the subject of 
its further research. Philosophy, critically assessing the method and results 
of science, shows its hidden assumptions, which affects the valuation of 
specific scientific theories. The science presented by Metallmann is a contin-
uous process that has neither a purpose nor an internal necessity. The devel-
opment of science, however, is entirely dependent on the creative activity 
of a man, able to respond adequately to emerging scientific problems. By 
solving these problems, we reveal the structures existing in reality that phi-
losophy uses to deepen understanding of the world. As Metallmann points 
out, paying attention to the occurrence of genetic and causal relationships 
becomes insufficient to capture the unity of reality. Attempts to synthesize 
structures recognized in particular detailed sciences more and more often 
allow (in this new perspective) to strive to understand the whole of being, 
not by reducing the whole to its constituent elements, but through the 
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structural recognition of this whole, which exhibits such properties that 
its elements lack214.
Establishing the proper relationship between science and philosophy, as 
Metallmann states in his work titled Nauka, pogląd na świat, filozofia is not 
easy. There are difficulties in establishing the appropriate scientific method, 
the proper criterion for accepting sentences as sensible and decidable and in 
seeking to obtain simple and unambiguous answers to both scientific and 
philosophical questions. What is common for science and philosophy, is 
the establishment of the so-called research setting. Both science and philos-
ophy strive to solve and explain their own problems by maintaining close 
contact with reality, and philosophy in addition to contact with reality, 
proper reference to science.
One can agree with Metallmann that a scientific philosophy is necessary 
to build a holistic image of reality at a given stage of scientific development. 
This philosophy allows us to choose the most valuable learning results 
that can be used to create a specific synthesis. At the same time, the overall 
picture of reality should also take into account, strongly emphasized by 
Metallmann, the cultural context of a given epoch. Paying attention to 
cultural and psychological factors in the development of science seems to 
be an interesting issue undertaken not only by Metallmann but also by 
Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz or Ludwik Fleck215 and requires a separate analysis.
The possibilities of building scientific metaphysics are critically evaluated 
by Roman Ingarden. In a different perspective, i.e. speculative philosophy, 
Ingarden, while analyzing the issue of the possibility of the philosophical 
synthesis of particular sciences, referred to logical problems, presenting an 
argument for the impossibility of such a synthesis. In his opinion, a categor-
ical judgment has its own formal object, and each true assessment, in addi-
tion to the subject, still has a material object, i.e. a certain objective state of 
 214 Joachim Metallmann, “Problem struktury i jej dominujące stanowisko w nauce 
współczesnej,” Kwartalnik Filozoficzny, Vol. 9, No. 4 (1933), pp. 346–350.
 215 Ludwik Fleck, “Powstanie i rozwój faktu naukowego. Wprowadzenie do 
nauki o stylu myślowym i kolektywie myślowym,” in: Psychologia poznania 
naukowego, ed. Zdzisław Cackowski, Stefan Symotiuk (Lublin: Wydawnictwo 
Uniwersytetu Marii Curie-Skłodowskiej, 2006), [first edition: Ludwik Fleck, 
Entstehung und Entwicklung einer wissenschaftkichen Tatsache. Einfűhg in 
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being that can be identified with a formal subject. Ingarden, accepted the 
decisions given by A. Pfänder, namely that there is a relationship of justifi-
cation between the premises and the consequence, if not only the truth of 
the premises is given with the necessity of the consequence, but also if the 
truth of the premises in no way presupposes the consequences of succession. 
On this basis, Ingarden states that the relation of justification occurs when 
the totality of material objects as premises leads not only to the necessity 
of the existence of a material object as a consequence, but at the same time 
does not require the existence of this object of consequence216. This means 
that the existing object conditioning the existence of the material object 
of the consequence, alone in its elements, is not conditioned by the exis-
tence of this object. In this way, the obtained cognitive result can be used 
to understand the relation of philosophy to specific sciences. Philosophy 
can therefore condition the development of positive sciences itself without 
being conditioned by these teachings. The obtained result of the analysis 
is interesting because it was achieved taking into account the decisions 
made in the field of logic, and then was transferred by Ingarden to the field 
of decisions of particular sciences and individual branches of philosophy.
Zawirski spoke out for the possibility of scientific metaphysics by exam-
ining the relationship between metaphysics and science. In his dissertation 
O stosunku metafizyki do nauki, he presented scientific metaphysics as 
a discipline lying between positive knowledge and metaphysical specula-
tion. On the one hand, in his opinion, there is no such detailed science that 
would give a complete synthesis of scientific knowledge. There is, however, 
an obvious need for a general and critical science which, by deepening and 
supplementing the results of specific sciences, would be a unified theory of 
reality217.
On the other hand, the theory of the whole of reality, being a synthetic 
philosophy, remains different from classical metaphysics218. It is obvious in 
this situation that the theory of reality, i.e. scientific metaphysics, is not a 
metaphysics in the full sense of the word, because it does not provide firm 
 216 Ingarden, “Stanowisko teorii poznania w systemie nauk filozoficznych,” 
pp. 388–389.
 217 Zawirski, “O stosunku metafizyki do nauki,” pp. 25–28.
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and reliable answers to humanity’s tormenting questions about the value 
of human life or the ultimate mystery of being. We will not get answers to 
these questions from either science or the theory of reality.
In the study Nauka i metafizyka219 Zawirski developed the idea of the 
theory of reality, first of all giving a more succinct definition of it and 
secondly retaining more consistency in carrying out arguments in favor 
of properly understood scientific metaphysics, modeled on the method of 
specific sciences. Zawirski proves in detail the truth of the two judgments, 
namely that the claims of general science about reality allow for the ap-
pearance of many possible interpretations, and that the general science of 
reality can never replace classical metaphysics.
Zawirski defended the scientific metaphysics, as we know, in his habilita-
tion thesis Metoda aksjomatyczna a przyrodoznawstwo. In the last chapter 
of his work Metoda aksjomatyczna a rzeczyswistość he concluded that 
metaphysics, due to the possible multiplicity of interpretations of the phe-
nomena to which it relates, cannot be replaced by the only scientific view of 
the world, but should complement it in the pursuit of a unified view of the 
world220. It should be noted that these remarks are very general, often not 
supported by proper argumentation. In large part they are formulated on 
the convictions of common-sense-like understanding of the natural reality. 
Thus, in Zawirski’s research, the only clear justification for the uniform 
image of the world is – accepted in scientific research – the axiomatic 
method, which is the implementation of the former search of metaphysics 
to bring the entire reality out of one or several of the highest principles.
It is worth noting here that the program of scientific metaphysics, for-
mulated by philosophers of the first half of the 20th century, was fully 
implemented by Benedykt Bornstein. The work on logical-geometric meta-
physics was a systematic work that occupied the entire creative work of 
Bornstein. His works were unknown to his contemporary philosophers, due 
to the fact that the successes of Polish philosophers in the development of 
 219 Zawirski wrote the work Nauka i metafizyka in 1920. The manuscript of this 
work was published only in the nineties of the 20th century in two parts in 
the quarterly Filozofia nauki. See: Zygmunt Zawirski, “Nauka i metafizyka,” 
Filozofia Nauki, Vol. 3 (1995), pp. 104–135; and Vol. 4 (1996), pp. 131–143.
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the scope’s logic were so great that they were not interested in the problems 
of content logic and quality mathematics. This situation is also taking place 
today. I will present the analysis of research results and critics of Bornstein’s 
scientific metaphysics in the second volume of this dissertation.
On the one hand the above-presented positions on the issue of the pos-
sibilities of synthesis of particular sciences show the richness of native 
philosophical thought and critical analyses of this subject; on the other 
hand, however, they allow for the proper assessment of Zawirski’s scien-
tific achievements. Despite the advantages of his work, we would like to 
note that Zawirski did not discuss many key issues within the framework 
of the – developed by himself – scientific project of metaphysics, which 
has to be perceived in the perspective of the above-mentioned positions of 
other philosophers.
There is no doubt that Zawirski did not use all these possibilities that 
were available in the ongoing discussions to complement and modernize 
the previously developed concept of scientific metaphysics. Therefore, it is 
understandable that the manuscripts that were developed and published in 
1995 and 1996 (Nauka i metafizyka) and in 2003 (O stosunku metafizyki 
do nauki) were left out in this manuscript. It turns out that the published 
works have, apart from the historical value, also the actual substantive 
value, and not only because they clearly are an attempt to build some form 
of scientific metaphysics that refers to the broadly understood experience 
while using the axiomatic method. What is more, the advantages of his 
analyses of the application of the axiomatic method to physics and the 
development of a scientific project of metaphysics are evidenced by the 
excellent knowledge of the natural theories to which he refers. In many 
places one has the impression that the content of new theories are being 
presented from the contemporary perspective of their understanding, as if 
forgetting about the fact that he commented on them at a time when they 
were only getting full citizenship in scientific research.

Part Three:  Selected works of Zygmunt 
Zawirski
1  The significance of many-valued logic for epistemology 
and its connection with the probability calculus221
Many-valued logic is the outcome of the research work done by the Polish 
philosopher Jan Łukasiewicz and the American Emil Post, who indepen-
dently and almost simultaneously (the first in 1920–1922, the second in 
1921) made this bold generalization of bivalent logic. Neither of them, how-
ever, defined the relation of this new logic to the probability calculus, and 
therefore its meaning for cognition was somewhat unclear. It was only the 
German logician Hans Reichenbach who attempted to solve the problem of 
probability in connection with the logic in which the “true-false” disjunc-
tion is replaced by a continuous scale of new logical values. However, the 
way in which Łukasiewicz, Post and Reichenbach understand this new logic 
is not the same, and therefore we need to learn more about these differences 
before considering the meaning of the new logic for human cognition.
In 1920, Łukasiewicz first developed a three-valued logic222 in which 
the third logical value, called the possibility, is so understood that its 
 221 Zygmunt Zawirski, “Znaczenie logiki wielowartościowej dla poznania i 
związek jej z rachunkiem prawdopodobieństwa,” Przegląd Filozoficzny, Vol. 
37, No 4 (1934), pp. 393–398.
 222 Cf. Ruch filozoficzny, Vol. V, pp. 169–171; also Przegląd filozoficzny, Vol. 
XXIII, pp. 189–205. Attempts to create logic with more than two logical 
values have already been taken much earlier. And so, MacColl  has developed 
a five-value modality account in his Symbolic Logic in 1906. Similarly, C.I. 
Lewis, developing the concept of “strict implication” in the Survey of Symbolic 
Logic from 1918, introduced the third logical value of “impossibility” as the 
one appearing next to truth and falsehood. However, after the creation of Prof. 
Łukasiewicz’s many-valued logic, Oscar Becker presented (Oscar Becker, “Zur 
Logik der Modalitaten,” Jahrbuch für Philosophie und Phänomenologische 
Forschung, Vol. XI, 1930, pp. 497-548) the logic of six or ten modalities, thus 
developing Lewis’ ideas. None of the above authors, however, extended their 
ideas to any number of logical values, nor did they present a system of many-
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denial gives again the possibility. Logical values, false, possibility and 
truth, are most often marked with the symbols 0, ½ and 1. The implica-
tion (i.e. the combination of two sentences with the conjunction: if, then) 
is defined for the new logical value in such a way that it assumes a value 
of 1 when the values of both the predecessor and the successor are equal 
to each other, or when the value of the predecessor is smaller than the 
value of the successor. In all other cases, the implication is only possible, 
so it has a value of ½. It was only in 1922 that Łukasiewicz created an 
infinite-many-valued logic in which new fractions of 0 to 1 were assigned 
to new logical values. If one of these fractions is marked with the letter 
p, then the sentence negation value is calculated according to the formula 
~ p = 1-p, whereas the implication p → q equals 1 for p≤ q, and is equal 
to the value “1− +p q” for p > q. It is immediately apparent that these 
definitions include, however, special cases, definitions of negation and 
implications of two- and three-valued logic. On the basis of negation and 
implication, then the logical sum is defined (combining two sentences with 
the help of a conjunction “or”) and the logical product (connection using 
the conjunction “and”); the definitions are constructed in such a way 
that the logical sum always receives the value of the greater component, 
and the product of the value of the smaller component. As a result of the 
values of logical constants adopted in this way (i.e. negation, implications, 
sum and product), the law of contradiction and excluded measure loses 
its sense in both trivalent logic and the infinite-many-valued logic postu-
lated by Prof. Łukasiewicz. This is the most important property of Prof. 
Łukasiewicz’s many-valued logic.
Post223 gives the same values to logical constants as Łukasiewicz does, 
and derives a new concept of so-called cyclic negation, based on which the 
negation of a certain value is a logical value directly lower than it. As the 
original terms of his system, he chooses this cyclic negation and the symbol 
of a logical sum, whereas in Lukasiewicz all constants have been defined 
on the basis of implications and ordinary negation. Post also provides log-
ical formulas for creating any new sentence functions with one argument 
 223 Emil Post, “Introduction to a General Theory of Propositions,” American 
Journal of Mathematics, Vol. 43 (1931), pp. 180–185.
 
 
The significance of many-valued logic for epistemology 121
and then any arbitrary arguments. He continues to add a very important 
remark that one can accept the sentences of n-value logic as the class ( )n −1  
of the sentences of bivalent logic. If all these bivalent sentences are false, 
then the sentence of the n-value logic is false, if all are false except one, 
then the sentence of the many-valued logic gets the value 1 1/ ( )n −  etc., if 
all are true, then the many-valued logic sentence is true as well. Thus, the 
relationship between the new logical values and the way of calculating these 
values in the probability calculus is indicated where exactly the probability 
degree is measured (according to the classical way of defining the measure 
of probability) the number of true sentences (“favorable events”) per certain 
number of true or false sentences (“accidents possible”). Post does not say, 
however, that such an interpretation is necessary when sentences of n-value 
logic can be considered sensible.
The above remark does not, however, explain the ratio of many-valued 
logic to the probability calculus; the difficulty of linking both algorithms 
exists in Post, as well as in Łukasiewicz, but for a different reason. To 
explain the issue, let us take as an example a five-valued logic, in which the 
values are marked with the symbols 0, ¼, 2/4, ¾, 1. If two sentences in this 
logic have a value of 2/4, then the logical sum of these two sentences 2/4 ∨ 2/4 
will get a value of 2/4 as defined by Łukasiewicz, or Post. But this corresponds 
in the probability calculus only to the condition when the probabilities of 
both sentences overlap; whereas if they are mutually exclusive, the sum has 
the value 1, and in case of crossing – the value of ¾. Here Post provides 
formulas for creating new logic functions, but it is not known whether 
the creation of new logical sums, derived from the probability calculus 
corresponds to his way of understanding the notion of many-valued logic. 
And yet this is an extremely important matter; because if we accept only 
the formulas 2/4 ∨ 2/4 = 2/4, the right of the excluded measure in many-valued 
logic must be eliminated. (Because ~ 2/4 = 2/4, therefore p ∨ ~p will get 2/4 for 
p = 2/4, so it will not be true). However, the right of the excluded measure 
remains valid even in many-valued logic, if for the case of exclusion we as-
sume the value of the formula 2/4 ∨ 2/4 = 1, and the formula 2/4 ∨ 2/4 = 2/4, will 
be limited to cases of overlapping probabilities only. It should be remem-
bered that in many-valued logic only the principle of bivalence falls away, 
according to which every sentence permits only two values, whereas the 
right of the excluded measure, according to which two contradictions must 
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be true, can be preserved in many-valued logic; and even must be preserved, 
if this logic is to agree with the probability calculus, because according to 
this calculation, one of the two contradictory possibilities must occur. One 
should therefore avoid mixing the principle of bivalence with the principle 
of excluded measure224.
In his “probability logic”, Reichenbach gave such a link between the new 
logic and the calculus, which helps him to remove all these difficulties225. It 
distinguishes between qualitative, intentional (which he also calls “topolog-
ical”) many-valued logic and quantitative, experimental or “metric” logic. 
Only the metric conception of many-valued logic, which commands the 
sentences of many-valued logic to be interpreted as a class of sentences of 
bivalent logic, makes this logic a system of verifiable sentences. Therefore, 
Reichenbach rejects the intentional interpretation that already assigns a cer-
tain number of values to a single sentence. Reichenbach, however, corrects 
Post’s demand that bivalent sentences whose ordered classes (or strings) are 
to be included as elements of many-valued logic can be presented as values 
of one and the same sentence function. This amendment is not necessarily 
a new one , as it is already at Łukasiewicz’s in the dissertation of 1913 
titled Die logischen Grundlagen der Wahrscheinlichkeitsrechnung gave a 
similar interpretation of the probability value. Reichenbach, who is a sup-
porter of the frequency definition of the measure of probability, extended 
this concept of probability values to propositional functions that allow an 
infinite number of values.
To calculate the value of the logic functions of sum and product, 
Reichenbach uses the most general formulas of probability; in his logic so 
many different values for the sum and the product of how many of them 
the calculus contains. In this way, this discrepancy of logic and calculus 
that occurred in Łukasiewicz’s and in Post’s calculations disappeared in 
Reichenbach’s. However, since Reichenbach has determined the implication 
 224 Jan Łukasiewicz, “Philosophiche Bemerkungen zu mehrwertigen Systemen des 
Aussagenkalkül,” in: Comptes Rendus de la Société des Sciences de Vasovie, 
Classe III (Warszawa: 1930).
 225 Hans Reichenbach, “Wahrscheinlichkeitslogik,” in:  Sitzungsberichte, 
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by means of negation and logical sum, the ambiguity of sum and product is 
in his calculations also transferred onto the implication and – at the same 
time – on equivalence, since the latter depends on the manner of deter-
mining the implications.
We allow ourselves to include here some comments about the Reichenbach 
system. Its distinction between metric and topological treatment of logic is 
quite accurate; it seems, however, that although topological considerations 
alongside metrics are not completely superfluous, a far more important 
thing is that Reichenbach introduced an unnecessary complication to cal-
culate implications and equivalence, so that these logical functions unnec-
essarily take as much value as the sum and the product. That is why we 
have created a many-valued logic system that has all the benefits of the 
Reichenbach system and at the same time avoids – in our opinion – its 
negative sides. As basic concepts, we took the Łukasiewicz implication and 
the cyclic negation of Post and – based on the formulas given by Post – we 
introduced as many logical functions of the sum and product as the calculus 
needs them. However, the implication and equivalence retain a constant 
value in us. The laws of contradiction and the excluded measure retain 
their value in our system as in Reichenbach’s, and unlike the systems of 
Łukasiewicz and Post.
In the article Les logiques nouvelle et le champ de leur application, 
published in 1932 in the French magazine “Revue de Métaphysique et de 
Morale”226, we pointed to two possible applications of multivalent logic. 
The parallelism of wave and corpuscular physics seemed, to us, under-
standable only in the light of Łukasiewicz’s three-valued logic; while an 
objective interpretation of the probability calculus seemed to indicate the 
relationship between this calculus and many-valued logic. As for the first 
application, it is possible that our first attempt was premature; it is possible 
that both theories do not concern the same details in the real underlying 
phenomena, i.e. that theories are not contradictory. It is possible that the 
further development of physics will shed more light on this matter. All the 
better, if it turns out that our explications are unnecessary, as we must admit 
 226 Zygmunt Zawirski, “Les logiques nouvelle et le champ de leur application,” 
Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale, Vol. 39, No. 4 (1931), pp. 503–579.
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that, as it seems, it does not bring any solutions to these difficulties, but 
only further emphasizes the difficulty of the problem solution.
Regarding the second point, i.e. linking the calculus with many-valued 
logic, one must admit that Reichenbach’s work from 1932 overtook our 
efforts in this direction. We must express our full appreciation for his work 
here, however in many details we have moved away from him. We agree 
with Reichenbach on the point that in many cases probability declara-
tion must pass as the final and reasonable form of decidability. Justifying 
this claim, Reichenbach, who clearly backs the frequency definition of the 
measure of probability, referred to the fact that the limes-time statement for 
u = ∞ for sequences occurring in nature is undecidable and senseless from 
the position of bivalent logic, and only within probability logic it becomes 
a meaningful and decidable theorem.
The above detail indicating some difficulties related to the concept of 
infinity, however, may be one of the motifs for which the postulate of 
decidability must satisfy itself with the decidability of probability. There 
are other motifs that lead to such a position. These are all arguments that 
justify an objective understanding of probability. The state of contemporary 
natural science, as we have pointed out in the above-quoted French article, 
also speaks in favor of this probability understanding. In any case, this 
problem deserves closer examination, and the contemporary logicians, such 
as Łukasiewicz, Post and Reichenbach, deserve gratitude for the fact that 
they have prepared formal tools for the scientific treatment of similar issues.
2  Importance of logical and semantic research 
for the theory of modern physics227
Speaking of the significance of logical and semantic research for physics, 
we do not want to make it clear that this influence is only one-sided and 
imposed in some way. On the contrary, contemporary physics, with the 
help of its theories (like relativity theory or quantum theory) gives impetus 
to new logical-semantic considerations in the field of theory and one can 
 227 Zygmunt Zawirski, “Doniosłość badań logicznych i semantycznych dla teorii 
fizyki współczesnej,” Przegląd Filozoficzny, Vol. 41 (1938), pp. 25–30. The 
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also speak well about the influence of mathematics and natural sciences on 
the theory of scientific cognition.
We distinguish two scientific methods, the deductive method used by 
mathematical sciences and the inductive method used by empirical sciences. 
But while the deductive method can only be characterized by deductive rea-
soning, the method of empirical sciences, i.e. inductive, cannot be defined 
by inductive reasoning explicitly, because deductive reasoning also finds its 
application in it. Based on protocol sentences, we rise in the empirical sci-
ences to general laws – as it is usually said – by means of induction, but these 
laws enter the empirical sciences only when they are checked, and then also 
the deductive method finds its application in them. In the advanced state of 
empirical sciences, one almost never goes to check for a single empirical law, 
treated in isolation from others, but works or disproves the whole system or 
theory. The number of independent laws and hypotheses decreases to such 
an extent that every general empirical opinion takes some responsibility for 
the entire system to which it belongs. One often has the impression that 
deductive systems are built only to be able to apply them in the empirical 
sciences. The idea is that there is only one scientific method, the method 
of real sciences, the science of facts, because the deductive method is only 
an auxiliary tool for the method of the science of facts. But one can also 
characterize the development of real science as a series of systems that fight, 
modify and improve endlessly, and whose number decreases incessantly.
It seems to us that the development of the deductive method contributes 
the most to the processes aimed at specifying the methods in general, 
because the gathering of protocol statements has only the effect of reducing 
the number of systems as the number of protocol sentences increases. Let 
us see, then, how the scientific nature of the theorem belonging to the 
system within the physical sciences is being specified. It is said that such a 
sentence has sense, i.e. it is scientific in nature if it is subject to verification 
or refutation. It was rightly noted, however, that this definition cannot 
be applied to deductive systems treated in isolation from their possible 
applications. In such a system, the language and its components depend 
on our choice. By building the system, we construct the language simulta-
neously. The sentence has meaning for us as far as it can be expressed in 
the terms of our language. But even here the scientific opinion is not iden-
tical to a sentence that can be proven or disproved. We distinguish between 
Selected works of Zygmunt Zawirski126
complete systems and incomplete systems. The system is complete if every 
sentence expressed in terms of the system in a sensible way functions in the 
number of theses of the system or, when attached to the system, creates a 
contradiction228. But we also know incomplete systems that do not possess 
the above property. In the language of such systems, there can be formu-
lated sentences, which are neither theses of the system nor will they create 
contradictions when attached to the system. An example of such a system is 
arithmetic. Fermat’s great theorem, when attached to the arithmetic system, 
does not create any contradiction; and all attempts of proposing evidence in 
the general form have so far failed. The above state of affairs seems not to 
be exceptional, for the young scholar of Vienna, Kurt Gödel, has created a 
general method for constructing undecidable sentences in all such systems 
that are the superstructure of arithmetic. Therefore, as one can see, there 
are deductive systems in which some sentences are undecidable; thus one 
cannot equate sensibility with decidability229.
However, one can give a definition of a real sentence in such a way that 
even undecidable statements will have to be true. As, in the case specified 
above, it was about arithmetic, and arithmetic sentences are commonly 
regarded as tautological tasks, if we equate tautological statements with 
real ones, we will be forced to consider arithmetical sentences that are 
undecidable. But one can act differently. It is known that Brouwer and 
Heyting have constructed a new logic in which they do not recognize the 
absolute validity of the excluded measure and in which, apart from real 
 228 Equivalent to the above definition is the following definition: The system is 
complete if out of two contradictions at least one is the thesis of the system 
(axiom or proven theorem).
 229 We had a problem in the French reading with the translation of the term 
undecidable (unentscheidbar in German), which some give away using the 
term invérifiable (see Alexander Hilferding, Le fondement empirique de la 
science, Louvain: 1936, p. 7), whereas others use the term indéterminable 
(vide Chaim Perelman, L’antinomie de K. Gödel, Bruxells: 1936). We used 
both terms, although the first one suggests the importance of the too-tight 
verification, as an empirical decidability by checking, and the second suggests 
the importance of broad meaning, which connects with Carnap in its termi-
nology in connection with the distinction of its Folge-Verfahren as opposed 
to Ableitungs-Verfahren. We also used the word insoluble, but this can refer 
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and false sentences, undecidable sentences are accepted that are not false 
in truth, but whose truth cannot be proved. Prof. Łukasiewicz’s student 
named Jaśkowski, showed that the Heyting’s logic, seemingly trivalent, in 
fact, leads to infinite, many-valued logic230.
The question arises whether these results obtained through consideration 
of deductive systems have any value for physical theories? We think so, 
because all physical theories are the superstructure of not only logic but 
also arithmetic. Thus, each physical theory carries in itself, as applied arith-
metic, issues that are undecidable in a certain sense. One can assume that 
the source of these undecidable problems are certain arithmetic concepts 
of an exceptional nature, such as the concepts of infinity and continuity, 
and that if it were possible in natural science to do without these concepts, 
then all difficulties would disappear. But we are not sure. We omit here the 
further difficulties that arise in physics from the necessity of choosing one 
of the various geometries, and we will now approach the difficulties that 
arise from the special nature of empirical assertions.
We distinguish, as we have already mentioned, detailed sentences, pro-
tocol statements (fundamental sentences) and general sentences obtained 
from the latter through the inductive processes. General sentences enter into 
the construction of the systems that are always provisional. It would seem 
that the problem of verification concerns only general sentences, empirical 
laws, because these are always uncertain and hypothetical. But in recent 
times it has been argued that even protocol sentences are not inviolable, 
because they require control and can be shaken. What sometimes occurs 
is the psychological impossibility of rejecting them, but there is no need to 
logically preserve them. Sentences can only be justified on the basis of other 
sentences; but what logical relationship can exist between certain sentences 
and facts of experience?
It seems that here some difficulties have been exaggerated too much. If 
we provide empirical data with certain names (not necessarily names but 
names that exist by means of a coordinate language), their ratio to protocol 
sentences will be presented as the ratio of the values of certain variables 
 230 The assertion that the Heyting system is infinitely multivalent comes from 
Gödel; Jaśkowski gave only proof of this claim.
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to the propositional functions in which these variables appear. We say 
then that these values check our function by providing us with protocol 
statements (fundamental sentences). In this way, the relation of empirical 
data, i.e. facts of experience, and fundamental sentences can be expressed 
in logical terms. But do these empirical facts provided with names unam-
biguously determine the appropriate protocol sentences? It depends on the 
language used. As long as our language is not established, the same facts 
can be expressed using different protocol sentences. However, once our 
language is established, the fundamental (protocol) sentence is unambigu-
ously determined by the experience data.
But the same difficulty that existed for the ratio of the facts of experience 
to protocol sentences appears again when we consider the relation of protocol 
sentences to theory, understood as a set of empirical laws that are a gener-
alization of protocol sentences. In other words, the question arises whether 
the same detailed sentences always check the same theory, or whether dif-
ferent theories can be checked by the same protocol sentences. As it seems, 
there is no doubt that different theories may be used to refer to the same 
protocol sentences, and that they may even lead to predictions of new phe-
nomena. Thus, self-examination is not enough, and what’s more, it does 
not even allow us to distinguish between empirical theory and metaphysical 
theory. The most diverse and most capricious theories can often lead to 
the same consequences231. Therefore, it was rightly argued that a scientific 
theory should not only be able to confirm, but also to refute. Popper, who 
paid attention to this particular detail, committed an exaggeration here, con-
sidering this detail as the only criterion for the scientific nature of empirical 
propositions. This is also why he rejected induction. However, it was rightly 
noted that the overthrow of an experiment or observation has the same rel-
ative character as the check; therefore, if we look closer to the process of 
checking or disproving, we will see that the alleged asymmetry does not exist.
In accordance to Reichenbach, we maintain that the relation of fun-
damental sentences to general empirical theorems can be expressed in 
the terms of logical probability theory, based on the concept of relative 
 231 Sometimes, however, a change in theory may result in a change of the entire 
language, and then there may be a change in the formulation of certain pro-
tocol sentences and not just rights.
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frequency. But is this position really connected with the type of many-
valued logic? Undoubtedly, the probability metric is based solely on the 
two-valued logic and no string of true or false sentences is yet a pattern of 
a new sentence of many-valued logic. But this empirical sequence can fund 
a new sentence, a supposition (a putting, using Reichenbach’s expression 
here) that is already in the opinion of a many-valued logic, a kind of weak-
ened assertion. This new many-valued logic is completely different from the 
many-valued logic offered by Brouwer, Heyting or Jaśkowski; it has, as we 
have seen, its source in the consideration of undecidable sentences (due to 
a certain way of proving).
One more detail of Popper’s position deserves our attention. As the empir-
ical process of confirmation or refutation cannot be prolonged without end, 
it is possible that our ideal of finite knowledge can never be achieved. If we 
want to measure the scientific character of empirical propositions according 
to their ability so as to check and disprove, we must confess that in this 
respect this scientific character is not sharp at all.
Does this mean that we are moving toward some skeptical consequences? 
Not at all. We would only advise a little to expand the scale of science for 
theorems and systems that would have to be considered unscientific if the 
scientific approach were too close. In addition, we were guided by a dif-
ferent thought. It has been shown recently (Alfred Tarski) that the classic 
concept of truth can be maintained and that its definition does not put us 
at risk of a vicious circle or antinomy. Based on this definition, it is pos-
sible to prove the validity of the principle of the excluded measure and the 
principle of contradiction for the languages of such systems in which this 
definition can be carried out. But the very definition of the real sentence 
does not give us the criterion of truth. The latter can take place only in very 
exceptional cases for formalized deductive systems, where this definition 
may take the form of a structural one. The long-term discussion between 
absolutism and relativism is not yet closed by the possibility of a correct 
definition of the true sentence. Actually, we think that in the discussion of 
this matter the issue of the so-called probability decidability, as the final 
method of decidability in certain issues, should also be taken into account. 
Apart from that, one should be more careful while paying attention to all 
these cases, where bivalent logic and the ideal of uniform knowledge based 
on it, encounter some embarrassing situations for any whatsoever reasons.
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3  Comments on the natural sciences method232
The way hypotheses are tested in the natural sciences seems to be of the 
utmost importance for a philosopher interested in the method of these 
sciences. The hypothesis is either a general theorem, or a unitary sentence 
about some elements of reality that are inaccessible to direct observation. 
Accepting a hypothesis (even provisionally), we derive specific conclusions 
from it and try to check whether they agree with the other hypotheses 
it concerns. If there is agreement between predictions drawn from the 
hypothesis and facts observed directly, then the hypothesis is confirmed 
and obtains the right of its functional “citizenship” in science. If we find a 
discrepancy, then the hypothesis is refuted and we reject it.
Recently, it was often emphasized that the negative result of checking 
the hypothesis is more important than the positive one. Confirmation of 
the hypothesis does not prove that it is right, it can be changed at any time, 
if it is demanded by the progress of science. At the same time it is worth 
observing that the negative result is decisive – the hypothesis is completely 
refuted. The rejection of the hypothesis corresponds to the logical law (from 
the theory of deduction) called modus tollendo tollens: If the hypothesis H 
implies the conclusion p and this conclusion p is false, then the hypothesis 
H is false.
 H p p H⊃( )∧  ⊃∼~ �
There is, therefore, an asymmetry between the positive and negative results 
of testing the hypothesis. The positive result only increases the probability of 
the hypothesis, while the negative result completely refutes the hypothesis.
However, some reservations are needed here. A complete removal of the 
hypothesis occurs only when none of the concepts included in and playing 
the role in the description of the experiment have been changed. For if the 
significance of the terms used is changed at least minimally, the hypothesis 
that has been refuted can be taken again. For example, the corpuscular 
theory of light rejected after Foucault’s experiments was again introduced 
into physics by the quantum theory, when along with various changes in 
the theory of light the meaning of the word “corpuscle” changed. The same 
 232 Zygmunt Zawirski, “Uwagi o metodzie nauk przyrodniczych,” Przegląd 
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applies to the situation experimentum crucis, and/or instantia crucis, i.e. 
to the case when one of two competing hypotheses or theories is chosen to 
provide a new discovered fact. From the two equally acceptable hypotheses, 
simultaneously, by means of one and the same newly discovered phenom-
enon, one of the hypotheses is confirmed and the other depreciated. There 
is an analogy between the verification of a particular hypothesis and the 
resolution of a conflict between two competing hypotheses. In one or the 
other case, we are forced to choose one of several possibilities, all of them 
forming an alternative. In the second case, the alternative is only more com-
plicated. In the first case, what is expected is an affirmative or a negative 
answer only; in the second case, a positive answer to one hypothesis is at 
the same time a negative response to the second hypothesis. However, it is 
easy to see the analogy between two situations and, at the same time, notice 
the difference between them if one understands the content and complexity 
of the hypothesis. Let us assume that the hypothesis is a logical conjunction 
of three sentences: “p”,“q” and “r”, and that it is rejected because of the 
falseness of its consequences. We receive a negation of this conjunction. 
But this negation  ( )�p q r∧ ∧ , can be transformed according to the laws 
of logic in such a way that we get an alternative consisting of seven parts:
 
∼ ∧ ∧( ) ≡ ∼ ∧ ∧( ) ∨ ∧ ∼ ∧( ) ∨ ∧ ∧ ∼( ) ∨ ∼ ∧ ∼ ∧( ) ∨
∼ ∧ ∧ ∼( ) ∨ ∧p q r
p q r p q r p q r p q r






q r p q r  
We rejected the “( )�p q r∧ ∧ ” conjunction and we faced the necessity of 
choosing one of the seven other possibilities. At the same time, the more 
complicated the hypothesis, the more possibilities we could choose. Only in 
the case of very simple hypotheses, the rejection of one hypothesis is tanta-
mount to accepting only one other hypothesis. However, these accidents are 
rare. Even the problem of whether the world is finite or infinite is not such 
a case, because the meaning of the term finite is mixed with the meaning of 
the term limited and for that reason instead of a simple two-part alternative 
we get a four-part alternative:
 p q p q p q p q∧( ) ∨ ∼ ∧( ) ∨ ∧ ∼( ) ∨ ∼ ∧ ∼( )
(p does not mean that the world is finite, and q that it is limited). The phys-
ical meaning of the terms used reduces somewhat the alternative, because 
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the situation that the world was infinite and limited is actually impossible, 
although logically permissible. Thus the “ ∼ ∧( )p q ” element is eliminated; 
however, despite denying that the world was finite and unlimited, we get 
an alternative that it can either be finite and unlimited (a case omitted in 
classical cosmology), or infinite and unlimited. In the case of the so-called 
experimentum crucis, it is rare for the competing hypotheses to be two 
contradictory statements. Therefore, it is better to pay attention to the 
complexity of hypotheses than to their number, which often depends on 
random historical conditions.
Duhem had reservations about the possibility of experimentum crucis 
in respect of case physics. He claimed that “physical experience can never 
disprove any one isolated hypothesis, only the entire set that creates the 
whole theory of the phenomenon” and therefore “experimentum crucis is 
impossible in physics”. This reservation is absolutely correct. A formula:
 H p p H⊃( )∧  ⊃∼~ �
can be used only in very rare cases, when a theory does not exist yet. The 
conclusion p is often derived not only from one hypothesis “H”, but also 
from the entire set of sentences “T1”, “T2”, “T3” … “Tn”, creating the 
theory, to which we add the hypothesis “H”. Hence the reasoning scheme 
should be the sentence:
 T T T T H p p T T T T Hn n1 2 3 1 2 3∧ ∧ … ∧( ) ⊃( ) ∧ ∼  ⊃∼ ∧ ∧ … ∧( )� �
from which we get a sentence
 
T T T T H p p T T T T Hn n1 2 3 1 2 3∧ ∧ … ∧( ) ⊃( ) ∧ ∼  ⊃∼ ∨ ∼ ∨ ∼ ∨…∨ ∼ ∨ ∼� � � � � �
The negative result of the experiment only proves that the conjunction 
“T T T T Hn1 2 3∧ ∧ … ∧ ” is false. Hence, something needs to be changed in this 
conjunction; either the H hypothesis has to be rejected, or one of the laws 
recognized so far. If the complexity of the H hypothesis were still taken into 
account, the number of possibilities would have to increase.
However, although in theory Duhem is right, in practice the situation is 
not so hopeless. We always choose the easiest way. Theory is not just a set 
of experimental laws; it is a collection that also contains many assumptions 
and/or definitions. Sometimes it is enough to change the definitions 
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themselves. Sometimes, however, there are more complicated events that 
can trigger a revolution in science. Such accidents occur when it is difficult 
to decide which route is really the simplest. Such a situation was in the mo-
ment of the emergence of the theory of relativity as well as the one when 
the formation of quantum theory took place. Classical laws have proved 
to be incompatible with experience. So, in this moment, one could either 
doubt all classical physics, or attach some auxiliary hypotheses to it. The 
second way seemed simple at first. However, when the number of negative 
experiences kept increasing slowly but steadily and as more and more auxil-
iary hypotheses grew, the idea of construing a classical physics construction 
turned out to be the simplest way out of this quite embarrassing situation.
The history of quantum physics again shows us something that has 
never been seen before, namely, two initially incompatible theories are 
complementary and can co-exist. A few years ago, we proposed the use of 
three-valued logic in quantum physics. However, by doing so, one should 
carefully examine whether the concepts of wave and corpuscles are really 
contradictory. As it turns out, they are not like that. Wave and corpuscular 
theory are somewhat incompatible, but the first one is not a negation of the 
other. One should rather take an expectant attitude, or adopt a more con-
crete answer, that the constant h and therefore the Heisenberg law creates 
an impassable boundary for checking the microstructure of the world.
4  Toward the analysis of the scientific synthesis233
The opponents of metaphysics most often turned and still draw attention 
to the need to synthesize human knowledge, so that one has the impres-
sion that this synthesis is to be a kind of metaphysics. Indeed, today’s neo-
positivists, by stating the slogan of knowledge unification, refer to Comte 
and Spencer as their predecessors; but, on the other hand, they would be 
willing to refer to the tradition of Leibniz’s mathesisi universalis, which had 
to solve all reasonably posed issues definitively and was most closely related 
to metaphysics. If neo-positivists are talking about an encyclopedia rather 
than a system, it is because they realize that the inclusion of all human 
 233 Zygmunt Zawirski, “W sprawie syntezy naukowej,” Przegląd Filozoficzny, 
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knowledge into one system may fail; at the same time, they are ruthlessly 
opposed to the gaps in the current state of knowledge to be supplemented 
with subjective guesses.
The exact separation between scientific synthesis and metaphysics 
cannot actually be carried out. Metaphysics is often accused of opera-
tions of the hypotheses which, unlike scientific hypotheses, are essentially 
unverifiable. Meanwhile, no hypothesis can be directly tested and only the 
consequences of hypotheses are verifiable; in this respect, metaphysical 
hypotheses are no different from scientific ones. In recent times, the ability 
to falsify falsification (Popper, Logik der Forschung, Springer: 1935) is 
undoubtedly better suited for this purpose, but in our opinion, only 
some wrongly constructed metaphysical hypotheses are not capable of 
falsifications.
The positivists’ claim that scientific notions, seemingly going beyond 
experience, can be defined with the help of empirical data – as they admit 
themselves today – was wrong (Carnap, Actes du Congrés international de 
philosophie scientifique, II, Paris: Hermann, 1936, pp. 61–70) and therefore 
I propose a different, more correct wording that all scientific concepts can 
be empirical, as well as able to be checked and/or reduced. The notions 
introduced by the reduction are different from the concepts introduced 
into the system by definition, so that they cannot be excluded from the 
system, while the definitively introduced terms can be eliminated i.e. they 
are translatable. Reductions would therefore only be recognized as some 
pseudo-definitions. We doubt whether this wording can be considered as 
final and sufficient: in any case it must be assumed that the meaning of all 
scientific terms and thus the terms of scientific metaphysics must remain 
under the constant control of experience.
Scientific metaphysics, if it is based on experience (and only such a form 
of metaphysics can be defended today), should therefore operate with terms 
whose meaning must be subject to the control of experience, and which 
all theses should be not only verifiable, but also subversive, if, in this way, 
following Kotarbiński, we will translate Popper’s term Falsifizierbarkeit. 
To the scope of metaphysical issues understood in this way, we include the 
issue of the temporal-spatial structure of reality, the problem of its dynamic 
structure, which cannot be separated from that, which includes both deter-
ministic and indeterministic issues discussed on the basis of science, and the 
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purposefulness with which our faith in the moral order of the world has 
been associated all that time.
We do not exclude our intuition from participating in the construction 
of such a system. However, since intuitive data is often unstable and even 
contradictory, there is always a need to capture intuitive beliefs in an axiom-
atic system, because only then can you be sure that you know yourself what 
you want to say and that you are well understood by others. Recognition 
of intuitive beliefs in a system (i.e. a set of sentences that covers all of its 
consequences), of course, does not absolve us from the obligation to look 
for counterparts in the experiment and therefore from the obligation to 
release it on the flop of not only checks but also falsifications. We do not 
make an exception in this respect for any system, the simplest deductive 
system that creates the laws of logic included.
It has to be observed that contemporary science, and thus, naturally, 
scientific metaphysics, is today free from Leibniz’s illusions, that every 
scientific problem is sensible and, therefore, decidable. Determinacy and 
reasonableness only overlap in complete systems. However, we know 
incomplete systems. The young scholar of Vienna, Karl Gödel, gave – 
for all deduction theories including arithmetic – the general method of 
constructing such sentences, which on the basis of a given theory cannot 
be proved or disproven; he also stated that the sentences built by his 
method become undecidable if the language used there has been enriched 
by entering variables of the higher logical types. The above discoveries 
reveal the importance of language for a system that unifies our knowledge. 
Whoever undertakes to work in this direction must not only be familiar 
with modern logic, but also with the results of research in the field of seman-
tics. Just as traditional metaphysics can be revived only by maintaining a 
living contact with science, traditional cognitive theory must undergo a 
rejuvenating treatment by including research in the field of semantics and 
logic (especially the part that is called metalogic). Without prejudging the 
question whether all the problems of the traditional theory of perpetration 
are to be reduced to semantic issues, we will pay attention to the impor-
tance of two works published in recent years in Polish, i.e. Dr. Tarski’s 
Pojęcie prawdy w językach nauk dedukcyjnych [The Concept of Truth in 
the Languages of Deductive Sciences] and Prof. Ajdukiewicz’s Naukowe 
perspektywy świata [Scientific Perspectives of the World].
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The first author shows that on the basis of deductive languages, one can 
construct an accurate and formally correct definition of a real sentence, and 
that this can be done in accordance to the classic understanding of truth, 
according to which something is true as far as it is able to resemble the 
reality. At the same time, it is obvious that the scope of the term “true sen-
tence” depends on the language being the subject of research, because it is 
impossible to speak about the meaning of expressions in isolation from the 
language to which the expression belongs. The article by Prof. Ajdukiewicz 
draws attention to the possibility of non-translatable languages, not because 
some of them aretoo poor, but because they are closed and coherent in the 
author’s sense. The author expresses the supposition that the language 
of classical and relativistic physics is such an untranslatable language. 
Following Reichenbach, we tried to describe the relationship of these two 
languages in the past, saying that the claims of one of them are borderline 
cases often found within the claims of the other. It is possible, however, 
that this boundary case is not the old language itself, but its equivalent and 
our statement would be as erroneous as the natural numbers 1, 2, 3 … are 
included in the set of rational numbers, while it is not them that are not 
contained in there, but some of their equivalents 1/1, 2/1, 3/1 … (see Henryk 
Mehlberg, La théorie causale du temps, Lvov: 1935, p. 109).
The inexplicability of languages can also come from the difference in 
the forms of logic that such languages use. It is known today that there are 
different logic systems that have the feature that one cannot translate one 
into another one. And here we have the right to suppose that only one of 
these systems best suits reality. The future, however, will only show whether 
it should be a system of binary logic, as we have suspected so far, or one 
of the many-valued logics.
Conclusion
In this first volume of the monograph titled Towards scientific meta-
physics, I turned my attention to the results of research done by Zygmunt 
Zawirski; while analyzing his scientific achievements, I  have made an 
attempt to present it in the context of his aspirations to develop scien-
tific metaphysics. I also carried out a critical analysis of the above issues, 
referring to other Polish philosophers, so as to determine the place and 
completeness of his concept of scientific metaphysics and to underline its 
relevance in philosophical research of the first half of the 20th century. 
I have provided detailed remarks and criticisms in particular subsections 
of the second part of the current volume. At this point, I will present the 
most general observations and conclusions regarding the philosophical 
achievements of Zygmunt Zawirski.
Many of Zawirski’s philosophical proposals still remain valid. It is pos-
sible to mention here the analyses of the cyclical nature of time, the problems 
of causality and the initiation of methodological studies, containing ideas 
that were developed by Karl Popper, but also Thomas Khun. The appli-
cation of many-valued logic to contemporary scientific theories remains a 
valuable contribution to the general picture of scientific research.
The main task, however, was the critical analysis of the scientific concept 
of metaphysics. It turned out that this concept did not get proper develop-
ment by Zawirski, although there were strong methodological premises, 
important achievements in the methodological and metalogical research of 
the 1930s. In those years, Zawirski limited his own project of empirology 
and meta-empiria to the study of the possibilities of building the synthesis 
of natural sciences. It should be stated, therefore, that Zawirski’s concept 
of scientific metaphysics is an interesting and still valid research program 
that he did not implement. Apart from the timeliness and the need to imple-
ment the idea of building a scientific metaphysics referring to experience 
and using a priori science, it should be stated that the proposal presented 
by Zawirski can be considered as an interesting and still current research 
proposal.
An important research result of Zawirski’s works remains the argument 




that indicates the existence of the absolute world. Hitherto attempts to 
determine the philosophical position adopted by Zawirski pointed to 
the manifestation of positivist tendencies, but the analyses of his issues 
regarding the determination of a place for metaphysical issues indicate 
that actually he adopted a position quite similar to the one found in Plato’s 
considerations.
It turns out that the question whether modern knowledge of nature 
reveal to us the nature of absolute reality still remains positive. According 
to Zawirski, physical knowledge does not present us with absolute reality, 
at times being able to indicate its existence. Both the objects revealing 
their relative features, as well as invariant laws belonging to the world of 
phenomena have their deeper base in the sphere of absolute reality. The 
physicists cannot forget about this reality when they make an attempt to 
relate their subjects of currently performed researches to the whole of the 
cognized being.
The axiomatic method used by Zawirski in metaphysical studies deserves 
special treatment. It is undoubtedly a breakthrough in understanding the 
development of metaphysical systems. The order of metaphysical systems 
was often considered in the order of time, in accordance with the Hegelian 
dialectical development pattern. Zawirski’s proposal to build scientific 
metaphysics as a deductive system in which scientific methods are applied 
is a proposal to enter a path leading to constant progress. In Zawirski’s 
views, this progress is guaranteed by the adoption of the method of par-
ticular sciences as the only method of discussing philosophical problems. 
This progress cannot, therefore, guarantee either reference to the Hegelian 
dialectical method or the methods of research of intuitionists found in 
Bergson or Husserl. It is known that scientific metaphysics does not exhaust 
all issues of interest that may be important to people, therefore although 
there will always be a need for constructing a more general metaphysical 
theory, we would like to leave this issue aside.
What is important in Zawirski’s works is his view that progress in logic 
cannot be indifferent or ignored in philosophical research. Even if one treats 
logic as one of the purely propaedeutic teachings, it is an indispensable field 
in philosophical education, therefore one cannot be a philosopher without 
knowing logic. One cannot agree with the objections to the scientific meta-
physics conceived in this way, i.e. reduced to the deductive system that it 
Conclusion 139
does not allow to examine reality in qualitative terms. These statements, 
in my opinion, do not reflect the truth; even a simple deductive system of 
sentences, considered according to the principles of the deductive method, 
determines the field of logic, i.e. the science which, in this case, does not 
investigate either size or quantity. Therefore, justifying this type of research, 
in the second volume of this dissertation, I will focus on Bornstein’s scien-
tific metaphysics, and in particular the general theory of reality described 
in the aspect of quality, not quantity.
Support and strengthening of the building of scientific metaphysics along 
the lines of the deductive system can be found in the works by Łukasiewicz 
and Tarski from 1930s, which resulted in the appearance of a fully new dis-
cipline of science – metalogic. The results of research on deductive systems 
should, in my opinion, be used to study systems of scientific philosophy. In 
my opinion, this type of research does not exclude various interpretations 
of these systems. An important issue, therefore, is the implementation and 
philosophical use of the possibilities of different interpretations of deduc-
tive systems. Assuming that the system of axioms of the system will also 
be fulfilled for the new meanings of the original terms appearing in the 
axioms, we obtain a new interpretation of the axioms, and thus the whole 
system. This issue will also be the subject of the research contained in the 
second volume of this monography – “Towards Scientific Methaphysics”.
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